Former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, distinguished
combat veteran, and retired Navy Captain,
Wade Sanders is much published on matters
of national security in major newspapers and
the Naval Institute Proceedings. He is also
a news commentator for NBC News. His imaginative
and innovative initiatives were key elements
in the transformation of the Reserve Components
of the Armed Services from Cold War mobilization
assets to relevant providers of contemporary
support.
He presently is senior partner of
a law firm dedicated to matters of corporate
governance, ethics, and specializing in employee
owned companies, as well as providing government
relations assistance to major corporations.
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We have a problem. Too many Reserve and Guard Units are deploying into the Iraqi theater without proper preparation, and we are paying a price for that lack of preparation. We are not talking about weapons or equipment. We are talking about people.
We were prompted to write this article because we were disturbed by the e-mails we have received from too many respected Reserve and Guard non-commissioned and commissioned officers deployed in support of operations in Iraq. We followed up by interviewing numerous junior and senior members of that deployed community in an effort to better understand the situation. In effect, we conducted an investigation and what we discovered was most unsettling.
The single most dangerous element we discovered is this: from the most junior subordinate to the most senior leaders, there is a disturbing misunderstanding of the nature of command and the responsibilities and duties that flow from it. While it is certainly true that command authority and responsibility is absolute, we found a failure to internalize the fact that command is a shared responsibility; that the success or failure of a commanding officer is not only the responsibility of that officer, it is the responsibility of those throughout the chain of command. Disturbingly, too many of the subordinates interviewed do not understand their near-absolute duty to support their commanding officers, whether or not they like those officers, and they fail to grasp the important role they play in the success or failure of command. What was discovered was not a rebellion against illegal orders; it was a rebellion against the fundamentals of command authority.
The second most dangerous thing we discovered is that senior leadership apparently did not anticipate, recognize, and initiate processes to actively and aggressively ameliorate the problem and take steps to prevent these rebellions.
The third most dangerous element is that there are too few members of senior Reserve and Guard leadership who have been in combat and/or have experienced the environment of sustained operations. They are, like their subordinates, "weekend warriors," with the casual mindset and attitude such a derogatory term assumes. They have neither the warrior spirit nor a clear understanding of their responsibilities to their troops. Some come from civilian jobs that require them to understand and exercise leadership; some do not understand the meaning of the word. It may take a bit more to engender the proper spirit in an accountant than the owner of a business, or it may not…but it is worth the effort to do so because a leader can develop and nurture the necessary warrior spirit.
Let's take one disturbing, but true, scenario. To those involved, I am calling this unit the 784th Transportation Company from Lincoln, Nebraska. Of course, there is no such unit, rather it is a composite of many Reserve and Guard units presently deployed to the Southwest Asian theater. In November, 2003, there was a change of command at the "fighting" 784th, and a proud young officer took his first command. We will call him "Jones." Green, ambitious, and enthusiastic, Jones came aboard determined to make the most of this career milestone. Excited and eager, he failed to fully appreciate that he had inherited a culture in place: a unit with set command and personnel relationships. And, not surprisingly, he had a different leadership style from his predecessor.
The prior C.O. was not a popular man with his troops, he was viewed as an arrogant and self-preserving politician who neglected his people as human beings and focused himself totally on managing his own exposure to his superiors. Training was avoided as too risky, and he rarely left his office, preferring to apply a "hands-off" management style. Both he and his Executive Officer relied on his senior enlisted representative, who Jones also inherited and who we will call "Smith," to actually run the unit. In effect, Smith was the de facto commanding officer.
Jones hit the ground running, and actively engaged his troops and his new X.O., who we will call Baker, with his participatory brand of leadership. Jones believed in "management by walking around," and he personally engaged the members of his unit, regardless of their rank. He was determined to learn everything about his unit. Smith viewed this involvement as an intrusion, and the reaction of some of the other senior enlisted was less than positive. The felt they were being marginalized and they viewed Jones as an unwelcome replacement for an extremely popular officer who had exercised a more casual style of leadership. However, there is nothing unusual here; new brooms often sweep clean, and troops are expected to adapt.
However, in December 2003, less than a month after he assumed command and before there was a chance for the unit to gel under his command, orders were received deploying the unit to Southwest Asia in support of IRAQI FREEDOM. There followed the predictable frenzy of bringing the unit up to materiel and personnel readiness. All the equipment shortcomings that the Jones inherited from his predecessor...often due to funding decisions beyond his control...had to be corrected, and right now. The predictable result: everyone did the best they could and the materiel issues were resolved, albeit at the cost of sleepless nights, internal infighting, and finger-pointing.
The more complex dynamic in such a high-tempo environment is the human one. Undermanned in peace, the 784th now received a rapid infusion of new people to bring the unit up to a war footing. These new folks, like the new commanding officer, were strangers in the mix and their infusion predictably created turf tensions and pockets of internal warfare between the existing stakeholders and the invading augmentees. This was the state of the 784th as it deployed into the theater of operations.
Once on the ground in Kuwait, assisted by the effort of sister units already deployed and with much hard work, the 784th came up to speed and was soon as professionally competent as any unit on station. By all rights, this should have been the beginning of improvement. But that was not to be. Smith, and some members of the old guard, still pined over the loss of their former commanding officer, and the rest of the enlisted personnel, unprepared for the predictable tensions of deployment and the complete reorganization of their unit, had yet to come together as a team. The 784th was in a particularly vulnerable state; it was time when all concerned needed to pull together, but they had not been prepared for this eventuality.
Unbeknownst to Jones, who was working hard to pull his unit together, Smith began a campaign of frequently and vocally expressing his dissatisfaction with the new order to anyone who would listen, including his prior C.O. and members of the staffs of Jones' superiors. He is heard to say such things as, "Who does this new guy think he is? I'm the one who runs this unit," and "I sure wish the old C.O. was back, at least he knew what he was doing." Smith felt that he had been stripped of the power and position he had enjoyed under the prior C.O., and he determined that the best way to return to his salad days was to get rid of Jones. The reality was that Smith was only the only person who "wanted the old CO back" because, as he put it, "He never came out of his office." With the unit still coming together, he found fertile ground to sew his seeds of discontent.
Jones' participatory leadership style had also irritated some of the other senior enlisted members, who viewed his communications with lesser ranks as a bypassing of their authority. Yet, instead of exercising their most fundamental duty to engage Jones and discuss their concerns, and seek a resolution that could lead to the development of a common vision, these seasoned troops abandoned their responsibility and made no effort to come to the aid of their C.O. Instead they joined Smith in his aggressive campaign of open criticism of Jones' abilities and his style. A disturbing pattern emerged: the turmoil and turf wars within the command sought a focus, and that focus was Jones, who was as unprepared as were the men and women in his command to deal with this predictable outcome.
Jones' X.O., Baker, then joined this developing mutiny. Baker, like Smith, had felt marginalized by Jones' leadership style. Like Smith, he also failed to aggressively engage Jones in an attempt to work out a common vision. Following Smith's lead, he engaged junior enlisted in discussion criticizing and ridiculing his C.O. He disputed Jones' directives, and communicated his dissatisfaction to members of other commands. For a number of reasons, including his necessary involvement with matters external to the 784th and his newness in command, Jones was unaware of this burgeoning rebellion.
Most of the other members of the unit were quietly and effectively carrying out the unit's mission and, by any measure, the unit was a success. However, he did sense that something was wrong, and he tried all sorts of creative ways to bring his troops together, but these efforts were ignored, or, worse, seen as fraternization by his superiors. The failure of support surrounded him and he began making errors in judgment, not errors which damaged the execution of the mission, but errors nonetheless. A couple of times he missed curfew, on a few occasions he bought rounds of drinks for his men.
Meanwhile, these errors, and the dissatisfaction of Smith and Jones' X.O. were being steadily communicated upward, without Jones' knowledge, to his superiors. Some of these individuals were apparently as unprepared as Jones and his unit to deal with the situation. They did not view the environment in the combat zone as being any different than being stationed in Lincoln, Nebraska. They did not understand the particularly unique tensions and circumstances occasioned by combat deployment. Quite simply, they were not warriors. Predictably, they decided to resolve the situation by protecting themselves by shooting their own.
Without the benefit of a thorough investigation, and against the recommendation of his own Chief of Staff, Jones' superior had him summarily relieved of command and sent stateside in disgrace. This same superior then contacted Smith and, incredible as it may seem, actually told him, "How come it took you so long to get rid of your C.O.?" As a result of the actions of these individuals, Jones joined other commanding officers similarly treated. His reputation and his career were effectively destroyed. The unit was left in tatters and he was replaced by those who engineered his downfall: Baker and Smith.
His command removed and his promotion in jeopardy, the investigation that should have preceded his relief was initiated. The difference was striking: instead of an investigation focused on determining whether Jones should be relieved, the investigation was focused on justifying that decision. The outcome was as predictable as the events that prompted it: survival of the senior leadership became the order of the day. The senior officer who relieved him was awarded a medal. Jones, whose unit's record of performance was unparalleled, will receive no medals.
Of course, there was an alternative: the senior leader could have recognized his own shortcomings, acknowledged that the environment Jones functioned in was a team responsibility, and could have taken action to support and rehabilitate, rather than search and destroy. So…what's that you say? That's what war is about: getting ready in a hurry and answering the call? Of course you're right, but what if most of this turmoil could be anticipated, and what if there were processes in place that could at the very least prepare the victims of this chaos? We say there are such processes and for the sake of those whose careers that are being destroyed, and those Reserve and Guard personnel who will be voting with their feet and leaving the services, they need to be put in place immediately.
Some may argue that we have presented a worst case scenario. We wish they were right. The fact is that this scenario was not unusual. Even in the best of circumstances, we need to prepare our citizen soldiers, sailors, and airmen, Reserve or Guard, from entry level to senior positions, to deal with the predictable scenarios they will face when deployed. They need to understand their respective roles within the command spectrum; to understand their duties and responsibilities. They can be taught to anticipate and manage problems. Their knowledge of tensions and dynamics that occur during a deployment can only strengthen them and help all concerned get through the uncertainty that precedes the gelling of a command team, including the not-too unusual circumstances described in this article. You may get away with some dysfunction on a weekend to weekend basis, maybe even during two week summer activation, but not during a full time deployment.
We need to develop and nurture combat qualified leaders. We need leaders and leadership that understands that sometimes standards of conduct are different between Lincoln, Nebraska and combat commands in a combat theater. We need people who know that it is proper and necessary within the sound judgment of a seasoned commander to take the environment into account, and to base decisions on the context of the situation.
The test was, and always should be, getting the job done: accomplishing the mission and bringing your people home alive. The 784th did its job, despite a deck stacked against it and despite predictions to the contrary, and now its C.O. is history, the victim of mutiny, sedition, and incompetent leadership. What is wrong with this picture? When will the other shoe drop? When will the senior leaders who have failed their commanding officers be held accountable? When will the leadership of the Regular Active, National Guard, and Reserve Components begin the process of properly preparing these components for all aspects of deployment? And, finally, when will they begin identifying and assigning men and women who are leaders capable of leading in combat situations, and relegate the administrators to what they do best?
All concerned would do well to remember the words of Admiral Jeremy Boorda who, as Chief of Naval Operations, echoed the sentiments of such warriors as General George Patton and Admiral Stan Arthur, when he said: "Rules and regulations are important and should, under normal circumstances be followed. However, it is important to understand that they are best guidelines. Any man who, when faced with adhering to those rules and regulations and doing the right thing, does the right thing, will never be in trouble with me."
Wade Sanders is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a distinguished and highly decorated combat veteran, presently practicing law in San Diego, California. He can be reached at wade2000@cox.net.
Major Stan Coerr, a Cobra attack helicopter pilot, was mobilized for Operation Iraqi Freedom, where he served in combat. He is presently a military policy consultant residing in San Diego, California.
