McNamara Kills the Pilatus Porter
By Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Navy History, April 2005
Riverine forces fighting in the Mekong Delta depended on helicopters for air support, but there weren't enough to go around. Enter the short takeoff and landing (STOL) Pilatus Porter.
The concept of civilian authority over the military has been a hallmark of democracy in the United States. Military leadership has never questioned it seriously, although in some instances it has been irksome, particularly in combat. Authority is the essence of the military profession, because it has such an impact on loss of life and winning battles. Leaders with great responsibility seek as much authority as they can to implement their plans for action rapidly.
With the arrival of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense in January 1961, the nature and degree of civilian control changed dramatically. He expanded his staff with a cadre of bright young intellectuals. Micromanagement became the norm, with more control being usurped by the new incumbents. Initially, they were fascinated with the details of nuclear warfare plans and the Cold War. Then came the Vietnam War, and they were faced with the problem of stopping the advance of communism with the use of military force, many miles from the homeland. Often, results were questionable.
For example, an elaborate "electronic fence," based on the use of Navy sonobuoys for the detection of movement on the Vietcong logistic trails, received a tremendous amount of support but failed. 1 Further, naval leaders deliberately ignored at least one order from the civil authority for the use of naval air. They were certain it would fail and would result in unnecessary loss of life had the idea been implemented. 2
But some weapon systems were winners in the Vietnam War. The scope of the campaign provided opportunities and funding for development of several. The helicopter, for example, was introduced to combat during the Korean War but matured in Vietnam, particularly for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The B-52 strategic bomber, which just a few years before had been declared "off-limits" for conventional warfare, became a master in "iron bomb" missions and has continued to gain effectiveness in the conventional warfare mission, having become a significant element in the delivery of today's precision weapons.
One new tactic for naval warfare evolved in Vietnam from the need to protect the beleaguered South Vietnamese in the watery areas of the southern Mekong Delta. That requirement caused the creation of the "brown water" Navy, something quite foreign to the traditional "blue-water" forces. It centered around small 29-knot patrol boats (PBRs), "31-foot fiber-glass boats powered and steered by turnable water-jet nozzles. Their basic armament consisted of two .50-caliber guns, one M-60 machine gun, and a 40-mm grenade launcher." 3
They were high-speed, maneuverable, low-draft vessels, manned by a couple of commissioned officers and an enlisted crew. They were part of an organization designated as Task Force 116 (TF-116) and received air support from a small contingent of borrowed Army helicopters manned by Navy crews. By early 1966, this force consisted of 120 PBRs, supported by 20 large personnel craft, one amphibious transport (dock), and one landing ship tank (LST). 4 In a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Command (CinCPac) expressed his desire to increase the number of PBRs to at least 200, because the PBR/helo operations had "been effective in disrupting enemy control and use of major waterways in the Delta Region." 5 In the same message, however, CinCPac pointed out that the effectiveness could not be "optimized without a concomitant increase in number of helos." More close air support was needed.
The PBRs plied the inland waters of South Vietnam, protecting the local inhabitants who were under constant pressure from the Vietcong. They made some major contributions to the war. The tempo of their operations and effectiveness increased markedly in the late 1960s, when Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was promoted to three stars and sent to Vietnam to take command of all in-country naval forces. His aggressive inspirational leadership was reflected in the actions of this young brown-water Navy. It was an unusual role for blue-water sailors—and it was hazardous.
This new Navy needed close air support. The PBR crews soon knew their business, but as with any surface combat operation, air support was required for reconnaissance and firepower in a firefight. The Navy in Washington had not anticipated this air support requirement and the normal acquisition process for a suitable air-support vehicle would take a lot of time. Makeshift actions came into play. Some Huey helicopters were borrowed from the Army, which really had none to spare. Machine guns were anchored to the floor of the helos, and they became "gunships" manned by Navy crews. On 1 April 1967, the existing helo detachments in country were organized into Helicopter Attack (light) Squadron Three or HAL-3. 6 This squadron provided helicopter close air support to the boats. It was divided into nine detachments scattered throughout the delta. These detachments operated from five airfields and three specially configured LSTs. "A typical detachment consisted of two helicopters, a lieutenant commander as officer-in-command, with seven additional pilots, eight aircrewmen (door gunners), and an assortment of maintenance technicians." 7
No one had to view this operation very long to be aware of some of the deficiencies. The helos were old, with many maintenance problems. The high-temperature and -humidity operating conditions in the area made it difficult for the helos to realize their full payloads and lift potential. Further, rapid response depended on distance from the firefight area. Time on station was limited by the helos' fuel and payload status. Also, the noise of the helo was a dead giveaway to the enemy.
As the PBRs moved through the waters of the delta, they were often ambushed, needing air support immediately. That meant a call for helos from the nearest operating base. Sometimes the delays in response were frustrating. Even after arriving on station, the helos still lacked the firepower and time to provide the desired protection. Of greatest significance, however, was the lack of numbers. Helos were in great demand by both Army and Marine Corps forces. The shortage was real, and this new Navy mission did not generate enough priority to provide all the assets needed to support this rapidly expanding brown-water force. So the responsible authorities in the Pentagon searched for a quick solution—something as good as or better than the rotary wing helo, something that would meet the need, at least on an interim basis, until a more permanent solution could be implemented. Enter the Pilatus Porter fixed-wing aircraft.
FAIRCHILD PORTER |
| Air America was already operating Pilatus Porters in Southeast Asia when the Navy got interested. Modified versions could carry 1,925 pounds of ordnance on five external stations; stores included forward-firing gunpods, bombs, rockets, and flares. Cost was $150,000 for a combat-ready aircraft. |
The Pilatus Porter, which was designated initially as the OV-12A, originated in Switzerland, meeting a requirement for high-altitude mountain flying with a short take-off and landing (STOL) capability. It looked something like a junky Spirit of St. Louis; but looks can be deceptive. It was a high-wing monoplane with a wingspan of about 50 feet, length of 37 feet, and weight of 6,100 pounds (maximum gross). Armament could vary, but in later versions it consisted of one 20-mm side-firing Gatling cannon plus up to 1,925 pounds of external stores on five pylons—two on each wing and one on the center fuselage. It could carry a variety of ordnance, including forward firing gun pods, 500-pound and 250-pound bombs, napalm units, cluster bomb units, flares, rockets, smoke grenades, and propaganda leaflet dispensers. Various combinations of machine guns and ordnance were tested and proved feasible. A Garrett turboprop engine delivering 650 horsepower propelled the aircraft and it had a reversible propeller. Maximum speed was 148 knots at take-off power, range was more than 400 nautical miles, and endurance was almost five hours. With portable oxygen for the crew, it could go to high altitude. With its engine shut down, it could glide silently for long distances and was an excellent reconnaissance platform. It could carry at least six passengers or an equivalent number of troops with field gear. Medical evacuation capabilities were one litter patient, three ambulatory patients, and one medical attendant. 8
The reversible prop and relatively high power gave it the short landing capability. Immediately on touching the ground, or even a bit before, the prop could be reversed and the aircraft would come to a halt on the width of a normal runway. With the exceptional amount of power available, it could take off in short distances, again the width of a runway. Most appropriate for the brown-water Navy, the plane was a jewel on floats. The reversible prop provided what all floatplanes need: the ability to "back up." One could park the aircraft alongside a pier or small boat more easily than parallel parking a car in a crowded metropolis. Further, the procurement cost was relatively minor—less than $150,000 for a combat-ready airplane.
The Central Intelligence Agency already had procured some of the aircraft and was operating them in Vietnam as "Air America," with major support capabilities in Taiwan. This in-country operation could provide a major support capability if needed.
In the mid-1960s the U.S. Air Force became interested in the Porter. Two of the birds were configured with bomb stations and automatic weapons. Tests indicated that for certain missions, the plane could be a winner. Several Navy officials reasoned that, as an interim emergency measure, it could add much to the brown-water Navy. Its speed, endurance, payload, and ability to take damage compared to the helo made it a natural for air support of the PBR task force. On floats, it could remain with the boats at all times. They did not have to be based at some shore facility several miles away, but could remain physically with the boats serving as an integral part of the fire fighting team. When missions were conducted, the birds could take off with the PBRs and remain with them from start to finish of a mission, providing reconnaissance and fire support as needed. It could be close air support at its ultimate best—control in the hands of the customer, with instant and constant availability.
As one experienced helo pilot and Navy Cross awardee in HAL-3 commented: "I would have given my eye-teeth to have had a fixed wing float/land capable machine to cover brown-water operations. To have had the Pilatus Porter would have reduced maintenance man-hours over rotary-wing aircraft, permitted more time on patrol/station and with the payload capability, we could have blown the socks off any enemy. And we haven't even touched on beans/bullets/mail/ and passenger movements that would have boosted morale greatly throughout the TF-116 operations theater." 9
So the Navy moved out smartly. Several leaders tested the aircraft, on both wheels and floats. Then-Lieutenant Colonel Robert Purcell, a combat-experienced Marine officer, was assigned as program coordinator. Purcell had been an enlisted Marine with infantry combat experience in the Korean War before he ever entered flight training with the rank of captain. His qualifications for his assignment are reflected in his combat awards, which include 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses, the Silver Star, a Bronze Star, 2 Purple Hearts, 28 Air Medals, and unit commendations. He was not particularly happy with being assigned to the Pentagon, duty often viewed as drudgery—a necessary experience for career advancement but not much fun. It was the fall of 1967 and he took action to clear all the procurement wickets in the Department of Defense, with a deployment date set for the spring of 1968. Initial support for the idea was almost unbelievably positive.
Next came the congressional wicket, with the need to gain authority for funding and procurement on a sole source basis, which meant no competition and no delays. The aircraft was in production, and several were available "off the shelf" on the parking ramp at Fairchild Aircraft north of Baltimore, Maryland. All that was needed was the modification to incorporate the armament features, and the bird would be on its way to a combat role. Deployment could be started in about 100 days from the word "go." The initial program, approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with Congressional support, was for procurement of 19 aircraft at a cost of $3 million. Support funds would come from the regular operating budget allocation.
Next page >>
