Smarter Security for Smaller Budgets

Regional Acceptance

Haze-gray U.S. Navy warships cannot shake off their ominous appearance or disguise their primary purpose as combatants built for offensive military missions. Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, discovered this in spring 2004 when he unsuccessfully attempted to implement the Regional Maritime Security Initiative in the Straits of Malacca. Navy warships when used for maritime security duties are too menacing in regions sensitive to sovereign rights, and may not always be the most politically acceptable means for combating maritime criminals and terrorists. 7 Recent diplomatic activity by the Japanese government underscores this issue. For the October 2004 Proliferation Security Initiative exercises held off Tokyo, Japan formally requested that the U.S. include Coast Guard forces. The Japanese wanted the Coast Guard present primarily to emphasize the law enforcement aspect of the exercises, as well as to draw upon the service's skill in boarding, conducting maritime searches, and constabulary duties. 8

International Engagement and Operations

The majority of the world's navies and coast guards are not blue-water, power projection, sea-control forces, but coastal services concerned with maritime security threats. Regional maritime security operations are the most likely activities with the international naval community. It is usually difficult for these international navies and coast guards to connect with the U.S. Navy's high-technology, deep draft warships. While the LCS is about the size of a frigate, it may not relate to the missions and force structures of many of the international naval organizations, and could very well intimidate them. Retired Royal Australian Commodore Sam Bateman, a maritime security expert specializing in Asia Pacific affairs, noted that coast guards are emerging as important national institutions in Asia and the Pacific with the potential to make a major contribution to regional order and security. 9 While the LCS would probably be highly appropriate for maritime security operations with larger, advanced navies such as those of Great Britain, Germany and Japan, it may not be the most appropriate means for the same operations with lesser capable navies.

Security Environment

In the mid- to late-Victorian era, the United Kingdom faced no peer to contest the Royal Navy's global reach, presence, and sea control. Yet, despite a main battle fleet of capital ships and world-ranging cruisers to deter rivals, the Royal Navy frequently found itself conducting operations with its dispersed frigates and specialized and purpose-built gunboats 10 optimized for local conditions 11 against maritime security threats. 12 The Royal Navy with its ships on station around the globe acted as the world's maritime constabulary safeguarding the seas. This allowed British merchant ships upon their lawful occasions 13 to sail without impediment, ensuring regional and imperial stability, and an unfaltering British, if not world, economy.

The prospects of the future environment facing the United States are nearly similar. Major theater war at sea is remote, but maritime security operations against numerous non-military, asymmetric threats are highly likely and must be defeated before they reach U.S. shores. 14 Such operations require the Navy to deploy around the world. This global naval presence benefits the world by providing protection for shipping. Although the U.S. has a negligible merchant marine fleet engaged in international trade, the nation understands the value of safeguarding the trade, since global commerce fuels its economy. 15 In early January 2005, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, stated that the days of major naval engagements are past—at least for now. He continued, Building a force set that is designed only to deal with. . . major combat operations. . . is the incorrect approach. 16

The Navy in the future security environment shares another parallel with the Victorian Royal Navy. Numbers count. Will there will be enough ships to meet the demand generated by non-military and terrorist threats, especially if it must also equip itself with hugely expensive, highly capable warships for dissuasion, contested access, and power projection purposes? 17 In the Victorian era the First Lord of the Admiralty complained about the pressures from merchants, missionaries, colonial, and foreign offices, that from Vancouver's isle to the river Plate, from the West Indies to China the Admiralty is called upon by Secretaries of State to send ships. . . . The undeniable fact is that we are doing or endeavoring to do much more than our force is sufficient for. It is fortunate that the world is not large, for there is no other limit to the service of the fleets. 18 While the world has not grown smaller in the intervening century, the size of the Navy continues to decline. It wants the LCS to cost no more than $230 million for the hull, not including the modular mission packages that could cost another $80 to $100 million per ship. 19 Can the Navy afford the numbers—50 to 60 LCSs—that its advocates frequently cite? At a cost that will likely exceed $300 million a copy, the LCS may be a Cadillac, when a Chevrolet-priced ship would do well for maritime security duties. 20

Too Capable?

Officials of both services agree that the Navy's role should be to support the Coast Guard, particularly in areas, such as air defense, where the Coast Guard has little or no capability. Navy officials believe that the Navy, while contributing to maritime homeland security operations, should remain primarily focused on deploying naval forces overseas to provide a forward defense against threats to the United States. 21 Why has the Navy decided it now must employ LCS in homeland security? Will the Navy use LCS to augment the Coast Guard for homeland security missions or conduct separate, stand alone missions? The defense department has offered few specifics about envisioned homeland security duties and the number of littoral combat ships needed. 22 One analyst believes that LCS will be used to guard offshore infrastructure, such as oil platforms or underwater fiber-optic cables. 23 Since the mainstays of homeland security duties are mundane and low-technology, using the littoral ships means their expensive warfare mission modules will find little everyday use. Before the Coast Guard could proceed with incorporating improved homeland security and defense capabilities for its two new maritime security ships, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted two exhaustive reviews. It would seem reasonable that the DHS decision process would be useful in evaluating the LCS's role in homeland security. Further, if the Navy wants to use the LCS in homeland security, its numbers will be affected by the Coast Guard's contribution of at least 33 major ships. Conversely, the analysis that led to the determination that the Navy needs to employ LCS in homeland security may be used by the Coast Guard to see if it needs additional maritime security ships.

The Right Way Ahead

As insurance, the LCS needs a naval warfighting capability for anti-access operations no matter how unlikely some defense analysts consider the possibility of conventional conflict. 24 How much anti-access capability is needed for potential military operations? Moreover, how much global maritime security capability does the nation need? Can one ship, such as the littoral combat ship, provide both capabilities? These are important questions particularly when some defense analysts believe that the LCS is going to spend 95 percent of its life doing [global war on terrorism] missions. 25 Purchasing expensive ships optimized for the least likely scenarios to be used almost exclusively in the most likely scenarios is a decision that requires close examination. 26

The littoral combat ships designed by Lockheed Martin, top, and General Dynamics, bottom, will have to be modified to be used in the maritime security role, a task for which they were not specifically designed.

Before proceeding with adapting the LCS for maritime security duties, the Navy should consider using the Coast Guard's maritime security ships, especially the larger NSC. With a range and endurance three times greater than the LCS, coupled with a 29-knot sprint speed, this ship may adequately serve, in terms of affordability, numbers, mission fit, and operating characteristics, as a suitable Navy ship for its global maritime security duties. The NSC's design for constabulary vice warfighting duties, equipment, systems, and dimensions could make its presence more acceptable and relevant for regional maritime security operations and international engagement purposes.

As part of its revamping of defense needs, the U.S. can ill afford to continue ignoring the lack of meaningful maritime security planning and coordination between the world's largest and seventh largest navies—the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard. The de facto joint relationship between the two services for ship, aircraft, and C4ISR procurement and maritime security operations needs to be formalized and overseen by Congress. Retired Navy Rear Admiral Philip Dur, chief executive officer of Northrop Grumman's Shipbuilding Systems, commented that it would be helpful if the Navy and Coast Guard jointly planned their long-term shipbuilding buys. I do not know that either service takes the other service's capabilities into account, he said. 27 The defense department's decision to use the littoral combat ship in the homeland security role without regard to Coast Guard developments is an additional argument for improved planning and coordination.

The time has come for the Navy and the Coast Guard to make the objectives of their National Fleet Policy Statement a reality. This innovative policy committed both services to develop complementary forces that address the entire spectrum of the U.S.'s 21st century naval and maritime threats, to leverage each service's core competencies to improve capability, interoperability, and affordability, and to stretch the budget dollar with economies of scale in total ownership costs.

In his 2005 Guidance, Admiral Clark directed a strong belt-tightening approach, calling for a faster, more agile and smaller fleet. 28 He clearly recognizes that the Navy's present acquisition plan is unaffordable and that building a force designed only to deal with major combat operations, given all the other tasks that it faces in the world today, is the incorrect approach to building the force set of the future. 29 Admiral Clark wants to reshape the Navy to handle anti-terror missions as well as traditional naval operations. 30 One of his key lieutenants, Vice Admiral Joseph Sestak, said, the Navy's traditional areas of operations—overseas offensive combat operations and homeland defense—are merging. 31 Is the Navy reinventing a portion of itself to do Coast Guard missions as it searches for more relevancy and affordability?

In a world plagued with a burgeoning growth in terrorist and civilian maritime threats, the nation can ill afford two separate solutions for its maritime security requirements. Full integration between the Navy and Coast Guard maritime security capabilities planning and operations is warranted, especially in light of budget realities. Admiral Tom Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard, believes that, In today's post-9/11 world, we must forge even closer bonds with the Navy. 32 Instead of talking about an increased Navy role in homeland security, Navy leadership should be talking about forging closer bonds with the Coast Guard.

1. Robert Work, Transforming the Battle Fleet: Steering a Course Through Uncharted Waters. back to article
2. John T. Bennett, Initial LCS Designs Expected to Meet Homeland Defense Requirements, Inside The Pentagon, 16 December 2004. back to article
3. Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background, and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 25 June 2004. back to article
4. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security to the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Integrated Deepwater Systems (IDS) Acquisition Decision Memorandum for Post 9/11 Mission Needs Statement, 21 January 2005 back to article .
5. Attachment 2, Deepwater Asset Description, Report to Congress on Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan 2005. back to article
6. Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship. back to article
7. Piracy and Terrorism, The New York Times , 10 April 2004. back to article
8. Japan Hosts Round Of WMD Drills At Sea, The New York Times on the Web, 26 October 2004. back to article
9. Sam Bateman, Coast Guards: New Forces For Regional Order and Security, Analysis from the East-West Center, No. 65, January 2003, pp. 4-6. back to article
10. Sir James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force , MacMillan, New York, 1971, p. 21. back to article
11. While these gunboats were ideal for constabulary duties they were of limited use in wartime. back to article
12. The U.S. Navy's maritime security operations in the littorals against the Philippine Insurrectos in 1899 and 1900 offer useful similarities to consider. See Commander Frederick L. Sawyer, U.S. Navy (Retired), Sons of Gunboats, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1946. back to article
13. Royal Navy Prayer, Book of Common Prayer. back to article
14. Mapping the Global Future, Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project Based on Consultations with Nongovernmental Experts Around the World, NIC 2004-13, National Intelligence Council, Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C., December 2004. back to article
15. Mapping the Global Future. back to article
16. Michael Bruno, Navy Not 'Correctly Balanced' For Future, Clark Says, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report , 12 January 2005. back to article
17. Robert Work, Transforming the Battle Fleet. back to article
18. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery , Ashfield Press, London, 1976, p. 180. back to article
19. Ronald O'Rourke, Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 3 September 2004. back to article
20. George C. Wilson, Remember the Cole and Reform the Military, National Journal , 28 October 2000. back to article
21. Ronald O'Rourke, Homeland Security: Navy Operations—Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 17 May 2004. back to article
22. John T. Bennett, Initial LCS Designs Expected To Meet Homeland Defense Requirements. back to article
23. John T. Bennett, Initial LCS Designs. back to article
24. Robert Work, Transforming the Battle Fleet. back to article
25. Dave Ahearn, Navy Needs Enough Ships, but Capability is Key, Defense Today , 20 December 2004. back to article
26. This is not a new occurrence. In 1912 the Navy employed the scout cruisers USS Birmingham and USS Chester as the first U.S. ships to conduct what would become the International Ice Patrol after the RMS Titantic disaster. The Navy pulled out of the patrol for the next year because it needed both warships ready for service in Mexico and West Indian waters, and the mission devolved to the Coast Guard. back to article
27. Roxana Tiron, Lack of Specificity in Navy Shipbuilding Plans Irks the Industry, National Defense, July 2004. back to article
28. Robert A. Hamilton, Navy's Chief of Operations Wants Faster, Smaller Fleet, New London Day, and Navy/Defense/Electric Boat, 4 January 2005. back to article
29. Ann Roosevelt, Build a Force for the New Strategic Landscape, Not the Past, Clark Says, Defense Daily , 12 January 2005. back to article
30. Christopher P. Cavas, New Missions to Rely on Sea Basing U.S. Navy Chief Says, Defense News , 12 January 2005. back to article
31. Christopher P. Cavas, New Missions. back to article
32. Admiral Thomas H. Collins, U.S. Coast Guard, Change And Continuity—The U.S. Coast Guard Today, Naval War College Review , Spring 2004, Vol. LVII, No. 2. back to article

Captain Stubbs served in the U.S. Coast Guard for 30 years, with duty as a senior strategic and force planner, a combat tour in Vietnam, and command of a major USCGC conducting maritime security missions. He works for Anteon Corporation as a national security consultant.

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