Email this page to friends RSS feed About H. Thomas Hayden H. Thomas Hayden recently concluded over 35 years of service, which included the Agency for International Development, the Marine Corps, defense industry and the Pentagon. His specialties are Intelligence, Counterinsurgency Operations, Counter-terrorism, and Joint Concepts Development and Experimentation. His Marine Corps assignments have included command of two separate battalions; AC/S G-2, 4th MARDIV & AC/S G-2 FMFEurope; Branch Head, HQMC, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC); Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC; and, Senior Program Analysts at HQMC with the Joint Staff and DoD at the Pentagon. Overseas assignments included Vietnam, Japan & Okinawa, Europe, Central America, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Somalia, Singapore, Philippines, and Colombia. He has an MBA (Pepperdine) and an MA in International Relations (University of Southern California). He has written two books and is working on a third. Thomas Hayden Article Archives Sound Off! - Have an opinion about this article? Visit the discussion forum. Related Links Military Opinions Index Global War on Terror Get $1000 a Month! Your service may have earned you great education benefits. Get up to $1000 per month to pay for your undergraduate, graduate or technical degree. Find out about military-friendly schools today.

June 6 , 2005

[Have an opinion on this column? Sound off in the discussion forum.]

Counterinsurgency may rapidly become the new buzzword in the Pentagon and the Armed Services. The occupation mentality in Iraq has finally been supplanted by real concern for fighting the insurgents with a military counterinsurgency plan. Now, how about the civilian programs and a Civil-Military Campaign Plan?

In Vietnam, the need for the integration of the military counterinsurgency campaign into the efforts of the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Inter-Agency programs became apparent in 1967. Thus, Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support was born. MACV/CORDS was a combination of the MACV Advisors with the USAID advisors, and all other civilian organizations in Vietnam into one integrated civil-military team. In provinces where the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army were quite active, an Army or Marine lieutenant colonel was usually the senior advisor. In provinces where pacification and revolutionary development were paramount, a USAID or State Department Foreign Service Officer was the senior advisor. It was reversed for the Deputy Senior Advisor.

If the Deputy was a Foreign Service Officer, he wrote the Fitness Reports on the military officers, and the Senior Province Advisor was the reviewing officer. Again, the reverse would be true if a civilian was the Province Senior Advisor. The key to successful integration of any civil-military team is whoever writes the Fitness Reports -- he is the man.

In his 2006 budget proposal, the President proposed creating a new “Active Response Corps,” which would be made up of foreign and civil service officers that could deploy quickly to crisis situations as civilian “first responders” -- i.e., to help set up stability, reconstruction and “democracy.”

In a recent speech by the President on his 2006 budget request, he requested $24 million for the Active Response Corps program. The program would be coordinated through the State Department's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization -- a new office. It should be recognized that Congress has not approved the Active Response Corps program. However, this program and new office were part of a larger effort to transform the State Department into more of an active agency -- one that could respond to situations like Iraq more quickly and effectively.

The State Department is creating the capacity to deploy inter-agency teams and get programs running on the ground. State will lead the coordination of U.S. Government civilian field operations or support embassy capabilities to do so, engage in preventative planning, and work with allies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. A trained Active Response Corps would deploy as “first responders” to organize staff planning teams, and if necessary, deploy with the military or multilateral peacekeepers to create the U.S. civilian base on the ground. After completing their service, the Active Response Corps staff would be part of a Standby Corps subject to recall for future stability and reconstruction missions. State will engage partner agencies and bureaus with technical capabilities to design, execute and manage “Stability and Reconstruction” activities. To access skills outside the U.S. Government, inter-agency working groups will identify key skill areas and be the conduit for establishing an operational database of global pre-positioned funding mechanisms to rapidly acquire and deliver resources.

However, none of this will work anywhere, particularly Iraq, if the powers that be do not create a Civil-Military Campaign Plan.

In Vietnam 1967, the MACV/CORDS Revolutionary Development Campaign Plan (RD Campaign Plan) was a re-tooling of the previous Strategic Hamlet Plan, Rural Redevelopment Plan, and Pacification Plan.

The RD Campaign Plan totally included all military operations, and made sure that any kind of counterinsurgency or major combat operation in any province would first consider the impact on the Revolutionary Development Program.

Unfortunately, the TET Offensive of 1968 set the RD Campaign Plan on its rear end and a new Accelerated Campaign Plan was developed. It wasn't clearly understood in Washington, D.C, that the US and Allied military victory after the TET Offensive was a major tactical defeat for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. It turned out to be a major strategic victory for the other side.

By 1973 and after the North Vietnamese Army failures in the Easter Offensive, it was clear that the Viet Cong were no longer an effective organization in the Republic of Vietnam. This fact was made abundantly clear when the US failed to provide promised support to the Republic of Vietnam to defend themselves, and the North Vietnamese Army -- with main active duty army divisions and no Viet Cong anywhere in sight -- conquered the Republic of Vietnam.

A comprehensive Civil-Military Campaign Plan has three major objectives:

1. Sustaining security and stability for the population from the insurgents, and depriving the insurgents of popular support.
2. Generating support for the elected government through reconstruction and meeting popular needs, thus building political and governmental support.
3. Neutralizing the active insurgents and support bases in the cities and rural areas.

It cannot over emphasize that the military and foreign service personnel be trained in the language, culture, religion, and history of their area of operation.

While the President's proposal has not received much attention from the U.S. national press, it needs immediate attention by Congress, and preliminary planning needs to start at the military command centers in Iraq.

A Civil-Military Campaign Plan is way overdue.

Email this page to friendsRSS feed

[Have an opinion on this article? Sound off here.]

© 2005 H. Thomas Hayden. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.