About the Author Major Donald E. Vandergriff, USA, an armor officer, teaches military science at Georgetown University Army ROTC. Vandergriff began his military career with the United States Marine Corps, and has had extensive experience in the field with the Army. After he transferred from the Marine Corps to the Army National Guard, he initially served as a cavalry platoon leader in the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (TNARNG). Upon entering active duty, he served in the Republic of Korea as a tank platoon, tank company executive officer and scout platoon leader for almost two years; at the National Training Center (serving both as an observer controller and in the OPFOR); and in the Middle East and Germany. He has his undergraduate degree in education from the University of Tennessee, a graduate degree in military history from American Military University, and began his PhD studies in military history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Major Vandergriff has lectured extensively on military effectiveness and cultural impacts in the United States and Europe. He has also been the subject of several articles that deal with military effectiveness and military transformation, including features in the Washington Post, The Atlantic Monthly, The New Yorker Magazine, The National Journal, Government Executive Magazine, The Washington Monthly, Army Times, Stars and Stripes, Norfolk News-Gazette and Pittsburg Star. He currently lives in Woodbridge, Virginia with his wife Lorraine, and their three dogs and one cat. Vandergriff has always been athletically competitive, playing Rugby at the University of Tennessee 1982-1984, at Fort Irwin 1987-1990, in Germany 1993-4, and in Northern Virginia 1996-97. Vandergriff also participated in Iron Man competitions from 1987-1990, and was an avid snow skier. His current hobbies include Tennessee college football, military wargaming, mountain biking, hiking and his dogs. Donald Vandergriff: Archive Discussion Forum Have an opinion on this commentary? Sound off. Get Breaking Military News Alerts Related Links Army Community Center Military Career Center

September 13, 2004

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To make the U.S. Army a more effective fighting force, I have lectured on the theme, "Change the culture!" for five years.

Why did I say this over and over? Because we have intelligent, hard-working people in the Army who need the autonomy to fight tough and determined opponents today and in the future.

The problem is that our military leaders are guided and promoted by Industrial Age personnel policies and regulations that stem from theories developed almost a century ago. And at this juncture in 2004, the U.S. Army is conducting wartime operations while at the same time trying to carry out a "transformation" from a mobilization, individual-centric force to an expeditionary, unit-centric force. War forces both good and bad changes.

A number of recent decisions and ongoing studies conducted by RAND, the Army War College, and internally within the Army regarding personnel management promises to finally drive the Army to become the cohesive professional force needed to deal with the array of threats we face now and in the future. These include the Army's decision to remove the "block checking" on the senior rater's portion of the officer evaluation report, which has the effect of creating the competitive ethic among fellow officers, undermining trust through careerism. In addition, the Army is moving to embrace moving from a promotion system created at the turn of the century (last century) to one that embraces professionalism in a 2004 analysis by the Rand Corp. ("New Paths to Success: Determining Career Alternatives for Field Grade Officers") on switching selected specialties that will help shift the Army from the "up or out" promotion system to the badly-needed "up or stay" promotion system. Another report, by Dr. Leonard Wong at the U.S. Army War College July 2004 of the Strategic Studies Institute ("Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom"). Wong's concerns that junior officers have adapted well, have become innovative, will be discouraged to remain so when they return to the stateside and bureaucratic Army. I think this is true, and my fear is that we will lose a lot of seasoned officers due to our hidebound refusal to change out of date and ineffective policies.

How are these elements helping transform the Army?

Let me first define where we have been and what the legacy personnel system has done to undermine the effectiveness of the force. Then I will analyze why these decisions were made and in addition what else has to be done for them to evolve in the right direction.

The message Dr. Wong sends is that our leaders are doing well adapting, but asks whether the Army's culture is prepared for them when they return from combat. One intriguing note that appears in his text is that while the leaders adapted, they did it on the job - that is, without institutional assistance from the Army. This says a lot for them, but the Army must do more to prepare them to deal with 4th Generation Warfare (4GW).

No one will deny that our soldiers and their leaders, particularly at the junior level and NCO level, are working hard and adapting to the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. My long-term goal as a personnel specialist in the Army has been to reform the military culture so that the acceptance of adaptiveness and innovation become second nature and accepted throughout the Army - including education, training and the process by which we access officers and promote leaders.

The other critical element that a changed Army culture will provide is to have its leaders mentally prepared for this new type of warfare before they ever deploy for combat. Adaptation in combat is fine, but this sometimes comes at a cost. Our leaders and soldiers adapt well, but why do they have to if the training and education system keeps pace with the evolution of war? To attain this, the Army must protect the innovators and reformers within its ranks.

Three years after 9/11 and 18 months after Operation Iraqi Freedom began, the Army is well on its way toward adapting a new culture that will cultivate the right leaders for tomorrow and the future.

Consider those two decisions I mentioned above - the Army's decision to do away the senior rater block-checking on the back side of its officer evaluation report for captains and below and warrant officers, and consideration of the Rand study that advocates establishing an up-or-stay promotion system in place of the 57-year-old "up-or-out" promotion system (legislated in 1947 with the passing of the Officer Personnel Act).

I have been hearing from a number of captains questioning whether this will actually separate the "wheat from the chaff." They ask how this new approach will differentiate the better performers from the rest. Another issue that has been pointed out to me by many in daily e-mails is how does this keep officers from becoming complacent, lazy or merely doing enough to get by? Finally, from some lieutenant colonels, of all people, I also heard that this seems to be the first step in establishing a truly professional officer corps.

What do these two conflicting viewpoints between the captains and the view of the lieutenant colonels have in common?

But "where is the beef!"

There has to be proof to the force of senior leader's words at translated into deeds in taking care of risk takers, such as instructions to promotion boards to disregard "COM" or center of mass Officer Evaluation Reports or placing these individuals in positions to influence future policies or as trainers or instructors.

But beyond such talk is the urgent need to create an Army culture where individual autonomy based upon trust creates a faster leaders' decision cycle in any type of environment.

To become more effective in 4GW, the Army and the other services must achieve what I term "parallel evolution in their personnel systems.

Parallel evolution is the changing of many institutions that support one another in the face of the changing nature of warfare. The 1980s COHORT experiment in unit manning is an example of what happens when "Parallel Evolution" does not occur. COHORT was developed as a compromise to the personnel system, featuring a smaller unit-centric system within the Army's larger individual-centric personnel system. Cohort consisted of taking selected combat arms units, initially light infantry companies, and later armor and artillery batteries, and keeping the enlisted ranks E-4 and below together for three years. The officers and senior non commissioned officers were exempted due to career progression concerns from the personnel community.

The two concepts contradicted one another and quickly spelled the doom of COHORT. Conflicting policies developed for different reasons tugged at each other and forced leaders to do the same. This will also occur with the movement from "up-or-out" to "up-or-stay" if several factors are not taken into consideration and changed or adjusted.

If you take away the senior rater block on the OER, thus eliminating the competitive ethic, you must also make accessions (how we produce officers) into the officer corps more difficult as well. You must also redefine the definition of success that the culture today defines as achieving high rank.

By "difficult" with accessions, I mean not using the rabid dog approach or harassment or unattainable standards for recruits, but using leadership in difficult but attainable missions as the measurement on who can make or not make decisions under pressure.

I will cover some ideas in my next article in this series on how Army ROTC is adapting to the future, and where it needs to go further in order to establish the foundation for the future officer corps. The final article will deal with implementing an effective "up-and stay" personnel system.

Contributing writer Donald Vandergriff is retiring next summer following a 21-year Army career including service as a personnel reform expert who consulted with Congressional and Army leaders and think tanks on personnel reform. He can be reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net.

Click to read part II of the series: Creating an Adaptive Officer Corps

Major Donald E. Vandergriff, an armor officer, is author of Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs. He can be reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net

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© 2003 Major Donald E. Vandergriff. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.