 |
H. Thomas Hayden
recently concluded over 35 years of service,
which included the Agency for International
Development, the Marine Corps, defense industry
and the Pentagon. His specialties are Intelligence,
Counterinsurgency Operations, Counter-terrorism,
and Joint Concepts Development and Experimentation.
His Marine Corps assignments have included
command of two separate battalions; AC/S G-2,
4th MARDIV & AC/S G-2 FMFEurope; Branch Head,
HQMC, Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict (SO/LIC); Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC;
and, Senior Program Analysts at HQMC with
the Joint Staff and DoD at the Pentagon. Overseas
assignments included Vietnam, Japan & Okinawa,
Europe, Central America, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, Somalia, Singapore, Philippines, and
Colombia. He has an MBA (Pepperdine) and an
MA in International Relations (University
of Southern California). He has written two
books and is working on a third.
Thomas
Hayden Article Archives
Sound
Off! - Have an opinion about this
article? Visit the discussion forum.
|
|
|
|
October 4, 2004
[Have an opinion on this column? Sound off in the discussion
forum.]
It never ceases to amaze me how the lack of institutional memory in the Department of Defense and the Services creates a need to "reinvent the wheel." The Army is now going to write a new Field Manual for Counterinsurgency Operations, "FM-I 3.07.22." I hope somebody has a copy of FM 31-73, Advisors Handbook for Counterinsurgency," Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1965.
The Department of Defense is writing a Joint Operating Concept -- "Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations." V 1.06 was printed on 8 June 2004. This document is supposed to encompass all aspects of counterinsurgency in security, transition and reconstruction. However, there is no section devoted to developing a system to measure success.
Earlier this year Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, asked his staff how would they know if they are winning in Iraq and Afghanistan. He asked the wrong question. The better question would have been, "Have we ever had a matrix to measure success in an insurgency?"
The answer is the Hamlet Evaluation System.
In 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara asked the CIA to develop a technique to measure trends in "pacification" in the Republic of Vietnam. The result was the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). The HES contained certain "objective" features, such as whether police or Popular Forces were in a hamlet, but it relied heavily on "subjective" features, designed to measure the quality of life of the people. The HES was to report whether a hamlet-dweller lived in some tranquility or if he was subject to harassment, intimidation, and/or attacks from the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army.
The most important feature of the HES was the fact that two separate parties prepared two separate reports independent of one another. The American Senior District Advisor and his counterpart, the Vietnamese District Commander, each prepared a report for their respective chains of command. This was supposed to ensure that the two did not cooperate to write a rosy and fictitious report.
After the reports were written, at the Province Senior Advisor level, then at MACV/CORDS (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam/Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support) headquarters in Saigon, the reports were compared.
Initially, the ARVN District Commander presented a much more glowing report while the MACV/CORDS advisor painted a much more realistic picture.
The questions were given a mathematical compilation to provide a statistical average for each hamlet, which were then accumulated for each village or city, then each district and finally, the province. A hamlet or village that was either rated secure or "under government influence" -- which was classified as A, B or C. Other hamlets that were under guerrilla influence were given a D or E.
The question always came up as to how was anyone able to tell what was fact and what
was fiction.
My answer, as a Province Senior Advisor, 1967-1969, was to carefully analyze each District Advisor's report, then determine where there may have been some "padding," (never called it false reporting), and look into the matter. If a village was reported as an A or B, "under government influence," and I knew it to be in contested territory, I would call or radio the Senior District Advisor, and tell him that I wanted to spend the night in that village. I told him that I would be leaving province headquarters in one hour and
expected to meet him and his ARVN District Commander at the village chiefs office in
two to three hours.
There was usually only one of two replies; "Sir, we cannot do that," or "Sir, can we make that a little later?" The latter always meant that the District Chief had to get a platoon in the village immediately to provide security.
The most impressive effect of the HES was on the local officials. From Province Chiefs
down to District Chiefs, they soon became aware that President Nguyen Van Tieu was
using the HES to measure the situation in each area. It became an efficiency report. It
became a gauge as to where to invest resources and where to send more security forces.
Accordingly, the HES proved very valuable to stimulate action, which was more effective
than simple orders form higher headquarters.
In January 1967, when the HES was first instituted, only some 62% of a mere 16 million
people were under government control.
Following the TET Offensive in 1968, the government initiated the Accelerated
Pacification Campaign (APC) Plan. This had as its major objective the consolidation of
past achievements and the expansion of government control over necessary territory. The
main effort was to be directed at maintaining security in those hamlets rated "under
government influence" and to increase efforts restoring security and limited quality of life
where needed. By the end of 1971, about 97% of the South Vietnamese 17.9 million
people were "relatively secure."
It would seem to me that the current situation in Iraq's Counterinsurgency Campaign
Plan requires an APC Plan.
Andy Krepinevich, Jr., in his book The Army and Vietnam, stated that using data from
the HES, as well as data on unit operations, showed how maneuver battalion days of
operations, in a given area, contributed little to population security. He went on to say
that on the other hand , VC activity in an area was closely associated with a decline in
security. The lesson was that big-unit sweeps did not promote pacification unless you
stayed in the area.
Both eyewitness accounts and mass data from numerous sources, attested that the
physical security provided for the bulk of the people in the rural areas, expanded
economic growth and improved the quality of life of the population.
Let's hope that someone in the Pentagon can find the historical data on the HES and
design one that will fit the paradigm in Iraq.
 Email
this page to friends
[Have an opinion on this article? Sound
off here.]
© 2004 H. Thomas Hayden. All opinions
expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily
reflect those of Military.com.
|
