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William Sturgiss Lind,
Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism
at the Free Congress Foundation, is a native
of Cleveland, Ohio, born July 9, 1947. He
graduated magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa
from Dartmouth College in 1969 and received
a Master's Degree in History from Princeton
University in 1971. He worked as a legislative
aide for armed services for Senator Robert
Taft, Jr., of Ohio from 1973 through 1976
and held a similar position with Senator Gary
Hart of Colorado from 1977 through 1986. He
joined Free Congress Foundation in 1987.
Mr. Lind is author of the Maneuver Warfare
Handbook (Westview Press, 1985); co-author,
with Gary Hart, of America Can Win: The Case
for Military Reform (Adler & Adler, 1986);
and co-author, with William H. Marshner, of
Cultural Conservatism: Toward a New National
Agenda (Free Congress Foundation, 1987). He
has written extensively for both popular media,
including The Washington Post, The New York
Times, and Harper's, and professional military
journals, including The Marine Corps Gazette,
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and Military
Review.
Mr. Lind co-authored the prescient article,
"The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth
Generation," which was published in The Marine
Corps Gazette in October, 1989 and which first
propounded the concept of "Fourth Generation
War." Mr. Lind and his co-authors predicted
that states would increasingly face threats
not from other states, but from non-state
forces whose primary allegiance was to their
religion, ethnic group or ideology. Following
the events of September 11, 2001, the article
has been credited for its foresight by The
New York Times Magazine and The Atlantic Monthly.
Mr. Lind is co-author with Paul M. Weyrich
of the monograph: "Why Islam is a Threat to
America and The West." He is the author of
"George W. Bush's `War on Terrorism': Faulty
Strategy and Bad Tactics?" Both were published
in 2002 by the Free Congress Foundation.
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August 25, 2005
[Have an opinion on a William Lind column? Sound off in the Discussion
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My two columns on the idea of a national militia as the best response to the Fourth Generation threat generated some responses that are worth thinking about. We will take a look at some of them here.
Let me first clarify one point: the militia we are talking about is a public, not a private militia. It is funded by and reports to the government (it is adcon to Congress and, unless mobilized, opcon to the county sheriff). Our working group thought it was important to keep the militia away from the federal executive branch as much as possible, because the executive branch will try either to destroy it or to turn it into a tool for Big Brother. But this militia is not just a bunch of guys running around in the woods. It is a state armed service, just like the four we now have -- the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard.
Now, some responses:
Myke asks, “I assume that by reporting to Congress he means that the militias would become tools of their particular representatives ... Isn't this the very sign of state collapse that van Creveld warned us of?” Our working group never envisioned the militia reporting to their local Congressman. Unless mobilized, it would report to the county sheriff. If mobilized, to a state governor or a CINC. As to whether it might contribute to the decline of the state, it depends on what kind of state we envision. The militia does represent decentralization away from Washington. But I think America's current over-centralization is itself a factor in the state's crisis of legitimacy. Both here and generally, it seems to me that decentralization and citizen involvement may help restore legitimacy to the state.
Two readers, Marion and Herbert, asked whether the Swiss militia model might be relevant. The answer is clearly yes. Switzerland's defense has been based on a militia for a very long time, and it has enabled Switzerland to preserve its neutrality, maintain its liberties and decentralized political system (real power lies at the cantonal, not the federal level of government) and keep its defense expenditures down. The Swiss militia is an ideal basis for defending Switzerland from 4GW. In fact, Switzerland already has an arrangement that other countries will need in a 4GW world: the regular armed services actually support the militia, instead of the other way around.
Keith asks, “Is Mr. Lind expecting the militia force he refers to, to replace existing ‘standing armies?' I could not imagine such a force being suitably equipped (or trained) for expeditionary warfare ... how can we do without modern, professional armed forces?” Our working group, and some though not all others at Col. Wyly's conference, saw the current armed forces as “legacy” forces. They represent a way of war that is passing, war between states. As we see in Iraq and Afghanistan, they do not succeed very well in Fourth Generation wars. We thought the first-line militia companies we envision would be better suited to 4GW, in large part because they would be trained to de-escalate confrontations, rather than call in F-18s to drop 2000-pound bombs in urban neighborhoods. The winding down of the legacy forces would come gradually, but the combination of their vast cost and declining utility means they are passing into history.
Dee noted that not all urban areas have sheriffs. If the militia there reported to the mayor, directly or through the police chief, they could become dangerously politicized. I agree. Does anyone know how many places lack sheriffs?
Thomas noted that in addition to the example of volunteer fire departments, we can point to three other militia-type organizations already in existence: the Civil Air Patrol, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and some state militias that remain separate from the National Guard. Karl pointed out that 10 U.S.C. 330 already provides legal authorization for an “Unorganized Militia” and a “Select Militia.” He notes, “This Code is still in effect, just ignored ... ” Nathan adds that since 1988, many counties have had “Local Emergency Planning Committees.” He adds, “The LEPCs could, by working with the sheriff (most do, closely, anyway today) be the coordinating catalyst to transform or spin off the militia companies.”
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These are all useful questions or ideas. The militia concept still needs a lot of work if it is to become viable. And the larger question still remains: is a militia the best answer to the question of what kind of state armed service America needs to defend against Fourth Generation threats?
The difference between the people who wrote responses to my columns and Washington is that the former are thinking about that question.
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© 2005 William S. Lind. William S. Lind
is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free
Congress Foundation. All opinions expressed in this article are
the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.
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