Hot Video: Watch as two pilots narrowly escape a crashing jet with their lives. See this and much more in this new feature. About the Author Major Donald E. Vandergriff, USA, an armor officer, teaches military science at Georgetown University Army ROTC. Vandergriff began his military career with the United States Marine Corps, and has had extensive experience in the field with the Army. After he transferred from the Marine Corps to the Army National Guard, he initially served as a cavalry platoon leader in the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (TNARNG). Upon entering active duty, he served in the Republic of Korea as a tank platoon, tank company executive officer and scout platoon leader for almost two years; at the National Training Center (serving both as an observer controller and in the OPFOR); and in the Middle East and Germany. He has his undergraduate degree in education from the University of Tennessee, a graduate degree in military history from American Military University, and began his PhD studies in military history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Major Vandergriff has lectured extensively on military effectiveness and cultural impacts in the United States and Europe. He has also been the subject of several articles that deal with military effectiveness and military transformation, including features in the Washington Post, The Atlantic Monthly, The New Yorker Magazine, The National Journal, Government Executive Magazine, The Washington Monthly, Army Times, Stars and Stripes, Norfolk News-Gazette and Pittsburg Star. He currently lives in Woodbridge, Virginia with his wife Lorraine, and their three dogs and one cat. Vandergriff has always been athletically competitive, playing Rugby at the University of Tennessee 1982-1984, at Fort Irwin 1987-1990, in Germany 1993-4, and in Northern Virginia 1996-97. Vandergriff also participated in Iron Man competitions from 1987-1990, and was an avid snow skier. His current hobbies include Tennessee college football, military wargaming, mountain biking, hiking and his dogs. Donald Vandergriff: Archive Discussion Forum Have an opinion on this commentary? Sound off. Get Breaking Military News Alerts Related Links Army Community Center Military Career Center

September 27, 2004

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Third in a Series

The other day, I was fortunate to walk in on a panel discussing Reserve and National Guard transformation. It was co-hosted by The School of Foreign Service at Georgetown and no other than the Association of the United States Army (or AUSA). The lecture by one of the members of the panel dealt with force structure and transforming the Reserve and National Guard. Then the audience asked questions, which surprisingly got to the heart of transformation.

I was impressed by several of the questions. The questions dealt with what forces have to do today and in the future to evolve, to prepare to fight 3rd and 4th Generation Warfare threats. I even heard the latter term used in a question. I heard a lot asked about unit manning and unit life cycles. I heard that the personnel system was years out of date. It was based on beliefs and theories developed a century or so ago ("Hmm … I kept saying to myself, this sounds familiar").

Then, from the panel, I kept hearing that nothing could move forward effectively until you -- "Change the personnel system!"

Due to the people who were saying this, I felt vindicated. I mean, a few of these people for a couple of years disagreed with me or disputed the merit of my arguments through back channel essays passed around to their Beltway buddies and within their think-tanks - and a "hit man" book review (that is where you have someone write the kind of review you want to see, usually damaging and a contrasting view to the book it is being written about).

But, what does "Change the personnel system!" really mean? I have been trying to define that question in my columns, or if you have my book, Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs, read Chapter 8.

Accomplishing "Parallel Evolution" means the evolution of the institutions that build a culture along with the evolving face of war. To me, the heart of these changes needs to be with those laws and policies that impact leader development and unit manning. For now I am focusing on the evolution of the officer corps under "Parallel Evolution."

One of the two biggest obstacles to effective transformation is the way we manage the officer corps (the other is resistance to moving to a unit-centric personnel system). The first and most difficult change will be eliminating the "up-or-out" promotion system and replace it with an "up-or-stay" system.

The "up-or-out" promotion system drives personnel policies that minimizes the probability that officers will have the time to develop the abilities to "rapidly grasp changes in situations and conditions" and "exercise initiative by independently planning." An officer currently spends his career on a "treadmill." It also develops the anxiety about getting promoted in officers and thus forces them to adhere to the "competitive ethic." The "up-or-out" system also fosters the "Peter Principle," where individuals tend to get promoted to their level of incompetence. Officers then get stuck in jobs because there is no possible way to advance. That job will undoubtedly be unfulfilling.

Unfortunately, the Army does not generally take steps to move personnel back to a level where they can function effectively. Where the Army runs into problems is when it uses promotion to reward performance and minimizes potential. These two concepts - performance or competence and potential for leadership need to be separated somehow in the promotion system.

The new promotion system will have to become more decentralized. Those who know the officer should be the ones with the authority to do the promoting and selecting of individual officers. This means regimental and division boards should be established to view fewer officers for a longer period of time. With commanders remaining at their positions longer, they will be able to better assess (on a first-hand basis) which officers deserve to be promoted or selected for attendance at a staff college.

Brigade and division commanders should be empowered or trusted to appoint boards to promote officers up through the rank of lieutenant colonel. With the field narrowed by a smaller officer corps, centralized boards could then decide who gets promoted to the rank of colonel and higher, and select officers to command brigades and larger formations.

All boards at all levels will use three tools - the OER (written solely in regards to the officer's character, an examination taken yearly, and the personal conduct of the officer in front of the board) - to determine promotions and selections. The bottom line in using such stringent tools is the implication that leadership and professionalism are critically important - too important to either rest on the sixty-second consensus opinions of disinterested officers serving the political agenda of the Army.

The type of officer needed for combat in the future will posses many qualities which cause uneasiness among superiors developed and raised in the culture of management science. A leader with strong character and imagination will always focus his unit on training for war, will spend his time on studying the art of war, and will not waste time in the diversions called for by the "up-or-out" system. Currently, the very officer reform advocates are calling for will get out of the Army when they return from Iraq or Afghanistan or will be relegated to backwaters assignments.

The causes of poor morale, career anxiety, the emphasis on the competitive ethic and the transformation or elimination of bold personality types are the key reasons to rid the Army of the "up-or-out" promotion system. This is particularly troubling for the type of Army officer and organizations required to carry out high-tempo operations, in conditions that will require us "to fight outnumbered and win." We invariably lose our warrior-leaders and our innovators under the entrenched personnel system. Only an "up-or-stay" system based on objective measuring tools and the trust and bond of an officer corps can create the type of leaders the Army deserves.

In an "up-or-stay" or "perform-or-out" (this term is from the work on junior officer development by Mark Lewis) promotion system, if an officer wants to get promoted, he will ask for it. The patterns for career management will change to support the number-one priority, a unit-centric personnel system. Initially, an officer will still enter the officer corps from one of three commissioning sources, but accessions (entry) will be more selective than ever before with a smaller officer corps.