Military Bookshelf: A Liberal's Wet Dream

Military.com - Tom Miller

Aug 18, 2008

Losing Hurts Twice as Bad: The Four Stages to Moving Beyond Iraq,
by Christopher J. Fettweis.  Norton, $25.95 (288p) ISBN 978-0-393-06761-3

I don't know a lot about Christopher J. Fettweis except that he teaches political science at Tulane University in his hometown of New Orleans.  That suggests lots of years spent in classrooms, libraries, and Starbucks.  I have no idea what life experiences he might have outside of academia.  I suspect very few. 

If I'm correct, that explains a lot about this book.  Nobody with actual boots-on-the-ground experience in dangerous places—and that includes lots of neighborhood playgrounds here at home—would be so sanguine about human nature.  And, nobody who hasn't spent his entire life in academia or politics would be so sure of their prescience. 

Fettweis, you see, has seen the future, and in his vision, the war in Iraq is irretrievably lost.  Nay, was never winnable.  The surge is not, will not, and can not work.  Any suggestion that it is working is a legend. 

Should I believe Prof. Fettweis or my sources with boots-on-the-ground in Iraq? 

One of my sources spent all of 2006 in Iraq and has been back since Nov. 2007.  He tells me that the difference is unmistakable.  Violence is down sharply, Iraqis are more optimistic, and progress is being made.  That does not mean that we've won.  It does suggest that we have a choice.  Press our advantage.  Or, quit.  Only the latter leads to certain loss.  Of course, that's what Prof. Fettweis proposes.  That's what I call a self-fulfilling prophecy. 

"The endgame in Iraq is now clear," at least to Prof. Fettweis.  Iraq is a "disaster," "failure," "debacle," "defeat," "desert quagmire"—as opposed to a jungle quagmire like Vietnam—"misguided effort," and "lost—and utterly pointless—cause."  At least one thing is clear: the professor won't be contributing to the Bush Presidential Library.

Unless you accept Fettweis' assumption—and that's all it is despite his efforts to convince us of its validity through repetition—you can stop reading now.  Everything else—and that's most of the book—depends on the U.S. losing in Iraq.  Any other outcome and Fettweis' treatise is just so much wishful thinking. 

We have to accept that the war is lost so that we can move on to healing the national psyche.  The professor is multi-talented: political scientist, omniscient futurist, and pop psychologist. 

But, that's a good thing since in the professor's view it's the psychological consequences of failure that will be most pronounced.  In fact, the "national security implications will be minimal."  All that talk about humanitarian disaster, regional instability, damage to American credibility, et. al. is just that: talk. 

"Credibility is an illusion [and] greatly exaggerated," the professor says.  The suggestions that our enemies will be emboldened and follow us home "are completely preposterous."   A humanitarian disaster is "not very likely" and U.S. troops actually are "prolonging its [Iraq's] agony." Of course, the U.S. should not leave behind "those unfortunate few" who "worked for democracy."  Few?  Hundreds of thousands of ordinary Iraqis have risked their lives to volunteer for the army and police and millions ignored militant threats to vote. 

Whatever.  Despite the minimal geo-political fallout, the professor expects that "the consequences for the national psyche are likely to be profound."  In fact, the Iraq Syndrome will include four stages of post-war grief—shock and denial, anger, depression, and acceptance—that must be confronted for recovery to take place.  For those who doubt how difficult this road to recovery will be, the author quotes the philosopher—and Hall of Fame baseball manager—Sparky Anderson: "losing hurts twice as bad as winning feels good."  Who knew?

Once we've accepted the inevitable in Iraq and withdrawn our forces and begun the process of national healing, we can get on with fundamentally remaking our foreign policy to reflect Prof. Fettweis' view of the world.  A view that is remarkably sanguine.

In Fettweis' world, "threats are minimal;" 9/11 was not a "declaration of war on America;" the potential for war between great powers "is all but unthinkable;" and U.S. retreat from the world is "virtually risk-free." 

Such a world does not need an American policeman.  In fact, an activist foreign policy does more harm than good.  "The United States," Fettweis concludes, "must come home." 

Fettweis' "strategic restraint"—which sounds a lot like isolationism—will do everything except usher in the millennium.  Fettweis thinks that it would especially please Founding Fathers like George Washington who warned against "entangling alliances."  Of course, Washington also owned slaves.  Times change. 

Perhaps most importantly, strategic restraint will allow Americans to sharply reduce military spending.  The resulting peace dividend can then be redirected to domestic programs like Hurricane Katrina relief. 

If all of this sounds too good to be true, it probably is.  And, if America follows the professor's advice, we're likely to discover what national grief really looks and feels like.

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Copyright 2008 by Tom Miller