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at the Frontlines.]
Strategy Implications
An aggressor might seek to use its SSKs in one or more of several ways.
1. Acts of terror or war against Blue Force (U.S., UK, etc.) coastal population centers and military or industrial installations. (This would potentially involve an extremely lengthy transit, probably exceeding submerged AIP endurance, thus requiring snorkeling to run the noisy diesel engines and pull in fresh air for the crew.)
2. Attacks against sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in mid-ocean or at choke points, i.e. anti-shipping operations and commerce raiding or attacks upon warships. (This often requires a lengthy transit with high risk of detection via acoustic and advanced non-acoustic ASW sensors -- see below.)
3. Defense of the aggressor's own local seaspace, to prevent Blue Force amphibious operations and/or land strikes that would bring down the in-power "evil" political regime.
In these three missions, SSKs have two apparent advantages. First, they cost perhaps one fourth or one fifth as much as a nuclear attack sub, so an aggressor can purchase many more of them for the same money. Second, to ultimately defeat that aggressor nation, however/wherever hostilities begin, we must eventually dominate their littoral, the home waters of their SSKs -- and this is where their propulsion systems perform optimally, and where their difficulty of detection is at its best.
But if the arguments earlier in this discussion are accepted overall, then an SSN penetrating enemy waterspace has several counterbalancing strengths. Perhaps most critical is the classic one of concentration of forces. That is, a given amount of money invested in one extremely capable boat (SSN) is better militarily than the same amount invested in several separate less capable boats (SSKs). Besides the military concentration-of-forces edge, the SSN also achieves a balance-sheet superiority: Much "fixed-overhead expense" is saved since only one of everything is needed instead of lots of copies of everything to fit out the bigger squadron of smaller hulls.
The SSN, when equipped with UUVs and UAVs along with advanced mine and counter-mine capabilities and combatant minisubs, can indirectly reach into the shallowest waters to seek and destroy the enemy SSKs one by one. Clearly, a remotely controlled "probe" launched from an off-shore SSN is much smaller and quieter than even the best imagineable SSK design, and it is also much cheaper and more expendable than the diesel-AIP boat lurking in the littoral. The apparent four or five to one advantage in numbers of the SSK for the same money is turned on its head, to become an up to five to one advantage in concentrated fighting power (payload weight) for the SSN. This general observation is particularly true for "emerging nation" submarines, where close-combat coordination among a submerged flotilla is infamously difficult. However, for this perspective to continue to hold true as the number of SSKs in the world constantly increases, clearly an adequately-sized SSN fleet is vital; otherwise, eventually, the SSKs can win by dint of sheer numbers.
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Once the aggressor's SSK fleet has been contained in its home waters, the enemy has at least three remaining options:
1. Keep its SSKs in-harbor as a force-in-being, representing a threat to any invasion by Blue Forces.
2. Actively engage Blue Force SSNs and their offboard fighting vehicles, in the littoral and out in deeper water, in hopes of inflicting sufficient losses to force a withdrawal or stalemate, at least politically/psychologically if not militarily.
3. Sortie the SSKs but have them lurk in hiding as a threat and deterrent, akin to SSBN tactics. Perhaps seek to refuel/reprovision them clandestinely at sea, or in harbors of nations friendly to the aggressor.
Tactics to counter these three options, respectively, would include:
1. Mine enemy harbor mouths. Also attack enemy SSKs at the dock with missiles, bombers, and/or special ops forces. (These are missions for which modern SSNs are ideal if not essential.)
2. As in 1, but also use to the maximum the SSN's superior sensor capabilities, weapons loadout, and warfighting endurance in a battle of mobility. Harass the SSKs constantly, and maintain a high rate of exchange of ordnance, non-reusable sensors, and expendable countermeasures. Do this by network-centric warfare cooperation with friendly airborne and surface weapons platforms, and their active and passive sonars. Also locate the enemy by LIDAR blue-green laser ASW detectors, LASH underwater color and shape anomaly detectors, portable/temporary SOSUS-like hydrophone grids, magnetic anomaly detection, and thermal, chemical, and wake anomaly effects. Maintain connectivity with UUVs by high-bits-per-second wireless underwater covert acoustic means, and do so from below periscope depth with surface and air units via sonobuoy-sized transceiver relay nodes and impending breathrough "comms at depth and speed" systems. Find bottomed SSKs using off-board probes, and prosecute them mercilessly.
3. As in 1 and 2, seek out the SSKs wherever they may be. Ideally, start by having SSNs in-theater before hostilities begin, and trail each SSK from port as it sorties. (Again, a large enough SSN fleet is essential to doing so with adequate effect.) Give the SSKs not a moment's peace. Deny them access to bases and tenders for replenishment, and sink or take down their milch cows. Deny the diesel crews their sleep and ruin their ability to think straight. Make every SSK mission a one-way mission. Localize, demoralize, and destroy.
The advent of undersea photonics (LIDAR, LASH, bioluminescence detection) and advances in sonar signal processing will make it harder and harder for a diesel or diesel-AIP to use one traditional infiltration tactic, namely hiding under or in the wake of a surface vessel. LIDAR scanners may permit "delousing" simply by looking under the keel. And the tonals generated by SSK diesel engines and/or near-surface screw cavitation can presumably be picked out of other noise by an alert escort's or helo's sonar watch, when properly equipped and trained. It can be expected than in any shooting war, or declared zone of exclusion, merchant ships upon which SSKs could ply this tactic will be scarce in any case.
One major threat presented by an SSK may be a weapons of mass destruction mission while "Allied" defenses are lulled in peacetime. Vigilance in undersea warfare by carrier battle groups on maneuvers, diligence in HUMINT and ELINT regarding enemy intentions and their SSK fleet readiness and movements, and constant acoustic and non-acoustic surveillance for suspicious diesel signatures on the high seas as well as in the friendly homeland littorals, will all give some protection. Once more, numbers of SSNs on deployment are crucial.
The WMD-laden SSK may be on a suicide mission as well. It is always wise for Blue Force commanders to assume enemy vessels are manned by determined opponents who will fight to the death in performance of their perceived duty. But for suicide forces, deterrence by the surety of mortal peril is simply not enough. A guaranteed hard kill is necessary, i.e. PK of virtually 100% for the defensive system overall. The discussion above about low displacement disadvantages and counter-tactics would still apply. The SSK must be forced to do the impossible: maneuver constantly while avoiding detection, fighting its way through a multi-layered active defense before reaching any high-value targets -- all while lacking sustained high-speed submerged endurance and without a large combat weapons/systems payload.
Conclusion
The small size of representative diesel-AIP submarine designs can be an important drawback to an aggressor nation dependent on such vessels. Tactics to exploit this weakness and deter/defeat aggression would include forcing a prolonged and continuous battle for seaspace dominance, in which the SSKs' fuels, weapons loadout, and crew are worked to exhaustion and their sources of replenishment are neutralized. Blue Force nuclear powered fast-attack subs, with their much larger payload capacity, unlimited high-speed cruising, infinite electrical supply, and enhanced survivability -- busily employing/deploying advanced combat sensors and systems, large special operations teams, and off-board littoral probes and fighting vehicles -- will help assure the "good guys" remain fully combat effective until, with the lowest possible casualties and least collateral damage, victory and peace are finally achieved. The lower cost of an SSK compared to an SSN is thus a red herring: The several SSKs one can purchase for the price of one good SSN are fundamentally unable to make up in numbers for what they lack as a group in overall warfighting quality.
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© 2005 The Submarine Review. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.
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