Will Judgment Be a
Casualty of NCW?
Page 2 of 2
Centralization of command authority was the hallmark of the Soviet—and
now, by default, the Russian—military.[2] Consistent
with a totalitarian government that has cause to fear its military,
decision-making power was held closely by the elite within the large
bureaucratic organization that ran the Soviet military machine. Close
control of military matters in a “tight” command structure supported
this orientation. Command by negation held no pride of place in the
“operational art” of the Russian military. Institutional controls were
established such that orders came from above without question.
A telling example of the inadequacies of this military command structure
is the lack of accurate battlefield assessment data from Chechnya to
reach high command. Initial assessments of the military force required
to subdue Chechen forces were so small that intelligence officials severely
underestimated the impact of known quantities of arms left by departing
Russian troops in June 1992. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated at
a press conference that one regiment of paratroopers could “solve the
problem” within two hours.[3]
The natural observation is that this intelligence failure is inconsistent
with a centralized, tight chain of command. The expectation is for stringent
information exchange, because only seniors are vested with decision-making
authority. In actuality, a highly centralized, vertical chain of command
must by necessity filter the upward flow of information. Because decisions
are made at the highest levels, the sheer volume of information to be
passed up the chain of command must be condensed for efficiency. Brevity
trumps substance, with the result that important information is lost.
If experience is to shape future policies, the lessons of Chechnya
and other recent nontraditional conflicts in the Russian “near abroad”
should ring prominent. The civil war in Tajikistan maintained its momentum
largely through weapons smuggled from neighboring Afghanistan. Civil
conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Abkhazia, the two Ossetias, and Georgia
bear many similarities to the Chechen conflict—a nontraditional enemy,
lack of consensus on objectives, nationalism, and tactics far removed
from the great tank battles envisioned in the Central European theater.
The dearth of sound tactical decisions in Chechnya can be attributed
largely to the limitations of the inherited rigid command structure
confronted with a far different battlefield from that for which it was
designed.
Russia failed to adapt command structure to its security environment,
resulting in military and political failure. The United States has a
command structure fundamentally different from Russia’s. In its proper
application, command by negation is flexible and responsive. While this
comparison of the two systems is not entirely rigorous, it highlights
an important point.[4] The nature of the new security threats facing the
United States—nontraditional enemies, lack of consensus on objectives,
nationalism, and new battlefields—calls for an adaptive decision-making
structure.
Application to Network-Centric Operations
So what do these two greatly differing institutional arrangements of
command structure have to do with network-centric operations and the
RMA? Everything. Command structure provides the vehicle by which strategic
policy is transformed to operational effect. The current composite warfare
commander (CWC) concept, in which individual warfare commanders are
assigned specific warfare areas in a theater, is a structurally sound—if
not brilliant—system.
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Simple and flexible, CWC obviates the information overload associated
with tactical decision making in a complex, high-speed, technically
advanced environment through smart delegation under an overriding command
framework. Those with the best information, expertise, or capability
are designated as specific warfare area commanders, responsible for
promulgating specific guidance complementary to the overarching general
tactical guidance (commander’s intent). Control from the top is maintained
through such structural mechanisms as weapons warning status and readiness
postures. Alternate warfare commanders are predesignated. Marching orders
are specified through intention messages, so the spirit and not just
the letter of the order is understood. It is a bottom-up rather than
top-down system. In tactical effect, the CWC concept is effective, flexible,
and responsive. It must be, because it has to function when the fog
of war has rolled in.
Decision Dynamics of Tactical NCO
Network-centric operations, when their evolution (or engineering) reaches
maturity, will provide extreme transparency to the highest levels of
the chain of command. The “man in the arena” will now have a larger
audience, with the unavoidable consequence that the audience will become
overly involved in the decision dynamic. Political considerations will
bear greater weight—and the political process has a well-established
ability to negate tactical advantage. Structurally, NCO thus has introduced
the ability to place a stranglehold on low-level decision making. The
interagency process is sound for national policy formation, but not
for individual and unit employment.
In addition to the potential for unnecessary oversight there is the
very real danger of its corollary: overreliance on guidance from above.
Tactical transparency allows the unit-level commander to defer decisions
to a superior that rightly should be within the unit-level commander’s
purview for reasons of expediency and applicability. Deferring decisions
up the chain of command may be fine in a world of perfect information
and little need for rapid action, but certainly not in the chaos of
war, no matter what technological levers are applied.
Modern weapon systems demand rapid response. The strength of our command-by-negation
system is that unit-level commanders maintain the deepest immersion
in the local tactical situation, have the best understanding of required
action, and are properly trained (and trusted) to make decisions exogenous
of the need for higher guidance. For risk-averse commanders, tactical
transparency can be a welcome crutch, because it offers the ultimate
cover.
Another aspect of command by negation is the level of ownership imparted
to the shooters. The ability of lower echelon commanders to have a significant
say in operational decision making improves morale and buy in. On the
other hand, when orders come from above, devoid of amplifying information,
the tendency is to follow the letter rather than the spirit of the order,
and the commander’s ability to motivate troops is frustrated.[5] When
coupled with military setbacks, as in Chechnya, this can erode the legitimacy
of high command decisions on a tactical level.
Leadership: Overcoming Human Tendency
An implicit assumption of network-centric operations is that information
management will allow the refinement of copious data to those pieces
a commander needs to make intelligent, well-informed decisions—the fog
of war will be penetrated by the RMA spotlight. But no spotlight is
bright enough to cut through human tendency. Tactical decisions simply
are not made in the realm of perfect information. That is the reality
of our business. Tactical decisions are made based on experience and
judgment, with the best possible use of whatever flawed information
is available. Human tendency is to desire complete understanding of
facts (the tactical scenario), outcomes (what will happen if I make
this decision) and consequences (who can blame me if this goes bad).
The keys to breaking through this tendency are not found in technological
solutions; they are found in the leadership aspects of decision making.
An example from naval history demonstrates this leadership. As Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific, during World War II, Admiral Chester Nimitz by and large left
decisions to his on-scene commanders, despite tremendous pressure to
take a closer level of involvement. He trusted Admirals Raymond Spruance
and William Halsey to develop good plans and to adjust as the battle
unfolded. Geographic circumstance and limited communications capability
certainly were factors in his relatively “hands off” approach. Yet,
the ability to trust subordinates with decisions was his hallmark, and
one of the characteristics that made him a great military leader.
Imagine if Admiral Nimitz had maintained the ability to pick up a voice
circuit and “chat” with Admiral Spruance on board the Indianapolis (CA-35)
while on the gunline at Okinawa. Could any conversation, or other information
exchange, truly have communicated the tactical reality of that campaign?
Likely not. Spruance was better equipped to call the shots for the simple
reason he was there, immersed in the tactical reality of the day. He
had “immersion knowledge.” Part of Admiral Nimitz’s genius was understanding
that his commanders had a better view than he did, and exercising the
leadership to not interfere or second guess his subordinates once plans
were agreed on.
Fast forward to the current security environment. Speaking from both
experience and observation, I can say tactical second guessing appears
fairly common. Often it takes the form of “sharing the picture” with
the upper chain of command, but even that implies oversight. Having
sufficient bandwidth to ensure real-time imagery of tactical events
is considered a staple of modern combat systems suites. Such tactical
transparency in a decision chain mitigates the role of unit-level leadership
and panders to the risk averse. Tactical transparency changes the incentive
structure of a military commander, particularly one who is averse not
only to difficult decisions but also to criticism.
We grow our leaders from an early age to seek responsibility and learn
the art of decision making because we understand that the essence of
leadership is the ability to act in spite of natural human tendencies.
Stewardship of Judgment
Technology is the vital next step in the evolution of warfare and
a powerful enabler. But it will never replace military leadership, particularly
at a tactical level. The engineered infrastructure of the RMA must be
viewed as another set of tools to complement the more important (but
unquantifiable) resource of leadership infrastructure. Used improperly,
network-centric operations have the potential to make a casualty of
the military judgment of our decision makers. We must continue to grow
leaders willing to make decisions regardless of what information has
or has not appeared on their computer screens. This implies conscientious
stewardship of judgment.
Military decisions must be sound, reasoned, and expedient. When the
moment of decisive and violent action is ordered, the commander closest
to the shooter has the best view. That commander may not have perfect
information, but a baseline of judgment and experience on which to base
decisions will carry the day. Leadership is the key to battlefield success,
not technology.
