Donald E. Vandergriff: Learn From the Past Before It Is Too Late
Donald E. Vandergriff: Learn From the Past Before It Is Too Late
About
the Author
Major Donald E. Vandergriff, USA, an armor officer, teaches military science at Georgetown University Army ROTC. Vandergriff began his military career with the United States Marine Corps, and has had extensive experience in the field with the Army. After he transferred from the Marine Corps to the Army National Guard, he initially served as a cavalry platoon leader in the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (TNARNG). Upon entering active duty, he served in the Republic of Korea as a tank platoon, tank company executive officer and scout platoon leader for almost two years; at the National Training Center (serving both as an observer controller and in the OPFOR); and in the Middle East and Germany.
He has his undergraduate degree in education from the University of Tennessee, a graduate degree in military history from American Military University, and began his PhD studies in military history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Major Vandergriff has lectured extensively on military effectiveness and cultural impacts in the United States and Europe. He has also been the subject of several articles that deal with military effectiveness and military transformation, including features in the Washington Post, The Atlantic Monthly, The New Yorker Magazine, The National Journal, Government Executive Magazine, The Washington Monthly, Army Times, Stars and Stripes, Norfolk News-Gazette and Pittsburg Star.
He currently lives in Woodbridge, Virginia with his wife Lorraine, and their three dogs and one cat. Vandergriff has always been athletically competitive, playing Rugby at the University of Tennessee 1982-1984, at Fort Irwin 1987-1990, in Germany 1993-4, and in Northern Virginia 1996-97. Vandergriff also participated in Iron Man competitions from 1987-1990, and was an avid snow skier. His current hobbies include Tennessee college football, military wargaming, mountain biking, hiking and his dogs.
Can you imagine General Eisenhower returning to the States just two months
after the surrender of Nazi Germany? Can you imagine Maj. Richard Winters –
the heroic citizen-soldier from Stephen Ambrose’s renowned World War II
history, Band of Brothers – returning to the States only a month after the
defeat of Nazi Germany to get on with his career?
I recommend to nominees Army Secretary James Roche and Army Chief of Staff
Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, please pull out the 1970 U.S. Army War College
report, Study of Professionalism, written by then Colonels Walt Ulmer and Mike
Malone – and read it! Its findings show what happens when our culture forces
its leaders to pick their careers over their soldiers.
Now I am hearing we are beginning to use tried and failed methods to keep up
personnel strength in units in Iraq? Tell me it is not so! That old Frederick
Taylor, the great 19th century industrial theorist, the real hand behind the
assembly line, is at work again.
We do know better. Why has the Army formed a Unit Manning Task Force composed
of some very bright people to come up with ways to revolve personnel policies
around a unit manning system?
Before Unit Manning, the personnel system also made attempts to haphazardly
rotate units to and from Afghanistan. Our culture allowed the personnel system
to throw them together, and then tear them apart upon their return (like we do
after CTC rotations). But, it was a positive start. Oh, did I mention, but we
still changed commanders out while units remained – remember the 101st
brigade change of command in Afghanistan.
With Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) we waived many policies that allowed the 3rd
Infantry Division to cross the LD on March 21 with solid teams of soldiers,
led by leaders at all levels that had worked and bonded into a “band of
brothers” through tough training in harsh conditions. This formula was a
central part for the 3rd ID’s success.
I knew this could not last long. It was too good to be true. The personnel
managers took the reins back. War is a distraction from the more important job
of managing careers.
But now we are at war and will remain at war for quite a long time. It is time
for a revolution in our industrial age personnel system that focuses on the
individual at the cost of the unit.
Put yourself in the shoes of a soldier who has trained stateside, done an NTC
rotation with that group of soldiers called his unit. He is then deployed
months before combat again. More bonding takes place. Trust is built at all
levels. A cohesive unit is formed.
Then, some career manager using a career template, based on theories developed
a century ago, says it’s time to move this soldier’s commander. “Others
are waiting in line behind, we have to be fair,” they say. “Other jobs
must be filled stateside. We must be fair.”
Is it fair to the unit in combat, its soldiers, to watch the commander drive
away, fly away, while the soldiers remain? After the change of command
formation, the soldiers return to patrolling, checkpoints and convoy security.
Officers come and go – this sounds like another war, a threat to cohesion
and morale. Unit effectiveness has to be degraded as the unit adapts to the
ways of the new commander. We have produced more officers than we need.
Imagine now that you’re the new guy just arriving at Baghdad International:
First you were shipped with many others to Kuwait. You notice how hot it is as
you’re bristled off individually to a unit operating somewhere in Iraq. You
join a unit that has already been there for a while. You’re the “newbie”
– the one that no one trusts, the one that gets extra duty the “vets”
don’t want. You are left to learn the ropes of a hostile, strange
environment. If something bad is going to happen, it is going to happen to the
new guy. The “vets” keep their distance out of self protection. It is a
lonely place.
Please, Mr. Roche and Gen. Schoomaker, transforming the personnel system
should be one of your top priorities upon taking your oaths of office.
The Army personnel system, characterized by the individual replacement system
and the Officer/NCO career management system, is the primary cause of these
problems. American units and service members have long suffered from the
excessive personnel turbulence and careerism caused by the personnel system.
The system itself was last codified at the end of World War II. Several Army
Chiefs have tried and failed to change the system. The personnel system is a
fundamental repudiation of the efforts to take care of and honor the
individual service member.
Opposition to change has historically centered in the personnel bureaucracy.
Personnel turbulence prevents training continuity and thereby causes low
readiness, low proficiency standards and high levels of Worktempo and Deptempo
as units strive to overcome organizational defects by long hours of training
and frequent training deployments.
The existing system allows careerism to flourish. This in turn leads to
micromanagement and distrust. It destroys cohesion and turns brothers-in-arms
into competitors.
The Army can create units that are more ready and service members who are more
satisfied by changing the personnel system. The key aspects of such a change
would be to use a unit, vice individual, replacement system and to allow
officers and NCOs to manage their own careers. A unit rotation system would
allow units to keep people together for three or more years and would allow
units to develop true competence, e.g., Delta Force and the SEALs. Allowing
officers and NCOs to manage their own careers, in conjunction with the
elimination of counter-productive policies like “up or out,” would allow
individuals to develop true expertise in skills that are becoming increasingly
important.
Transforming the personnel system thus will sharply increase readiness and
proficiency while lowering personnel stress and enhancing the satisfaction of
individual service members. A new personnel system is essential to obtaining
the benefits of Army Transformation.
A 2001 study by the Army Science Board found that Army transformation plans
must include transformation of the personnel system. The reasoning is simple:
The personnel system prevents current and future combat units from executing
their increasingly complex missions effectively.
So I beg the incoming Secretary and Chief of Staff to dust off the 33-year-old
Study of Professionalism report, study its findings and lessons, and then
adapt and change the old ways before it is too late.
The current Army personnel system does not promote Army Values.
Major Donald E. Vandergriff, an armor officer, is author of Path to
Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs. He can be
reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net
