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H. Thomas Hayden
recently concluded over 35 years of service,
which included the Agency for International
Development, the Marine Corps, defense industry
and the Pentagon. His specialties are Intelligence,
Counterinsurgency Operations, Counter-terrorism,
and Joint Concepts Development and Experimentation.
His Marine Corps assignments have included
command of two separate battalions; AC/S G-2,
4th MARDIV & AC/S G-2 FMFEurope; Branch Head,
HQMC, Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict (SO/LIC); Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC;
and, Senior Program Analysts at HQMC with
the Joint Staff and DoD at the Pentagon. Overseas
assignments included Vietnam, Japan & Okinawa,
Europe, Central America, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, Somalia, Singapore, Philippines, and
Colombia. He has an MBA (Pepperdine) and an
MA in International Relations (University
of Southern California). He has written two
books and is working on a third.
Thomas
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February 28, 2005
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The Gulf War may seem like a long time ago, but in fact it ended on 28 February 1991. Funny how your last major war sticks out more than others, even though I spent two years in Vietnam (1967-69). I certainly spent enough time in the Gulf (August 1990 to April 1991) -- enough time to make it more than just a passing memory. However, with all our Marines and the men and women of our Armed Forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Djibouti, and many other places but home, the Gulf War seems like it was but a skirmish, compared to the big one still raging today.
It was most fortuitous that General Norman Schwarzkopf and his U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) changed the original scenario for Exercise Internal Look, July 1990, from one involving Iran, to the defense of Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack into Kuwait. At the time of the exercise, I was serving as the G-3, Operations Officer, 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG), I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). Exercise Internal Look had all the major USCENTCOM component commands of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and USAF, all at Eglin Air Force Base for a Field Command Post Exercise.
All the general officer leadership and their principal staffs worked through an exercise that seemed to be far fetched from any real scenario that we would have to execute in the future. Little did we know that Exercise Internal Look would later prove to be a dress rehearsal for Operation Desert Shield, and later, Operation Desert Storm. Little did I know that 10 days after my return to Camp Pendleton, California to assume command of HqSvcBn, 1st FSSG, I would be headed to Saudi Arabia with the battalion to assume command of the I MEF Rear Area Security Forces.
Marine Corps commanders in the Gulf War included LtGen Walt Boomer, CG I MEF along with MajGen Mike Myatt, CG 1st Marine Division, MajGen Royal Moore, CG 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and my boss, BigGen Jim Brabham, CG 1st FSSG. MajGen Bill Keys, CG 2d Marine Division, would later join the I MEF in Saudi Arabia for the assault into Kuwait.
Operation Desert Shield was to be a United Nations-approved multi-national military force defending Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack, until diplomatic missions could convince Saddam Hussein of the error of his ways and evacuate Kuwait. However, by Thanksgiving 1990, it became evident to almost everyone except the Russians and the French -- sound familiar? -- that Saddam would not leave voluntarily, and would need a little push. Accordingly, the UN authorized President George Herbert Walker Bush to use all means necessary -- including armed force.
During Operation Desert Shield, a number of military operations were being carried out, like Maritime Interdiction Operations by U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels, along with other Coalition navy vessels; they stopped and searched Iraqi and other foreign flagged ships to enforce the United Nations embargo. Additionally, in early January 1991, U.S. Navy ships and embarked Marines had to be detached from the amphibious task force and sail south to Mogadishu, Somalia, to evacuate U.S. Embassy personnel and foreign diplomatic personnel.
President Bush gave Saddam one last chance on 15 January 1991, and clearly stated that the UN resolution to evict Iraq from Kuwait would be carried out on 16 January. When the deadline passed, a massive air campaign not seen since World War II pounded Saddam's forces.
U.S. Central Command decided that the only realist option for any possible success in Kuwait would be to give the Iraqi army what would be called the "left hook." The XVIII Airborne Corps and I MEF would not have enough troops to accomplish such a mission; accordingly, General Schwarzkopf asked for four more divisions.
Military planners normally looked for a ratio of 3 to 1 superiority for attacking in open terrain, and 5 to 1 to attack heavy fortifications. Intelligence reports put the ratio in favor of the Iraqis in tanks at 4 to 3, artillery at 5 to 3, and front line combat troops about even. Not the best of numbers for the attacking forces.
Achieving local superiority required a major deception operation. The Navy and Marine Corps task force floating in the Gulf of Arabia gave General Schwarzkopf the deception he needed to tie six Iraqi divisions to the Kuwaiti coast awaiting an amphibious assault.
The 1st and 2d Marine Divisions would attack the "elbow" of Kuwait, acting as bait to hold the Iraqi forces' attention while the main attack, the "left hook," would thrust into Iraq far to the east. I MEF knew the amphibious operation would be only a feint.
In a brilliant plan to facilitate the attack, MajGen Mike Myatt, Commanding General 1st Marine Division, asked permission to infiltrate four Marine battalions across the border to clear and mark lanes through the mine fields. By daybreak on 23 February, two battalions had penetrated eight miles through the Iraqi barbwire, mines and waiting fire trenches, and lay undetected, dug in foxholes all day.
The Marine Corps ground attack was to begin at 0400 local time, 24 February, and the main attack twenty-six hours later. Six hours into the Marine attack, USCENTCOM realized that the Marines were way ahead of schedule. The Army's Armored Calvary Regiments were not scheduled to attack until G+26 Hours, or 0600 25 February. The "main attack" moved out 15 hours ahead of schedule.
On 27 February USCENTCOM intelligence reports indicated that the Republican Guards were completely surrounded. Some commanders were reporting that only Iraqis on foot were escaping the net. Rick Atkinson in his book, CRUSADE: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, wrote: "Only the fabled fog of war can explain this misapprehension."
It was later learned that the Army had hoped to have the XVIII and VII Corps attack across a common front. However, a substantial gap developed between the two Army corps, and the "left hook" turned east much too early to trap the main body. The majority of three Republican Guard divisions exploited this mistake to escape across the Euphrates River, or into Basrah. Over two divisions of Iraqi armor were waiting to cross Shatt al Basrah when General Schwarzkopf reported to President Bush that, "The gates are closed." Unfortunately for the Kurds and Shiites who would later rise up in revolt, under US encouragement, the Iraqi army was still powerful enough to squash all resistance and kill a substantial number of opponents to the Hussein regime. Regretfully, the US offered no assistance to the revolt and would very much regret that decision later in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
While a Marine Corps reconnaissance unit had secured the U.S. Embassy the day before the ceasefire went into effect, orders came from "on high" that the Marines were to evacuate the Embassy. At 1330 local time, 28 February, U.S. Army Special Forces made a helicopter "assault" into the Embassy. After blowing a huge hole in the chancery, and finding no enemy forces, the liberation of Kuwait was declared complete.
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© 2005 H. Thomas Hayden. All opinions
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