DefenseWatch Ed Offley, Editor of DefenseWatch magazine, has been a military reporter and defense specialist for 22 years in a variety of journalism assignments throughout the United States. DefenseWatch is an online magazine that addresses military and security issues from the viewpoint of active-duty and reservist component personnel and veterans. Offley previously served as Editor-in-Chief of The Stars and Stripes after the civilian-owned newspaper was acquired by Stars and Stripes Omnimedia Inc. in March 2000. A 1969 graduate of the University of Virginia, Offley served in the U.S. Navy in Vietnam before joining The Virginia Gazette, Williamsburg, Va., as a reporter in 1972. He worked as an editorial writer at three newspapers in Virginia during 1977-85 before joining The Seattle Post Intelligencer as an editorial writer in 1986. Offley, 55, lives in Panama City Beach, Fla., with his wife, Karen, and daughter, Andrea. Contact: dweditor@yahoo.com. Related Links DefenseWatch Website Article Archive Hot Discussions Have an opinion on this commentary? Sound off. Get Breaking Military News Alerts

On Aug. 30, 2004 , Smith said ten Iraqi ING soldiers from the company he was training came to his room with an interpreter and stated that their commander, Capt. Haidar, was charging them for each round of ammunition that they fired.

In his statement to the GAP investigators, Smith said, "I asked them what they were talking about and they stated that this was the second month that Capt. Haidar, the C/303 commander, was charging soldiers for use of ammunition. I later gathered on statements that any soldier who fired a round on a mission would be charged D8,000 from their pay. Among all the other absurd implications of this was where was that money going? Apparently some 15-20 soldiers in the company were being charged for bullets and this was not the first time." Smith added that a 1st Lt. Hanni, the Charlie Company paymaster, said that Haidar had also tried to extort additional money directly from the unit's payroll.

As he pursued this development, Smith said, the evidence again led directly to Lt. Col. Mohammad.

"I found out later, through U.S. cadre that large amounts of ammunition were disappearing from company stores and that Lt. Col. Mohammad would simply just ask for more," he told the GAP investigators. "It was my deduction that this ammunition was being sold on the black market or stored at some other location." Smith said he and several senior NCOs conducted a detailed inventory and learned that over 10,000 rounds of ammunition and between 50-100 AK-47 assault rifles had disappeared.

"The same ended up being true of gasoline used to run the Nissan and Mitsubishi pickups for the ING," Smith said. "Every other day, the gas tanks would be empty and need to be refueled. It was the assessment of all U.S. cadre that the [fuel] tanks were being siphoned off post and then driven back empty to be fueled up by the Americans. We all gave out stern warnings as well as watched the consumption rate and the level of this problem has dropped significantly."

After researching unit records with several other American officers, Smith calculated that out of contracts totaling just over $1 million, Mohammad had pocketed up to 40 percent of that total, or $400,000.

The AR 15-6 investigation confirmed that Mohammed had forced his soldiers to reimburse him for the cost of expended ammunition. "[Col. Mohammed] admits to holding individual soldier's wages until they provided the missing ammunition," the report stated. "This may have contributed to Capt. [Smith's] perception of corruption. However, the report said there was "no credible evidence of theft or corruption in the handling of ammunition and fuel in the 303rd ING Bn."

Smith dismisses the exoneration of Lt. Col. Mohammed regarding the ammunition and fuel losses. He said the matter was first presented to him by a senior American NCO who observed the missing stocks and confirmed the losses himself in a subsequent inventory. None of the American soldiers familiar with the disappearing fuel and ammunition were interviewed in the AR 15-6 probe, Smith says.

Smith said by September 2004, he had become extremely frustrated to learn that his superiors in the 2-12 CAV and 2nd Brigade were not aggressively investigating the allegations raised by both Iraqi and American troops involved in the support contracts for the 303rd ING Battalion. Nor did they respond to an apparent death threat against Smith by Lt. Col. Mohammad that prompted the captain to leave Iraq for several weeks on emergency leave.

"I've tried to report these issues several times," Smith said. "I've been told repeatedly that it's the 'Arab' way, and that 'we're not going to change their culture.' ... I've tried to report these incidents numerous times to both the HHC cadre at Hawk Base and the field grade officers at 2BCT. It seems that I'm the one who keeps getting put against the wall for each accusation. Lt. Col. Mohammad has used his free access to my chain of command to discredit myself on several occasions, because it seems I'm costing him a lot of money. I've been preached at numerous times about Army values and integrity, but what has been displayed by this chain of command is horrendous."

Upon his return to Iraq from leave in early October 2004, Smith learned that Lt. Col. Mohammad had informed senior 2nd Brigade officers that he "didn't want me there anymore." Rather than launch an investigation of the theft allegations, Smith said 2-12 Battalion executive officer Maj. Paul D. Horlacher formally counseled him, then threatened him with a letter of reprimand (later withdrawn) for refusing to sign a statement attesting to Mohammad's rationale for getting rid of him.

Horlacher did not respond to a DefenseWatch request for comment passed through the division public affairs office.

Even worse, Smith accuses the 2BCT leadership of failing to react to a far more serious allegation against Mohammad – that he had committed a war crime against an Iraqi civilian that resulted in the detainee's death.

Uninvestigated Murders

A prime mission of the 303 ING Battalion, Smith recounted, was to conduct security patrols in the western sector of Baghdad . From accounts by eyewitnesses, Smith said he learned that on several occasions, Mohammad arbitrarily apprehended civilians off the street and he and his soldiers would beat them.

On Sept. 4, Smith later told 2BCT superiors, there was a suspected sniper incident while Mohammad's soldiers were on patrol and the ING unit captured two suspects. The Iraqi officer "beat two persons (who were involved in the shooting of an ING soldier) so badly that he broke both men's skulls and they had to be evacuated to the U.S. Green Zone hospital (31st Combat Support Hospital ) where one reportedly died," Smith said he had learned.

Five days later, Smith had a second encounter with Mohammad's unit over the death of an Iraqi civilian. In Smith's own account, a 303rd Battalion patrol shot and fatally injured a civilian motorist, then tried to blame the incident on American troops:

"On the 9th of September, sometime in the early hours, 2LT Aitheer, the [Personal Security Team] leader for Lt. Col. Mohammad, was leading a squad-sized patrol in Ameriya," Smith recounted. "He returned and provided the following story: He had heard gunfire while he was on patrol and moved to the scene where he saw three Humvees conducting a [tactical control point] and observed four Humvees and two [Bradley Fighting Vehicles] on a patrol in the area. The Americans there stated that they had a firefight with bad guys and to leave the area because it wasn't safe. 2nd Lt. Aitheer complied and after continuing his patrol found a vehicle with a man who had been shot. The man stated that Americans had shot him when he was in the crossfire of an ambush and he had driven to that location and stopped, hoping someone would help him. They drove him to the hospital where he died."

Upon further investigation, Smith verified with the 2BCT Battle Captain , " There were no American units there." He concluded that the Iraqi lieutenant's account was "a lie."

The AR 15-6 report into the incident found "no credible evidence that supports that this incident occurred," noting that the information Smith had received was only in the form of a conversation with the Iraqi lieutenant.

On numerous occasions, Smith said, Mohammad would personally beat the civilians that his soldiers had detained. The GAP report continued, "Capt. Smith reported that sometimes they were guilty of a crime, but more often than not, these were civilians who had reportedly insulted an ING soldier. [Mohammad] would interrogate them and beat and abuse them for 4-5 hours and then release them. On one occasion ... U.S. cadre had to rescue the detainees from a mob of over 100 ING soldiers who were kicking and beating the two men while Lt. Col. Mohammad personally beat them with a large wooden pole."

Smith said he unsuccessfully pressed his superiors at company and battalion level – who were responsible for training the 303rd ING Battalion – to launch an inquiry into the allegations of the detainees' deaths and other instances of abuse.

"After asking what sort of investigation was being conducted I was told by HHC cadre that nothing was going to happen," Smith said.

"Whether it was a mistake, an accident, or a legitimate shooting, an inquiry needs to be made to establish exactly what the circumstances [of the deaths] were," the captain said. "It is my belief that [the motorist] was shot by ING and the story fabricated [by the Iraqis] to protect themselves. Due to the cover-up, I believe this shooting was highly illegal and a formal investigation needs to be conduct[ed] to determine criminal negligence or intent."

The AR 15-6 investigation did confirm Smith's accounts of detainee abuse by Lt. Col. Mohammed, noting that senior 1st CAV officers "all took immediate and appropriate action" including a verbal reprimand to Mohammed by a colonel in the American unit. "Additionally, a policy was put in place that required U.S. Cadre personnel to chaperone ING soldiers as they were conducting detainee in-processing."

Inconclusive Investigations and Exile

Upon the 1st Cavalry Division's redeployment to Fort Hood in February 2005, Smith said he was dismayed to observe that his insistence on investigating the Iraqi commander had prompted what he terms as "petty" gestures by his superiors against him. His chain of command refused to publicly award him the Purple Heart medal he had earned during the attack on Aug. 14. Then, a recommended Bronze Star medal was downgraded to a lesser Army Commendation Medal.

But there were more serious consequences, Smith said. He realized that his superior officers – particularly 2BCT commander Col. Formica – had turned on him. "I have attempted to change units twice since my return," he said. "First to 1-5 Cav in 2BCT then to 3BCT altogether. Each time, Col. Formica called the chain of command to inform them that I couldn't be trusted and that I was incompetent in some way, shape or form." Today he works on the 1CAV division operations staff as a project officer.

Formica did not respond to a DefenseWatch request for comment passed through the division public affairs office.

The Army did launch two investigations as a result of Smith's complaints, but he described both of them as inconclusive.

Chiarelli, the 1CAV division commander, ordered the administrative AR 15-6 investigation into Smith's allegations in January 2005, but the GAP report subsequently found, "There was no disclosure made of results to the investigation, and no notification as to the harm already done to Capt. Smith."

In response to a request for information on the incidents involving Capt. Smith, the 1st Cavalry Division provided a sanitized copy of the 120-page AR 15-6 report that deleted the names of all persons interviewed by the investigating officer. Smith said last week he had yet to learn from his superiors whether or not the letter of reprimand is still proceeding through Army channels. Nor had Smith received a copy of the AR 15-6 report until DefenseWatch provided him with a copy of the document the Army had released.

Smith also filed a formal complaint with the Multi-National Force/Iraq Inspector General over what he terms illegal retaliation by his superiors over his charges of theft and abuse by Lt. Col. Mohammad and several of the Iraqi's subordinates. Smith said he received an oral briefing on the IG report on June 17. The probe concluded, "They can see no validity in my claims even though they did acknowledge the coincidence of the timing of my disclosures of circumstances and the dates of retribution," he said.

Army officials told DefenseWatch that the MNF/Iraq IG Report was not immediately available for release to the news media or public.

Asked why he continues to battle his Army chain of command, Smith replied: "Bottom line to that is I don't quit. Especially when my country needs me. I hate the Army, for a large number of reasons. But I love my country. And right now the Army is failing our country."

In an email exchange, Smith noted that the 1st Cavalry Division is currently refitting for a return to Iraq later next year and he would above all else like to deploy with it. "I simply want a fair shot at commanding a company when we next deploy," Smith said. "I want to help make the Army a better institution."

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Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at dweditor@yahoo.com. ©2005 DefenseWatch. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.