An Unlikely Location

Securing the Negotiations

Mead's most immediate concern was the physical security of the shipyard in general, and Building 86 in particular. The Navy had directed him to turn his "new storehouse building," over to Secretary Peirce for use by the peace delegates. 16 Workers quickly divided its interior by erecting walls and hanging drapes. Although the building, which featured a sturdy brick facade, was plain by present-day standards, a member of the Russian delegation remarked, "One cannot help but admire the contrast of the American surroundings and ours especially as compared to the poor premises of the Russian Foreign Office." 17

To protect his yard, the storehouse building, and the peace delegates, Admiral Mead called in the Marines. Writing to Brigadier General George F. Elliott, the Corps' commandant, Mead requested a detail of two sergeants, six corporals, and 42 privates to supplement the yard's existing security detachment of Marines. 18 The commandant granted the admiral's request for the non-commissioned officers, but drew the line at 25 privates, stating that the detailing of the other 17 Marines was "impracticable." 19

Mead also ordered the yard to be "absolutely closed to visitors" during the conference and required departments to provide each employee with a personal pass for admittance to the facility during the proceedings. 20 Applicants for employment were advised to apply by mail; however, veterans could apply during a four-hour period on Mondays and Tuesdays at the yard's front gate. From there, they would be escorted to the application window and then returned to the front gate under guard. Even individuals applying for enlistment received similar treatment. 21

During one of the festivities that surrounded the peace talks, crowds listen to dignitaries outside Building 86, the converted storehouse in which the negotiations were held.

Controversially, Mead took steps to limit the presence of the press at the shipyard. In the days following the official announcement of the conference, hundreds of reporters and photographers flowed into Portsmouth. The admiral established a formal application process for press access to the delegates, and a limited number of passes were issued, Mead later wrote, "as nearly as possible in the order in which their applications were taken." This caused resentment among the larger press population and the major U.S. media outlets, which believed that they should have special privilege. 22 Many even filed protests with the Navy. 23

The draconian nature of Mead's actions with regard to public and press access and his use of the Marines to provide security for the yard fulfilled President Roosevelt's wish to provide "some retired place" for the peace negotiations, but security was only one aspect of Roosevelt's use of the military in his diplomacy. Another lay in his intention to use the Navy Yard's unique communications capabilities to monitor carefully the on-going negotiations.

Listening from a Distance

When the State Department first surveyed Portsmouth as a possible negotiation sight, one of its initial questions was whether the local Western Union office could expand the number of wires into town. 24 Communications, secure and unsecure, were critical to the success of the conference, and Portsmouth was unusually well equipped. The first transatlantic telegraph cable came ashore just down the coast at Rye Beach. Western Union was present in ample force, and Portsmouth had telephone service. Moreover, the Navy Yard had its own telegraph and telephone capabilities as well as a wireless telegraphy station that allowed Navy commanders to communicate nearly instantly up and down the coast and with ships at sea. 25

Within days of the announcement of Portsmouth's selection, Mead began fielding requests from local telegraph companies to string additional wires into the yard. Initially he simply delayed the decision by passing it on to the Navy Department. 26 The secretary of the Navy took nearly half of the remaining time before the conference to grant permission. Even then Mead carefully controlled access by directing the new lines to an ad hoc communications center while allowing each telegraph provider only one line and one operator inside Building 86. 27 These lines were primarily for the use of the peace delegations and Assistant Secretary of State Peirce.

Controlling the size of the communications stream out of the shipyard helped Roosevelt to "take the pulse" of the activities within its secured confines. While there is nothing that suggests that the president read the emissary's messages, he was aware of who sent telegrams, when they were sent, how long they were, and how many were sent. Registered in the yard's logbooks, this information alone would reveal to an informed observer a great deal about the tempo and direction of the negotiations. It was a resource over which the Navy, and by extension Roosevelt, exercised a great deal of control, and it allowed the president to remain as fully informed as possible in Oyster Bay.

Protocol in a Republic

In European imperial courts, diplomacy had its own sense of style. Possessing court ranks, diplomats wore uniforms at state functions denoting their relative position within the court. Great conferences were held in fine palaces, surrounded by historic state treasures and booty, denoting the sum total of a nation's past and present greatness. Admiral Mead, on behalf of his president, was tasked with hosting a Russian delegation headed by a future count, Serge Witte, and a Japanese delegation led by a baron, Jutaro Komura, while upholding the anti-aristocratic traditions of the American republic. Fortunately, the elements and customs of the naval services were more than up to the task.

The presidential yacht Mayflower , as well as the packet ship Dolphin , would provide transportation for the delegations from their meeting with the president at Oyster Bay to Portsmouth. Often used by Roosevelt, the secretary of the Navy, and various commanders of the fleet, these were small, swift vessels with well-equipped, comfortable accommodations for the diplomats. Mead's responsibilities began with the disembarkation of the delegations in Portsmouth. In order to transport the visitors from the vessels, as well as to handle the daily movement to and from the Wentworth Hotel to the yard, Mead ordered into service four Navy cutters, boats approximately 25 feet long, manned by enlisted crews of five sailors. 28

While the boats were being painted and made fit for the distinguished passengers, Mead inquired as to the official diplomatic status of his guests. Secretary Peirce informed him that Witte and Komura would each carry the title of ambassador. This presented certain requirements on Mead's part, and he wrote the chief of the Bureau of Equipment in Washington, asking if the U.S. jack "or that of the nation to which the ambassador belongs" should be flown from their cutters. 29

In this photo taken during the talks, the head of the Russian delegation, Serge Witte, sits directly across the negotiating table from his Japanese counterpart, Jutaro Komura.

The Bureau of Navigation, closely aligned with the secretary of the Navy's office, subsequently gave notice that the envoys would receive ambassadorial status while in the United States and that they should receive the full honors due that office. 30 Two flags, one Russian and one Japanese, arrived and were mounted prominently upon the jack-staffs at the bow of the cutters.

The admiral's preparations for the delegations' arrival indicate that his initial letter to the Marine commandant, General Elliot, had two purposes. To be certain, he desired the unique security capabilities the Marines could supply, but he also hoped to provide the type of ceremonial presence that the U.S. Marine Corps embodies. Marines on duty at the commandant's headquarters in Washington, frequently detailed to high-level White House events, were trained in just the type of presentation Mead desired, but they were under the personal command of General Elliot. This suggests a reason for Mead to contact the commandant rather than the yard or base commanders in nearby Boston, Newport, or New York. Each had a healthy supply of Marines on security detail. They could have quickly and easily arrived in Portsmouth, but the admiral wanted the spit-and-polish appearance and ceremonial ability that only Washington Marines could supply.

On 7 August 1905, the Mayflower and the Dolphin hove into port, having transported the two delegations up from Oyster Bay. The two parties boarded the cutters and made the short trip to the pier where Mead awaited alongside Secretary Peirce. The admiral had published a special order governing the arrival of the peacemakers, ordering his staff into "dress" uniform and the Marines into "full-dress" for the occasion. 31 As the delegations reached the top of the pier's brow, a deafening cannon roared the first of its salutes while the Marines smartly presented arms. 32 Mead and Peirce led the delegations into Building 86, which had been gaily decorated with flags to mark the occasion. There, the admiral hosted a reception for the two delegations. 33

Mead did not forget the social component of the protocol equation. In Europe, balls featuring court dress, the latest Paris fashions, and military uniforms festooned with flashing medals accompanied great gatherings of diplomats. Portsmouth's gatherings were more subdued but no less glamorous. On the evening of 17 August, ten days into the negotiations and at a very tense juncture, Mead and Peirce co-hosted a social event for the participants. Military officers wore "evening dress," ladies wore the latest available fashions, and the Mayflower 's military band provided music. 34 While a breakthrough did not occur coincidental with this event, it did demonstrate that the American hosts were dedicated to doing everything within their power to bring about peace between Russia and Japan.

Roosevelt's Diplomacy Revealed

The negotiations did reach a successful conclusion. The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on 5 September 1905 at the Navy Yard to the accompaniment of ceremonial cannons and church bells pealing. 35 A year later Roosevelt learned that he had earned the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize. The prize committee cited his ability to "infuse the ideal of peace into practical politics" as one of the prime reasons for his recognition. 36 Because he was still in office, T.R. directed Assistant Secretary of State Peirce to accept the prize on his behalf.

Yet, aside from the president's overriding commitment to arbitration and mediation as a means for settling international conflicts, what do the negotiations at Portsmouth and Roosevelt's role in them tell us about his style of diplomacy? First, we can establish that the diplomacy practiced at Portsmouth truly was in his style. Secretary of State John Hay was ill and confined to his home throughout most of the first half of 1905. He died on 1 July, during the Portsmouth preparations. 37 Elihu Root did not become secretary of state until the talks were well under way. 38

Style mattered to Roosevelt, and he knew it mattered within the context of traditional diplomacy as well. As the head of a republic that shunned court dress and aristocratic titles and had been in existence for less than 150 years, Roosevelt faced many hurdles in impressing his guests with the dignity of their host nation. His familiarity with the Navy and Marine Corps presented him with a solution. When it came to ceremony and honors, no one could affect the style of aristocracy better than the naval services, and that is what Admiral Mead set out to do. Establishing the degree of success is a matter of pure conjecture, but the one area of the proceedings that Serge Witte did not complain about in his memoir was protocol and ceremonies.

Roosevelt did more than set style of his diplomacy; he was, in fact, deeply involved in its execution. T.R. paid intense attention to the communications out of Portsmouth. His normal voluminous written correspondence appears to come to a complete halt during the ten days that followed the opening of the negotiations. 39 He remained aware of the activities within the yard to the degree that he summoned members of each delegation at key moments of impasse to meet with him in Oyster Bay. His comments to them were informed enough to restart the talks as well as influence their individual governments back home. 40

Yet in the choice of a navy yard for the site of the peace negotiations we can discern something more than Roosevelt's style or his level of participation; we see his fingerprints on his favorite talisman. By 1905 the pattern�the formula�of his diplomacy was set: When Roosevelt faced a crisis, he reached for the naval services. In conflicts involving the United States that would be considered normal, but the fact that it remained true even when presented with a situation that was purely diplomatic (at least from the U.S. perspective) reveals the depth of Theodore Roosevelt's attachment to the Navy and Marine Corps. They had become as much a part of his "speak softly" as they were his "big stick."

Theodore Roosevelt (T.R.) to Baron Kentaro Kaneko, 31 May 1905, T.R. to William Howard Taft, 31 May 1905, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt ( TLTR ), vol. 4, ed. Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951-1954), 1198. back to article
The yard actually fell within the boundaries of the neighboring state of Maine, but it would be Portsmouth that would be remembered by history. Raymond A. Esthus, Double Eagle and the Rising Sun (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 52. back to article
Theodore Roosevelt (T.R.) to Oscar Solomon, 9 February 1904, TLTR , 721. back to article
T.R. to Theodore Roosevelt Jr., 10 February 1904, TLTR , 724. back to article
T.R. to Cecil Spring Rice,13 June 1904, TLTR , 831. back to article
T.R. letter to John Albert Tiffin Hull, 16 March 1905, TLTR , 1141. back to article
T.R. to George von Lengerke Meyer, 26 December 1904, TLTR , 1078. back to article
State Department telegram to Ambassador Meyer, 8 June 1905, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1905 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), 807. back to article
Ambassador Meyer to President Roosevelt, 18 June 1905, Minister Griscom to Secretary of State, 18 June 1905, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1905 , 811-812. back to article
T.R. letter to Kongoro Takahira, 15 June 1905, TLTR , 1226 back to article
T.R. to Takahira, 15 June 1905. back to article
Eugene P. Trani, doctoral dissertation, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in Rooseveltian Diplomacy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1966), 74-75. back to article
Edward N. Pearson to Herbert H. D. Peirce, 3 July 1905. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress (Hereafter referred to as TRPLOC), Series 1, Reel 55. back to article
Peter E. Randall, There are No Victors Here (Portsmouth, NH: Portsmouth Marine Society, 2002) 11-12. back to article
Navy Department letter to Rear Admiral William W. Mead, 10 July 1905. Record Group (RG) 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard General Correspondence, Folder 127. National Archives Annex, Waltham, MA (NARA-WM). William B. Cogar. Dictionary of Admirals of the US Navy , 2 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 189-190. back to article
Navy Department to Rear Admiral William Mead, 10 July 1905. back to article
J. J. Korostovetz, Pre-War Diplomacy; the Russo-Japanese Problem; Treaty Signed in Portsmouth, U.S.A. (London: British Periodicals, 1920) 8 August 1905. 44. back to article
Rear Admiral George Mead to Brigadier Commandant George Elliot, 20 July 1905. RG 181 Portsmouth Navy Yard, Letters and Endorsements Sent to the Commandant, USMC (1902-1911) vol. 1. National Archives Annex, Waltham, MA (NARA-WM). 84. back to article
Commandant George Elliott to Rear Admiral William Mead, 24 July 1905, RG 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard, General Correspondence, Folder 127. NARA-WM. back to article
Rear Admiral William Mead to Mr. J.J. Haring, 1 August 1905. RG 181.3.10, Records of the Portsmouth Navy Yard, Misc. Letters Sent (Press Copies) 1899-1907, vol. 17. NARA-WM. 418. back to article
Rear Admiral William Mead, Special Order, 2 August 1905. RG 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard, Orders, Memorandums and Circulars issued by Commandant, 1898-1911. NARA-WM.166. back to article
Rear Admiral William Mead to Secretary of the Navy Charles Bonaparte, 8 August 1905. RG 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard, General Correspondence, Folder 127. NARA-WM. 33-34. back to article
Mr. E. B. Pillsbury to Rear Admiral W.W. Mead, 28 July 1905. RG 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard, Telegrams Sent, 1901-1911, vol. 7. 461. back to article
Trani, 75-76. back to article
Roosevelt knew of this capability. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the McKinley administration, he had been keenly interested in the introduction of all manners of new technology. back to article
Secretary of the Navy to Admiral William Mead, 26 July 1905. Portsmouth Navy Yard, General Correspondence, Folder 127. NARA-WM. 17. back to article
Admiral William Mead to Mr. C.F. Ames, 4 August 1905. Portsmouth Navy Yard, Folder 127. NARA-WM. back to article
Admiral Mead to Chief of Navigation Bureau, 24 July 1905, RG 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard, General Correspondence, Folder 127. Admiral William Mead to Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, 4 August 1905. RG 181 Portsmouth Navy Yard, Letters Sent to Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting (1862-1910) vol. 12. NARA-WM. 336. Rear Admiral Mead to Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 29 July 1905. RG 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard, General Correspondence, Folder 127. NARA-WM. 40. back to article
Rear Admiral William Mead to Rear Admiral Henry Manney, 29 July 1905. RG 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard, Commandants Letter Books (1891-1909) vol. 2. NARA-WM. 190. back to article
Bureau of Navigation to Rear Admiral William Mead, 31 July 1905. RG 181 Portsmouth Navy Yard, General Correspondence (1900-1911), Folder 127. NARA-WM. back to article
RG 181, Portsmouth Navy Yard, General Correspondence, Folder 93. Special Order, 4 August 1905. NARA-WM. back to article
Korostovetz, 44. back to article
Rear Admiral William Mead to Rear Admiral Henry Manney, RG 181 Portsmouth Navy Yard, Letters Sent to Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting (1862-1910) vol. 12. NARA-WM. 339. back to article
Rear Admiral Mead to Commanding Officers, USS Mayflower and USS Dolphin , 17 August 1905. RG 181 Portsmouth Navy Yard, General Correspondence (1900-1911), Folder 127. NARA-WM. back to article
Randall, 54-55. back to article
http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1906/press.html back to article
Theodore Roosevelt to Clara Hay, 1 July 1905. TLTR . 1258. back to article
Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938), 454. back to article
Roosevelt averaged three to four letters a day throughout the weeks leading up to the opening of the conference, and then, abruptly, writes nothing consequential enough to be included in his edited letters between 5 August and 13 August 1905. TLTR . 1299-1301. back to article
Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternberg, 21 August 1905, Roosevelt to Jean Jules Jusserand, 21 August 1905, Roosevelt to Kentaro Keneko, 22 August 1905. Roosevelt to Herbert H.D. Peirce, 23 August 1905, Roosevelt to Kentaro Keneko, 23 August 1905. TLTR . 1306-1312. back to article

Commander Hendrix is the prospective executive officer of Tactical Air Control Squadron Eleven, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California. He has twice been named the Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar by the Navy Historical Center, and is this year's John D. Hayes Scholar. He is a member of the Board of Directors and the Editorial Board of the Naval Institute.

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