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Urban warfare considerations should drive decision making in all administrative areas, from acquisitions to manpower. Vehicles, aircraft, logistics equipment, communications systems, and weapons should be procured with an emphasis on what the equipment can do in an urban environment. In the same way that the Corps buys equipment with a focus on weight and size (because of airlift and amphibious considerations), the Corps should buy equipment with an urban-warfare focus.

While acquisitions are crucial, perhaps more fundamental to the transformation of the Corps is to assess its manpower needs accurately. Current force structure and manning levels may not be appropriate for urban combat operations. Development and study of urban warfare could (and perhaps should) lead to changes in tables of organization and tables of equipment. For example, the force service support groups may develop organizations specifically designed to support Marines in the urban environment; the Marine air wings may develop a sort of adaptable urban composite squadron; and the divisions may change the structure of the hallowed infantry rifle squad. Perhaps new MOSs will be created to focus exclusively on urban warfare.

The Marine Corps must make a significant investment in urban combat training facilities. The Corps should establish large training facilities (at least a square mile) both in the continental United States and overseas. The facilities should include large, fenced-off, live-fire zones with realistic and rapidly repairable structures that will allow for combined small arms-air-artillery live-fire training. The portions of these new training facilities for maneuver and long-term operations should incorporate numerous types of construction that represent various regions of the world. Opposition forces should be established at each facility to act as a consistent, thinking enemy. When units are not engaged with a thinking, moving enemy, they should fight simulated, computerized foes. Squads of Marines could train in a warehouse-sized room surrounded by interactive video screens, working to develop their urban decision-making and fighting skills with instant feedback. In addition, each barracks (not just infantry) should be equipped with urban video games such as modern versions of the groundbreaking Marine Doom.[5] Though videos games often have a “Generation X” feel about them, and older Marines may shudder at the thought of training in front of a television or computer monitor, Corps-developed or even off-the-shelf video games undoubtedly will help build the urban warfare ethos.

U.S. NAVY (J. WEST) With an Urban Warfare Training Center that uses the Mountain Warfare Training Center (above) as a model, the Marine Corps can become the Defense DepartmentÕs lead force for urban doctrine and development.

While the development of urban combat training facilities will increase the proficiency of the urban warrior skills, the Corps still needs a school to train the trainers, along the lines of the Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport, California, founded in 1951 to address combat deficiencies. The center’s current mission includes: “development of both individual and unit mountain skills with primary emphasis on enhancing overall combat capability. Marines at the Center are also involved in testing cold-weather clothing, equipment, human performance, rough terrain vehicles, and developing doctrine and concepts to enhance our Corps’ ability to fight and win in mountain and cold weather environments.”[6] By simply changing the words “mountain” and “cold weather” to “urban warfare,” this mission provides exactly what the Marine Corps requires of an Urban Warfare Training Center. And it needs to establish one immediately, perhaps at 29 Palms.

Over the next few years and months, the Corps will contain Marines with the most urban fighting experience in 35 years. The Corps needs to harness that expertise and assign those urban-combat Marines to the teaching staff of the new school. In addition, Great Britain and Israel should be encouraged to send exchange officers to the school (with a reciprocal exchange for our officers and senior non-commissioned officers), allowing the Corps to reap the benefits of having lessons-learned feedback from places such as Belfast, Basra, Jenin, and Ramalla, in addition to the knowledge gained by Marines in Iraq. The Corps always has been proud of its formal schools, and the Urban Warfare Training Center should be built and funded to draw a joint and international student body. As always, however, the focus must be on training Marines for combat.

Historically, the Corps has “made Marines” at its entry-level schools by imbuing the young men and women with the ethos and culture of the Corps. This initial indoctrination is absolutely critical. Officer Candidate School, The Basic School, and the recruit training regiments need scaled down urban combat training facilities at their bases. History classes in entry-level schools should be updated to emphasize urban combat. While the Corps should not ignore its World War II heritage, training videos should emphasize Hué, Nasiriyah, and Fallujah, as they now do Tarawa and Iwo Jima. Military occupational specialty schools other than just School of Infantry and Infantry Officers’ Course should train using urban warfare procedures and techniques. If a young Marine or Marine officer expects to fight in a city (in the way that today they expect to deploy on a ship) when he or she graduates from basic training, the Corps will be closer to making the cultural transformation.

The combined arms exercise program has served the Corps well over the years. A shift to an urban combined arms exercise (UCAX) would meet future needs even better. By having the UCAX at 29 Palms, the program could use existing Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (“Coyotes”) procedures and facilities. The new program also could be the world’s largest and most advanced urban training facility. (It should be several miles on each side-the Town of Blacktopville.) The UCAX would retain many of the same aspects of today’s combined arms exercise, but should include at least two weeks (of four weeks, as opposed to today’s three-week CAX) in an extended urban campaign against a battalion-sized operational force.

Finally, the term “urban warfare” should become a common expression. Commanders should teach their Marines about the Corps’ urban heritage. Leatherneck, the Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Times, and Proceedings should sponsor writing contests for essays highlighting urban warfare. All levels of resident and nonresident professional military education should incorporate urban warfare; schools such as the SNCO Advanced Course and the Command and Staff College should incorporate multiple urban warfare case studies into their curricula. The Corps’ amphibious heritage was built into Marine Corps culture and ethos by emphasizing history, teaching classes, and similar fundamental educational and institutional methods. “Expeditionary forward deployment on amphibious ships” is simply part of the Corps’ ethos. Urban combat must take on a similar status in the Corps.

Answers to Criticism

Fiscally, the proposed urban transformation is challenging. To be sure, a re-allocation of funds currently committed to new platforms will have to occur. The Corps must present the Department of Defense (DoD) with a plan for its internal transformation and make a convincing case for additional funds, especially for the expense of constructing and maintaining the urban combat training facilities. A recent precedent exists: the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force was created and funded in 1995-96 because the Corps convinced Congress and DoD that it had a unique capability.[7] Urban warfare expertise will be a unique Corps capability worldwide. The Marine Corps should strive to be the DoD proponent of urban warfare doctrine and development. Marine Corps leadership should emphasize that U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force units also will use the urban combat training facilities and receive training in Marine Corps urban warfare schools. Marine Corps leadership should set a goal of having doctrine established, the training facilities constructed, and schools developed and/or modified by 2010. Such a goal will allow the Corps and Congress time to reallocate spending priorities. Facing the momentum of transformation, the Corps’ fiscal and legislative teams will have their work cut out for them, but the challenge is surely no greater than during the development of amphibious warfare in the late 1930s.

U.S. MARINE CORPS (E. J. YOUNG) With an Urban Warfare Training Center that uses the Mountain Warfare Training Center (above) as a model, the Marine Corps can become the Defense DepartmentÕs lead force for urban doctrine and development.

The Marine Corps should address safety concerns in three ways:

• Study and perhaps revise live-fire safety regulations. The sharpest minds of Marine Corps safety, marksmanship, and training should convene to re-examine current safety systems, policies, and procedures. All units (and all MOSs) should increase the use of operational risk management to reduce risks and closely examine training procedures.

• Develop a specific urban training standard operating procedure that will apply Corps-wide. It should include concepts such as the following sequence for training: (1) operations order/brief; (2) terrain model brief and walk-through; (3) walk-through on terrain; (4) dry run with blanks; and (5) live fire. The urban standard operating procedure can be instilled in entry-level training and reinforced in the Fleet Marine Force; the process is good for both training and safety. In addition, urban warfare lessons learned from Iraq, reflecting real-world use of the latest weapon systems, needs to be incorporated into safety regulations and urban standard operating procedure.

• Develop training munitions that will foster more realistic and safer combined-arms training. “Blue bombs” have changed little in two decades, and modern technology definitely supports innovation in this area. Thin-skinned paint-filled or water-filled “bombs” and “shells” should be developed. Research should increase toward finding viable munitions such as “deadened” bullets that expend their energy more rapidly and grenades that stun temporarily and without physical damage to training personnel. The goal of the new training munitions should be maximizing safety and feedback.

Those who may say that “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” need to be reminded that the Corps was not broken in the 1920s and 1930s. In fact, the Corps was heavily engaged in the Caribbean nations fighting guerrillas and enjoying success. Innovation and transformation do not necessarily occur because there is a fundamental problem—it can and should occur before there is a fundamental problem. Combat in Ramadi, Fallujah, Najaf, and other Iraqi cities bring new urgency for this transformation. Today’s newspaper front pages dramatically show the Corps’ need for urban warfare excellence.

Finally, it is commonly believed by many that specialization tends to cause basic skills to atrophy. First, to call urban warfare skills “specialization” is a stretch. That is akin to calling mechanized operations specialized. To be skilled in missions such as urban combined arms, urban sustainment, and urban reconnaissance only will improve and magnify Marines’ skills in other terrain. While jungle patrolling, cold-weather operations, and mountainous operations may become secondary skills, the Corps should not ignore those skills—it should continue to train in these areas as it does today. Urban warfare should be the focus, but not to the total exclusion of other skills.

Conclusion

When one examines potential future-war scenarios, two facts stand out: First, future conflict likely will occur in urban areas. Second, the Marine Corps will be involved in these conflicts, because the great majority of the urban areas of the world are in the littoral regions. Within this context, it is imperative that the Marine Corps act now to shift its focus to that of an urban-warfare expeditionary force-in-readiness. The Corps must not stray from the belief that urban warfare development has the potential to do for the Corps and the nation what amphibious warfare development did for the Corps and the nation prior to World War II—win this nation’s wars.

Major Houlgate is an infantry officer who has served with 6th Marines, 7th Marines, as an inspector and instructor in 25th Marines, and on The Basic School staff. Currently, he is assigned to the Strategic Initiatives Group in Plans, Policy & Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps.

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