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H. Thomas Hayden: Counterinsurgency not Occupation
H. Thomas Hayden: Counterinsurgency not Occupation

 

About the Author

H. Thomas Hayden was formerly the President and CEO of First Communications Company (FCC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a joint venture between Raytheon and a Saudi Company involved in Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) Systems for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Saudi Arabian National Guard and Ministry of Interior. Before retiring from the US Marine Corps, assignments included Commanding Officer (CO), Headquarters and Service Bn, 1st Force Service Support Group, which deployed to the Gulf War, CO Brigade Service Support Group – 9, which deployed to Somalia and CO MAU Service Support Group – 33, which deployed to The Philippines and Korea. He was Branch Head, Headquarters Marine Corps, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC with assignments to Central America. He has participated in combat operations or contingency operations in the Republic of Vietnam, Central America, Gulf War, Somalia, and Colombia. Tom has a MBA, MA in International Relations, and a PhD candidate in Business Management. He is the author of two books and is currently writing a third: SHADOW WAR: Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; WARFIGHTING: Maneuver Warfare in the US Marine Corps. He has published over 40 articles and has been awarded the Navy League’s Alfred Thayer Mahan award for literary achievement.

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Global Hotspot: Iraq

Terrorist Reference

October 30, 2003

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The Sunday, October 26, 2003, "Outlook," Section of THE WASHINGTON POST, has an outstanding article, "The Right Fight Now: Counterinsurgency, Not Caution, Is the Answer in Iraq," by Mr. Tom Donnelly and Mr. Gary Schmitt.

This article will certainly make a helpful contribution to discussions in the widely debated "Coalition" occupation in Iraq.

While these two gentlemen have many right ideas on counterinsurgency, there is more to be said on this subject.

As they stated, "...the Bush administration can rightly point to success in reconstructing Iraq...(however) unless the security situation in Iraq is brought under control and the insurgency there decisively defeated, those success can never be made permanent..."

To be sure there is an insurgency with banditry and die hard Saddam loyalist who oppose the Coalition occupation and reconstruction in Iraq, and the SMALL WARS MANUAL, published by the U.S. Marine Corps in 1940, can be one reference that may add some considerations on what solutions may apply to Iraq.

Unfortunately, the U.S. Army has provided an inexcusable indictment of itself with its most recent report that there is no effective Intelligence organizational effort in Iraq at the lowest levels. The U.S. Army's "Stability Operations," a euphemism for counterinsurgency, must improve its Intelligence activities before any plan will have any chance of success.

In order to accomplish any effective counterinsurgency program, the first priority is Intelligence, the second priority is Intelligence and the third priority is Intelligence. Intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination must be directed against the Sunni irregulars, the "foreign fighters," and radical Islamic clerics who want an Islamic State like Iran.

Regarding counterinsurgency, the early decades of the 20th Century saw U.S. Army success in The Philippines and U.S. Marine Corps successes in the "Banana Republics;" and, not long ago, even that dirty word "Vietnam." They all recognized that the key to "stabilization" was an effective grassroots gendarmerie.

Also, what is missing in Iraq is a coordinated "Civil-Military Campaign Plan," that address all aspects of counterinsurgency with effective security and political, economic and social enhancements.

Again as Donnelly and Schmitt stated, developing and executing a successful counterinsurgency strategy is a challenge but not beyond the U.S. capabilities given the American history and experiences in previous endeavors.

Believe it was the philospher George Santayana who said that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

[Have an opinion on this article? Sound off here.]

© 2003 H. Thomas Hayden. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.


 



 



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