 Dick
Coffman is an international business and security
consultant and media commentator on intelligence,
homeland security and terrorism. He is managing
Director of Odysseus
Group International, which provides risk
management and security solutions to the transportation,
basic infrastructure and manufacturing industries.
Mr. Coffman specializes in ports and maritime
security and homeland defense. He is founder
and President of Coffman
Global Group, which leverages worldwide
networks for business development and marketing
in high technology, basic materials and capital
construction.
Mr. Coffman has conducted assessments of intelligence
operations for the U.S. Customs Service and
the Office of Naval Intelligence and for a
major defense contractor.
Mr. Coffman served 31 years in the Central
Intelligence Agency where he formed and managed
the Agency's first counterterrorism analytic
organization and served as Chief of Station,
chief of staff to the Director of the Clandestine
Service, coordinator of major worldwide covert
intelligence programs and CIA representative
to the NATO Commander.
He also served four years in the U.S. Marine
Corps, including duty in Vietnam in 1965 and
1966. Mr. Coffman remained in the Marine Corps
Reserves retiring in 1992 at the grade of
Colonel. Mr. Coffman is a student of military
history and an authority on the U.S. Civil
War.
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July 11, 2005
If the US fails to heed the lessons of the terror attacks in London on July 7, it will be at our peril.
Spared serious terrorism for almost four years since 9/11, London 7/7 should be a reminder that America remains under mortal threat and has much to do to reduce our vulnerabilities.
The first lesson of London 7/7 is that America -- clearly the Jihadist target of choice -- has been spared so far not because, as some suppose and many are saying publicly, that the US is a better-defended, tougher, riskier target than the UK.
In fact, the opposite is true. The UK is compact and more defensible than is the US. Moreover, the UK is protected by experienced, sophisticated and battle-hardened intelligence and security services. Steeled and schooled by a three-decade struggle against indigenous Irish Republican Army terrorists, major British cities, notably London, bristle with defenses, including blanketing surveillance systems, vigilant law enforcement, and tested, citizen-based security protocols.
As a small island nation, the UK is much more difficult to infiltrate than the US with its thousands of miles of coastal and land borders and already overrun by upwards of ten million illegal immigrants.
Rather than take false comfort that the US was not attacked, Americans must understand that, if Jihadists can circumvent British security and operate in the heart of London, then major US cities are very much at risk.
There is a danger that Americans have fallen into the complacency almost smugness, which clearly helped create the environment for the 9/11 attacks. Having spent vast sums and constructed a seemingly formidable defensive system, many are prone to believe the US is virtually invulnerable and that little remains to be done to make America safe.
This comfort zone is unfortunately being fed by political rhetoric, on one side by those who decry the need for offensive operations against terrorists abroad or tough statutes to control the threat domestically. On the other side, under unrelenting political attack over Iraq and its efforts to extend the Patriot Act, the Administration has overstated the effectiveness of domestic security programs.
The reality, however, is far from the rhetoric. And that brings up the second major lesson from London 7/7: domestic intelligence is indispensable in ferreting terrorists and their plans and preventing domestic attacks. An impressive first responder capability -- as shown in London -- can mitigate the effects of an attack and speed recovery. But, only premonitory intelligence can prevent a domestic based attack and obviate the need for any mitigating response.
Under enormous US pressure abroad, many al Qaeda controlled or affiliated Jihadist groups have evolved into locally based, autonomous terrorist organizations able to choose targets and conduct attacks independent of central direction. For internal security agencies, they have become more dangerous and difficult to control, especially when functioning as sleeper cells.
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As was the case in Madrid 3/11 and presumably in London 7/7, attacks were prepared and conducted by deeply imbedded indigenous cells, possibly comprised of homegrown Islamicist terrorists. While effective against internationally based al Qaeda terrorists and command structures, even the most capable foreign intelligence services are unlikely to make much of a dent in uncovering purely domestic and home-based terrorists.
And the stark fact is that US domestic intelligence capabilities are only in their infancy, several years behind those of the UK.
Several presidential and congressional commissions, as well as the Justice Department Inspector General and GAO have all concluded that the FBI has simply not made significant headway in transforming into an effective domestic counterterrorism intelligence agency. Still, the White House has gone ahead with plans to establish a National Security Service in the Bureau with significant input from new National Intelligence Director John Negroponte.
At this juncture, given the threat and obvious vulnerabilities, we have little choice but to make this arrangement work for the best. Time is short -- we don't know how short -- and the US lacks the authorities, resources and will of the Washington leadership to build a domestic intelligence agency from scratch.
The DNI should make it his highest priority to select a tough-minded chief executive with deep intelligence experience for this Service, and provide the funds, authorities and autonomy needed to mold and field a domestic capability as soon as feasible. The DNI, if not the White House, should ensure against bureaucratic or other interference.
Whether or not this is workable, what we now have is plainly inadequate to the threat before us.
The third lesson of London 7/7 is that the US as a matter of urgency must have a far more balanced allocation of energy, focus and investment into transportation and basic infrastructure security. We have spent nearly $18 billion on commercial aviation security, no more than $1 billion on maritime security and less than a quarter of that on surface transportation security, including trains and buses.
While only Washington measures program effectiveness and importance by the money it costs, these figures still represent a snapshot into how mal-apportioned are our resources and mistaken our priorities. Money leads to organizational muscle in Washington, and the Transportation Security Administration formed after 9/11 has been almost wholly focused on commercial aviation security, arguably producing some positive results but only at great cost.
The cost includes short-changing land and maritime transportation systems now of most obvious terrorist interest. We have left the country dangerously exposed to maritime attack using massive conventional explosives or, worse, weapons of mass destruction positioned in sea borne containers or aboard ship.
Worse, so much money has been poured into homeland security so rapidly since 9/11, many allocation decisions have inevitably been politically driven. How else to explain grant funds for ports in Arkansas and inland Virginia while only awarding a fraction of funds requested for the truly threatened mega ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach and New York, against which a serious attack would be calamitous for the nation's economic well-being.
This, despite continued pressure on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by tenacious Congressmen and Senators for risk and vulnerability based funding decisions. Newly installed DHS Secretary Chertoff seems to have absorbed this message and is promising an overhaul of the DHS system to focus on threat, vulnerabilities and consequences as the criteria for funding allocations.
Only immediate implementation of this sensible approach, and perhaps White House intervention will ensure a sensible risk-based system, which results in balanced resources for our transportation and infrastructure.
In reality, our ubiquitous and dense infrastructure and transportation systems are virtually impossible to defend completely. But, better resource decisions, a healthier appreciation of our vulnerabilities as underscored by the London attacks and some semblance of a domestic intelligence capability, while only a start, can in the long run afford the US the security it clearly needs.
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© 2005 Richard Coffman. All opinions expressed in this article
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