Prussian cadets had to solve problems with many variables, under different conditions, and then brief their decisions to the instructor and class. The problems the cadet were given were complex and dealt with units three levels above their own (in the case of cadets, platoon = company, battalion and regiments). The instructors were seeking to find out what the cadet would do when presented with a complex problem. They were not concerned with what had already been taught the cadet-what he knew-but the cadet's willingness to present and solve the problem. These scenarios were timed. When time was up, the cadet presented his solution. Instructors and peers evaluated decision making ability, not how tasks were accomplished.9
The TDGs introduced the cadets to the unknown, with the result that students wanted to know more and asked questions. They also sought to answer for themselves what they did not know.10 Also, the students were given orders that conflicted with the situation on the board and were forced to resolve the conflict between the two. Another technique they used to teach decision making was to change the original situation or the orders while the cadet were preparing their solution to the initial problem. This forced the student to either challenge the original order due to it being out of date, or accept the old order and live with the consequences. Most of the time, the TDG was also presented under limited time, creating even more stress. But, it was when the cadet briefed their solution that the major part of the learning took place not only for the briefer but for also for his peers.11
The cadet would have to present his proposed solution in front of his peers, instructors, and sometimes visiting officers. The great von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1858-1888 frequently visited corps district academies (where the Germans produced cadets) and would sit in on these games. Sometimes Motke would even oversee the instruction and present the situation, and then guide the discussion afterward-imagine if General Schoomaker did that!.12
The Prussians went beyond using TDGs to teach, they also used them in their evaluations. Weak performance on graded TDGs was grounds for failure on either an exam or for expulsion from the cadet academy. Signs of weak character were grounds for failing an exam, or worse for a repeat offender, for expulsion from the course. The inability to make a decision, or defend one's decision in the face of adversity was grounds for not being commissioned.13
There were several measures which demonstrated what type of character the cadet possessed short of performance on an actual battlefield. If the cadet changed his original decision in order to go along with the instructor recommended solution, he was seen as a failure, as having weak character. Weak character was also demonstrated if the cadet stayed with a poor or out of date decision from higher because that is what "higher" told him to do. And lastly, the worst thing a cadet could do was make no decision at all.14
The contrast between the Pestalozzi education approach and today's "crawl-walk-run" or "lecture-demonstration-practical application system" used in most ROTC curriculums is dramatic. This contrasting American approach was born out of necessity in World War I. The U.S. Army, arriving on the field of battle unprepared for large scale war, followed the French military approach to education. This approach was based on the philosophy of Rene DeCarte. De Carte was a famous mathematician who broke down engineering problems in sequence making it easier to teach formulas to engineering students. This approach was translated into French military training, where the French found it easy to break down military problems solving into processes (checklists) in order to educate their officers and their awaiting masses of citizen soldiers upon mobilization.15
The Cartesian approach allowed the French (and later the U.S.) to easily teach a common, fundamental doctrinal language to many who were new to the military. It significantly reduced the time it took to master the basic military skills. The downfall of this approach is that it simplifies war (complex problems) into processes where the enemy is only a template-not a free thinking adversary with a very important voice in determining how the plan might be executed. The Cartesian approach also slows down a decision cycle by turning the planners focus inward on process instead of outward on the enemy.16
The French, relying on a massed citizen Army of the late 19th and early 20th Century, had to find a way to instruct many citizen officers quickly in military doctrine. Additionally, due to the casualties of WWI, the advance of modern weaponry and its destructiveness, the French needed a way to teach its officers how to control these resources in order to concentrate fire power to compensate for their lack of unit skills on the battlefields of 1917-1918. They used an orderly and systematic approach to planning similar to the MDMD.17
When the U.S. arrived in 1917 with its new Army, led largely by citizens who had been transformed into officers almost over night, they needed to learn the fundamentals of the profession of arms quickly. All U.S staff officers and commanders attended French schools in planning and controlling forces in combat. After World War I, the U.S. and the French were the victors, and saw that victory as a justification of their training process. When the French developed "Methodical Battle" in the interwar years, the U.S. copied it with all its accompanying process focused education. The U.S. Army carried this over to its education and training, as well as its doctrine.18
The Germans, on the other hand, invested far more time and rigor in developing leaders who could decide faster in fluid situations (their downfall, was ignoring the art of strategy, which would eventually lead to their defeat when they produced enemies faster than they could kill them). They also promoted a military culture that encouraged initiative among subordinates (after a thorough and very tough accession's process).19
The French and the U.S., in contrast-and to be fair, out of desperation because their larger societies did not put premium on funding and supporting professional preparedness peacetime-put to practice Progressive era personnel theories, opened the net wide to accessions (to be democratic and fair), without a hard "filter" up front to judge character under stress prior to awarding a commission. It was felt, that new officers could learn on the job either in peacetime duty or in war. This was a very harsh way to develop and prepare leaders, but when both countries felt that they were the victors in war with out examining why they were the victors, then mistakes were often ignored.20
History shows at least one thing: the Army is again disregarding evolving the way it develops its leadership-the part that causes human interaction to become effective and organizations to operate efficiently-with its transformation. Of course many other good things in the personnel arena are changing, such as a move to stabilization and unit manning, but we must go much further than ever before. We must not be afraid to tell our nation that the way we select, develop and commission our officers is out of date, based on assumptions made a hundred years ago.
Will the Army ever learn? Why are we afraid to admit that the way we "produce" most of our officers is behind the times. It is time to change ROTC, in all aspects. It was created and evolved based on out of date assumptions. It is around today based on myths and traditions that have little to do with meeting our nation's challenges of the 21st Century. Instead, ROTC needs to rank among other professional admittance programs.
To prepare the Army for the 21st Century, to rebuild and repair after Iraq will require institutionalization a new leadership model through new innovative diligent education and effective, multidimensional evaluations of the full spectrum of leadership competencies. More important, the Army must not be afraid to challenge the new generation with it experiencing more earlier in their careers. Otherwise, the Army cannot reach its full potential because it still basis it education system on one developed on out molded techniques developed for a different kind of citizen from a different society, fighting in a different kind of war.
Contributing Editor Maj. Donald Vandergriff is the author ofPath to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs(Presidio Press). He is retiring next summer following a 23-year career in the Marines and the Army, including "out of the box" service as a personnel reform expert who has consulted with congressional, Army and DoD leaders, as well Army Task forces and think-tanks that dealt with Transformation issues on personnel reform. He is currently writing his next book, Raising the Bar: Evolving ROTC with the changing Face of War. He can be reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net.
Endnotes: 1 For more of the history behind this evolution and an understanding of why the U.S. Army went this way, go to http://www.d-n-i.net/vandergriff/rha/index.htm. The "Revolution in Human Affairs" is my magnum opus, which is the extensive study of the Army's personnel system and how to evolve it to prepare the Army for the 21st Century. Also see, Donald E. Vandergriff, Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, May 2002)
2 Colonel Wilbur Gray, "Playing War: the Applicability of Commercial Conflict Simulations to Military Intelligence Training and Education," (DIA Joint Military Intelligence College, Bolling AFB, DC, 1995), Vernois' system was a "free" Kriegsspiel as opposed to Reisswitz rigid variety. This meant that most calculations and die rolling was eliminated in favor of an umpire who would determine results based on the situation and his own combat experience. Whether "free" or "rigid," however, wargames had become a mainstay of German military training. Also, the author visited the Eisenhower library collection March-April 1993 and examined the Swift collection, including his book of Verdy Du Vernois's War Game, published in 1877, he proposed to eliminate the written rules and govern opponents by tactical rules which would become obvious during the course of the game.
3 Peter Paret, Understanding War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 78-80. Also see, Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 192-193.
4 It is important to note that at the time several U.S. officers spoke French with German being a distant second, if it existed at all as a second language.
5 Boyd L. Dastrup, The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History (Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 1982), p. 35. The Leavenworth methodology for teaching problem-solving skills has remained constant since the 1890s when Swift introduced an educational technique known as the applicatory method, under which lecture, recitation and memorization gave way to hands-on exercises in analytical problem solving such as map exercises, war games and staff rides-all designed to teach students how to think, not what to think. By the late 1930s such exercises accounted for more than 70 percent of total curriculum hours. The applicatory method survives in the form of practical exercises, terrain walks, staff rides and the capstone exercise PRAIRIE WARRIOR, which relies heavily on computer simulation. See also, Major Eben Swift, US Army. Field Orders, Messages, and Reports (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906) (UB283 .A45 1906), A classic in its own right concerning the art of issuing orders, using varied 19th century examples.
6 E-mail discussions with Mr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson December 16, 2004; "Put another way, it is no accident that Pestalozzi focused on "pre-school" - the education of very young children - and that many German officers referred to TDGs as "pre-school" ["Vorschule"] for tactics."
7http://www.cals.ncsu.edu/agexed/aee501/pestalozzi.html 8 John Taylor Gatto "The Prussian Connection" The Underground History of American Education: An Intimate Investigation into The Problem of Modern Schooling ( New York, New Society Publishers, 1991), p. 79.
9 Zaghloul Morsy (ed) "Thinkers on Education," Volume 3, (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1994), p. 21-45.
10 This is true classical education, which I believe U.S. education at all levels, public as well as in the military, has gotten away from. Instead it uses the rote memorization approach in the pursuit of goals and test results, and to provide equity to a large number of the population.
11 Ibid, p. 44-45; Also e-mail discussions with Mr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson December 16, 2004, on the use of Tactical Decision Games (TDGs). Bruce added that "it is not so much "training" and "pre-training." That is to say, they serve to develop habits that are conducive to the use of all sorts of other methods, to include more elaborate simulations and field exercises, to study tactics."
12 Helmuth Graf von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of War, ed. Daniel J. Hughes, trans. Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1993), viii.
13 Gunther Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 296-325; and Detlef Bald, "Zum Kriegsbild der milit¨arischen F¨uhrung im Kaiserreich," in JostD¨ uffler and Karl Holl, eds., Bereit zum Krieg: Kriegsmentalit¨at im wilhelminischen Deutschland, 1890-1914 (G¨ottingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1986), pp. 146-159. Before a cadet could graduate he had to receive a favorable faculty recommendation (based on the continual evaluation of each student's creativity, objectivity, and mental stamina, as well as course grades) and to complete a comprehensive series of written and oral examinations.
14 "Über Militair-Bildung und Wissenschaft," Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt, No. 1 (Hereafter, Beihefte. 1877), pp. 1-37, here p. 7. The article draws from a variety of authorities (e.g. Pascal, Voltaire, Kant, J. S. Mill, and Gibbon), suggesting that officers of the Bismarck era possessed a broad educational background for its officers.
15 Faris Kirkland, "The Gap Between Leadership Policy and Practice: A Historical Perspective," Parameters, September 1990, pp. 54-55. Discussions with Dr. Faris Kirkland, 12 April 1998. See also Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime 1784-1898 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 61-64, 194-198. James H. Hays, The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management Policies: A Preliminary Study with Parallels from Industry (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1978), pp. 105-114
16 The problem with the Cartesian approach is not that it is wrong, but that it does not fit in with the problem at hand. It is the same thing with Operations Research, which is a powerful tool for solving certain very well-defined problems. The problem that we have with OR in the Armed Force is that we try to apply it to all sorts of inappropriate problems.
17 Robert Doughty, Seeds if Disaster: The Development of French Doctrine, 1919-1939 (New York, Archon Books, 1986). Also see, Donald E. Vandergriff, ""Without the Proper Culture: Why Our Army Cannot Practice Maneuver Warfare," Armor, (Fort Knox, KY, U.S. Armor Association, January-February 1998), pp. 20-24.
18 Russel F. Weigley, "Elihu Root Reforms and the Progressive Era," in William Geffen, ed. Command and Commanders in Modern Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1971), p. 24. Jack C. Lane, "The Military Profession's Search for Identity," Marine Corps Gazette (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, June 1973), p. 40. Samuel P. Hays, "Introduction" in Jerry Isrel, ed., Building the Organizational Society (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 3 & 10.
19 I must allude to the fact that we must use caution when adapting the education methods of the pre World War II German cadet officer schools to U.S. Army ROTC. Their methods were sound, but were supported by an ability to make harsh cuts without much question from the chain of command, which was tolerated in their culture of the day. The best voice in this matter is found in Daniel J. Hughes, "Abuses of German Military History," Military Review 66, no. 12 (December 1986): 66-76. Also see, Lt Col Paul Tiberi, "German versus Soviet Blitzkrieg," Military Review 65, no. 9 (September 1985): 63-71; and Maj George A. Higgins, "German and US Operational Art: A Contrast in Maneuver," Military Review 65, no. 10 (October 1985): 22-29. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985) was of the same genre.
20 Hays, The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management Policies: A Preliminary Study with Parallels from Industry, 105-114.
