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Joe Buff: Transparent Seas? (Part I)
Joe Buff: Transparent Seas? (Part I)

 

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Page 2

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Limitations of All Detection-and-Tracking Systems

Because the basic rules of practical science apply to all devices that utilize any combination of matter and energy to perform useful work, MAGIC would have limitations in the following regards:

1. Attenuation rate: Emissions and signatures, of search devices and targets, spread out with distance according to physical laws. (Even focused laser beams do spread.) This leads to weakening, or attenuation. For instance, when the spherical spreading model applies, the signal strength of an SSN's broadband and tonals detected passively declines inversely with the square of range. (Twice as far means one-quarter the strength.) The signal strength of an active sonar echo off that SSN's hull, as picked up by the platform emitting the "ping," declines inversely with fourth power of range -- this is true of radar too. (Twice as far means one-sixteenth the strength.)

2. Image resolution: Every search system has a limit, as to the angular separation between two distinct objects, below which the system cannot tell the two objects apart. Similarly, every system has a limit as to the angular size of an object, below which that object cannot be recognized by the system as existing at all. The greater the distance between an object of a given size and the search system, the smaller the angle subtended and the more likely the object is to fall below the resolution limit. Wear-and-tear on equipment, and "creeping miscalibration" or deferred maintenance and battle damage, can worsen resolution to become much poorer than the nominal or theoretically ideal. Also, if the bearing to the detector is known, a vessel can maneuver to present its smallest aspect toward that bearing, reducing the threat of detection even further.

3. Environmental noise and clutter: Whatever combination of matter and energy are utilized by a search system to do searches, the environment in which the system exists (including its internal equipment, electronic circuitry, and power supply), and the environment in which potential targets exist, will both contain other matter and energy which baffle the system's automated algorithms and also confuse its human operators. This unwanted, misleading, or distorting naturally occurring matter and energy is "noise." Noise causes false-positive detections, whose prosecution will waste time, effort, and ammunition, and can lead to increasing operator fatigue, apathy, and carelessness. Noise can cause false-negatives, in which real targets fail to be noticed. The latter, to the hunter, is a highly undesirable outcome.



4. Aggregate area search-rate per unit time: The surface area of all the world's oceans is about a hundred million square miles. Even when the zone relevant to a given operation is greatly narrowed, a search system requires an allowance of adequate time to carry out complete surveillance with minimal positive and negative false alarms: The area search rate -- and also, the total field of view and the mobility of a single MAGIC installation -- would determine how many separate installations are needed to cover a given theater of battle rapidly. The achievable aggregate search rate might be protracted compared to the period during which crucial command decisions must be made. Thus the practical benefit of MAGIC data to C3I will be impaired.

5. Data integration lag, and processing delay or failure: Some forms of search technology must observe each individual small unit of area or volume for a substantial period to be able to gather meaningful and reliable data. Some types of raw data are not useful for target detection and command decision-making until after computational processing which may require non-trivial intervals of computer time. During savage battle, computer time might be available only in competition with other critical tactical and strategic requirements, and then only in the face of aggressive opposition-force Information Warfare attacks (eavesdropping and spoofing; virus and worm sabotage against communication links, switching equipment, and computers; plus other electronic or physical degradation of links, hardware, operating systems, data storage, and applications software).

6. Cost, lead-time, and security of system specifications: New technologies and weapon systems are expensive; no nation's defense budget can ever expand to infinity. From initial proposal of concept, to solving of practical implementation problems, to prototyping, testing, mass production, and field deployment and operator training, can take years or even decades. Delays and budget caps may limit the actual utility of MAGIC. Espionage and counter-espionage might also prove decisive to the effectiveness of MAGIC -- knowledge by the opposition of operating details and performance specs enables devising optimal counter-techniques, as will be elaborated below.

These six broad limitations, piling up in chaotic real-world combat conditions, place rather restricted maximums on:

1. The area over which MAGIC could be employed, and
2. The reliability of MAGIC inside that area.

Possible actions by MAGIC's hoped-for target and its supporting forces to "erode" the effective search-area size, and in-area reliability, will be treated in the following section.

But first, note that even if the hunted submarine were acquired by MAGIC, all is not lost. "Detected" does not necessarily mean "damaged or destroyed." The target can fight back: against the detection system itself, against prosecution platforms dispatched because of the detection system, and against weapons launched from the prosecution platforms.

When network-centric warfare is running full tilt, this fighting back can employ many friendly assets working in concert with the endangered submarine or submarines. The present concept of Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (JSEAD) extends to a Joint Suppression of Enemy Antisubmarine Defenses (JSEASD?), in which total "water superiority" is achieved by a hypermodern combined-arms blitzkrieg extending even into cyberspace. This will be the main theme of Part II.

(continued)

 
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