William Sturgiss Lind,
Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism
at the Free Congress Foundation, is a native
of Cleveland, Ohio, born July 9, 1947. He
graduated magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa
from Dartmouth College in 1969 and received
a Master's Degree in History from Princeton
University in 1971. He worked as a legislative
aide for armed services for Senator Robert
Taft, Jr., of Ohio from 1973 through 1976
and held a similar position with Senator Gary
Hart of Colorado from 1977 through 1986. He
joined Free Congress Foundation in 1987.
Mr.
Lind is author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook
(Westview Press, 1985); co-author, with Gary
Hart, of America Can Win: The Case for Military
Reform (Adler & Adler, 1986); and co-author,
with William H. Marshner, of Cultural Conservatism:
Toward a New National Agenda (Free Congress
Foundation, 1987). He has written extensively
for both popular media, including The Washington
Post, The New York Times, and Harper's, and
professional military journals, including
The Marine Corps Gazette, U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings and Military Review.
Mr. Lind
co-authored the prescient article, "The Changing
Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,"
which was published in The Marine Corps Gazette
in October, 1989 and which first propounded
the concept of "Fourth Generation War." Mr.
Lind and his co-authors predicted that states
would increasingly face threats not from other
states, but from non-state forces whose primary
allegiance was to their religion, ethnic group
or ideology. Following the events of September
11, 2001, the article has been credited for
its foresight by The New York Times Magazine
and The Atlantic Monthly.
Mr. Lind is co-author
with Paul M. Weyrich of the monograph: "Why
Islam is a Threat to America and The West."
He is the author of "George W. Bush's `War
on Terrorism': Faulty Strategy and Bad Tactics?"
Both were published in 2002 by the Free Congress
Foundation.
[Have an opinion on a William Lind column? Sound off in the Discussion Boards.]
If there is one thing that all Washington should be able to agree on, it is
that the United States does not want to fight another war in Korea. The
bloodbath would be horrific, the financial cost would be ruinous, and the
effects of such a war on the stability of northeast Asia would be
unpredictable. Plus, we might not win.
Yet when President Bush was asked during his recent Asian trip about North
Korea's request for a non-aggression pact with the United States, he
replied, "We will not have a treaty, if that's what you're asking. That's
off the table."
For heaven's sake, why?
North Korea has offered to give up its nuclear weapons program for such a
treaty. Speaking with Thailand's prime minister, Mr. Bush later said, "We
have no intention of invading North Korea." If that is true, then what is
the Administration's objection to a formal non-aggression pact? At the very
least, offering North Korea such a pact would put the onus on them if they
chose to continue their nuclear program instead. And if they did in fact
give up their nukes in return for a treaty, we would walk away with a very
good deal.
Here we see the underlying problem with the Bush administration's foreign
policy. On the surface, its actions often do not make sense. There is no
obvious, clear, or even rational explanation for positions the
administration takes. Naturally, that leads people at home and abroad to
ask what is really going on. What is the Bush team up to? What is their
hidden agenda? What are their real intentions and plans?
The Iraq war is exhibit A. Since Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction
and was not working with non-state, Fourth Generation forces (aka
"terrorists"), what are the real reasons America attacked Iraq? For oil?
For Israel? For world dominion? Everyone speculates, because the official
answers don't make sense.
Now the same speculation is underway about American intentions in Korea.
Does America perhaps plan to attack North Korea's nuclear facilities? Does
it think a war in Korea would injure China, which elements in Washington see
as a probable future enemy? Do Pentagon advocates of the so-called
"Revolution in Military Affairs" believe they could win an easy victory over
North Korea, thereby justifying even more money for high-tech weapons? What
are the unstated, real reasons behind Mr. Bush's refusal to consider a
non-aggression pact?
It appears that North Korea may save the Bush administration from itself in
this case. Secretary of State Colin Powell has indicated that the U.S.
might offer a written guarantee of some sort that it will not attack North
Korea, a guarantee that would be backed by China, Japan and Russia as well.
After first rejecting this offer, the North Korea now appears willing to
reconsider. This is wise from their perspective, because a guarantee
involving the other regional powers would put more, not fewer, constraints
on Washington than would a bilateral treaty. If America signed, then
attacked North Korea anyway under the administration's preventative war
doctrine, it would have serious problems with China, Russia and Japan. It
is all too easy to imagine Mr. Rumsfeld, at a news conference following an
American strike on North Korea, referring to a non-aggression pact as a mere
"scrap of paper."
But the underlying problem remains. So long as Washington's actions do not
make sense in terms of its stated policies and intentions, people will keep
wondering what the real game is. Curiouser and curiouser, as Alice would
say. One is tempted to revise a bon mot from that worst of years, 1914: in
Pyongyang, the situation is serious but not hopeless; in Washington, it is
hopeless but not serious.
