Book Review: A Fiery Peace In A Cold War

Knight Ridder/Tribune

Neil Sheehan made an important contribution to history in 1971 as a New York Times reporter when he obtained The Pentagon Papers from Daniel Ellsberg. The resulting reports earned his paper a Pulitzer Prize after Sheehan revealed previously unknown facts about how President Johnson had deliberately expanded the Vietnam War. In 1989 Sheehan was personally awarded a Pulitzer for his book on the Vietnam War -- A Bright Shining Lie that focused around Lt. Col. Paul Vann and his involvement in that struggle. Sheehan's current book, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War, (Random House/ Sep 2009) also focuses around an individual, the Air Force's Bernard Schriever, to tell how the U.S. went from a shaky high-cost defense built around bombers to much more formidable missile-based system.

Sheehan's book opens with the Air Force's chief, General "Hap" Arnold, meeting young Col. 'Bernie" Schriever in preparation for the general's retirement. Arnold stressed that it was the civilian scientists, not military engineers, who had made the key technological innovations during WWII. WWI, he said, had been won by brawn, WWII by logistics, and WWIII would be won by brains. To try and maintain relationships with those scientists, now returning to their universities, Arnold formed a new Scientific Liaison Branch and wanted Schriever to head it. Schriever did not disappoint and went on to become the father of the modern, hi-tech Air Force by building the first missile defense.

Meanwhile, American scientists were busy creating the first H-bomb -- an 82-ton 1952 monster with a 10+ megaton TNT (MT) explosive force. This quickly was trimmed to the first 'droppable' version weighing 21 tons with the same explosive force. General LeMay, SAC Commander, pressed for even lighter version, and the 1956 'model' was down to less than 8 tons. LeMay's goading eventually resulted in an American stockpile of 20,941 MTs. LeMay also planned to fuse a lot of his monster bombs for ground or near-ground bursts to ensure crushing underground bunkers and other hardened targets. The result, unfortunately, would have been to poison the atmosphere and bring on a nuclear winter for the entire northern hemisphere.

While General LeMay was building SAC's bomber inventory up to a 1,769 level (vs. 85 for the Russians) and around 250,000 men, Schriever's research and development focus made him aware of John von Neumann and Edwin Teller's prediction that by 1960 the U.S. could build an H-bomb weighing less than a ton and with the explosive force of a megaton. The implication was it would be possible to build a rocket that could fling a thermonuclear projectile down on any city in the Soviet Union. Schriever seized on that knowledge -- adding to his workload involving in-flight refueling systems, thwarting LeMay's request for high-flying bombers (Schriever saw them as vulnerable to rockets), and encouraging the development of turbofan jet engines allowing low-level bombing runs that evaded both radar and missiles -- without rapidly running out of fuel.

Moscow, moreover, was not sleeping. Russia did not have the experience building and using heavy bombers that the U.S. had, nor the ability to encircle the U.S. with its bases as we could them. It did, however, have about 5,000 German rocket engineers and technicians with V-2 experience. Thus, the Soviet Union instead opted for rockets -- first SAMs capable of reaching Francis Gary Powers' U-2 at 70,000 ft. in 1960, rockets to launch Sputnik in 1957, and then deployed ICBMs of their own (1959).

Schriever concluded that existing plane manufacturers were too staid and slow to either attract the required top-notch scientific talent he needed or meet demanding timelines. Instead, he arranged to work with Simon Ramo and Dean Wooldrige (TRW after 1958). Schriever also determined that he needed high-level Air Force support, and found that in Trevor Gardner, a high-level assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force. Not only did Schriever have to compete with General LeMay's SAC for funds and attention, but the Army's Jupiter rocket program led by Werner von Braun as well. Then there were technical problems -- creating a multi-stage rocket, engines that could steer by being swiveled, and the lack of sophisticated microcircuitry, a presidential directive to move vital defense production into the heartland (away from California's high-technology resources), and airplane manufacturers complaining that they were being unjustly left out. Schriever achieved his desired highest Air Force priority, but still found himself fighting for money -- eight levels of budget approval, with Secretary of Defense Wilson in opposition. Thus Schriever, along with his civilian 'godfather' maneuvered to make a presentation to President Eisenhower, via the Dept. of State.

After 13 failures, Schriever's group successfully launched a satellite that could take photos over Russia before being retrieved over the Pacific. This accomplishment immediately put to rest both the myth of a 'bomber gap' vs. Russia and the fear of another 'Pearl Harbor' sneak attack. (The 'missile gap' myth was also put to rest via these spy satellites.) Reliability improved -- between 1966-70 Schriever's group recovered all 28 film capsules launched. The Air Force also improved its missiles via development of a 2nd-generation solid-fuel rocket (immediate launch, vs. hours of loading dangerous and unstable fuel into liquid-fueled rocket tanks).

Sheehan credits General Schriever and those he led with purchasing the time in which the Soviet Union could self-destruct economically. Their Air Force ICBMs also became the vehicles that opened the exploration of outer space. General Schriever died in 2005, at the age of 94, having come a very long way from his humble birth in Germany and introduction to the U.S. through Ellis Island.

Bottom Line: Bernard Schriever brought great political and leadership skills, as well as a strong personal drive and initiative to the important task given him by General Arnold. His contributions are related well by Sheehan. The unasked question, however, is: "Why were Schriever versus von Bruan, and the Air Force versus the Army, in competition to build America's first missiles?"

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