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The Marines have a history of embracing
innovative concepts that add
to their warfighting capability. These
concepts include intellectual and academic
ideas, such as wargaming. The
wargaming conducted by the Marine
Corp in the 1930s laid the foundation
of the amphibious doctrine used
in World War II and is still cited as a
classic use of wargames to win wars.
However, in the Marine Corps today,
wargaming below the Marine expeditionary
force (MEF) level suffers
from ignorance and apathy -- I don't
know and I don't care. Most Marines
have not been exposed to any
wargaming or simulations during
their careers, and have no idea why
they should be. This is because
wargaming in the modern Marine
Corps suffers from both misused capabilities
and unused potentials.
For clarity, this article is not referring
to course of action wargaming
as used in the Marine Corps Planning
Process. Rather, it is referring
to the conventional wargame that is a
conflict simulation or as defined by
the Wargaming Division of the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory
(MCWL) as:
. . . the artificial replication of a situation
of competition or conflict not involving
actual military forces, and is
characterized by human decisionmaking
which impacts the course of
events throughout. It revolves around
the interaction of two or more opposing
forces guided by predetermined
objectives, rules, data, and procedures
designed to depict an actual or
assumed real world situation.
The Marine Corps has developed
two extremes in regard to wargaming.
The first is that most simulations
Marines encounter (if they encounter
any) are large, complex, high command-
level computer simulations that
last for days or weeks. On the other
end are tactical decision games
(TDGs). TDGs are one of the best and
most enduring training aids the Marine
Corps has used, but they are limited
by the fact that they have a static
enemy force. They are excellent for
what they are designed to do, and that
is train Marines to develop an executable
plan in the minimum amount
of time. But, unlike a simulation,
there is no following test of that plan
against a thinking enemy. A simulation
trains a Marine in the same
things as a TDG but also trains the decisionmaking
cycle against an intelligent
opponent.
As far as the large, complex simulations
are concerned, this is where
the Marine Corps has misused capabilities.
This author has participated
in Marine tactical warfare simulations
in Twentynine Palms, Camp
Lejeune, and with the Marines in
Thailand, and in ULCHI FOCUS LENS
in Okinawa and UNIFIED ENDEAVOR
at Camp Lejeune. The utility of these
simulations for command levels below
division was minimal. These simulations
were designed to train joint
commands on a MEF level and higher.
These fall under the category of
Title 10 wargames, such as the type
addressed in the article by the
Wargaming Division, MCWL, "Expeditionary
Warrior: The Marine
Corps and Title 10 Wargaming,"
(MCG, Sep03). These games usually
involved dozens or hundreds of people
for several days or weeks. The
problem is that for Marines and
staffs under a divisional level, there is
a great deal of time spent with little
in return. Since the focus of these
games is high-level command and
control, small unit staffs are relegated
to pushing icons around the
screen in a slow and tedious process.
There is rarely any realistic tactical
play for these units. For instance, the
smallest level unit in ULCHI FOCUS
LENS was a battalion that could not
be broken down into its component
units. This is a software problem and
could be fixed, but that is not the focus
of Title 10 simulations, so it probably
will not be addressed.
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Nor should it be. The focus for
Title 10 wargames is high-level command
and control. The actions of an
individual company may not contribute
to the training objectives on
that level. The problem is that battalion
staffs, company grade officers,
staff noncommissioned officers
(SNCOs) and NCOs are drawn into
these simulations to act as unit commanders
and staffs. While these
units derive some training benefit
from these simulations by conducting
staff planning and writing orders,
this is usually done by the unit
only for their use and will end up
having no real impact on the simulation.
Battalion and company commanders
would most prefer to use
their scarce time to conduct this
type of staff training in conjunction
with their own field exercises and
training objectives.
The future trend is for more simulations
of this type becoming bigger,
more complex, and joint. The MCWL
Warfighting Division web site at
www.wargaming.quantico.usmc.mil discusses several of these
simulations in detail. This is a good
trend and will be most beneficial to
joint staffs and higher level commands.
Unfortunately, it is not good
for units that must participate or send
Marines to participate for a week or
more at a time in a simulation that
provides little to the unit in return.
How can this problem be corrected?
Two ways are by focusing and limiting
-focusing on what the training
objectives of these simulations are
and limiting the number of people involved
to those being trained and the
minimum needed to operate the simulation
(usually contractor personnel).
Focusing on specific objectives
and personnel will restrain the urge
to incorporate more and more
Marines with the idea that "everyone
will get something out of it." Specifically,
if the objective is to train a joint
staff in strategic-level operations, then
there is no need to incorporate lieutenants
as battalion commanders
pushing icons across a screen. This
addresses the misused capability in
wargaming the Marine Corps has, but
what about the unused potential?
The unused potential is the widespread
availability of wargames and
the ability of battalions, companies,
and squads to use them for their own
training. For the purposes of this article
there are three types of wargames
available for widespread use-computer,
manual, and nonspecific.