H. Thomas Hayden was formerly the President and CEO of First Communications Company (FCC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a joint venture between Raytheon and a Saudi Company involved in Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) Systems for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Saudi Arabian National Guard and Ministry of Interior. Before retiring from the US Marine Corps, assignments included Commanding Officer (CO), Headquarters and Service Bn, 1st Force Service Support Group, which deployed to the Gulf War, CO Brigade Service Support Group – 9, which deployed to Somalia and CO MAU Service Support Group – 33, which deployed to The Philippines and Korea. He was Branch Head, Headquarters Marine Corps, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC with assignments to Central America. He has participated in combat operations or contingency operations in the Republic of Vietnam, Central America, Gulf War, Somalia, and Columbia. Tom has a MBA, MA in International Relations, and a PhD candidate in Business Management. He is the author of two books and is currently writing a third: SHADOW WAR: Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; WARFIGHTING: Maneuver Warfare in the US Marine Corps. He has published over 40 articles and has been awarded the Navy League’s Alfred Thayer Mahan award for literary achievement.
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George Tenant did the honorable thing. Now it is time for others in the Administration to follow his example.
The failures of the CIA under George Tenant’s watch are enormous. Many claim that before 9/11 he was telling everyone that would listen, that something big was going to happen. He reported that Al Qaeda may have been planning a major attack on the US.
The 9/11 catastrophes were a failure of the CIA, FBI, and the National Security Council. Mr. Richard Clarke’s recent discovery that he was the point man and did not do enough is almost laughable if it were not so serious. Up until 9/11, the only thing I remember about Clark was his "Chicken Little" approach to the anticipated, so-called "Y2K (2000) emergency." Clark was telling everyone that the 2000 millennium would bring major disruptions from terrorists, economic and business unreadiness, and technical glitches in our worldwide computer networks.
The CIA failure at 9/11, followed by the misunderstanding of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq and the recent announcement that Ahmed Chalabi is an Iranian spy, is too much incompetence to be overlooked.
In a recent discussion with Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, USMC (Ret), former J-3, Director of Operations for the Joints Chiefs of Staff, I asked the general what happened to the WMD in Iraq. Everyone thought they were there.
General Newbold said he thought they were there, but this was almost irrelevant to the case for going to war.
I asked him to explain.
He said that there were three basic tenets listed in the rational for going to war: (1) Saddam Hussein a threat to the region, (2) he had WMD, and (3) he was aiding and abetting terrorists that posed a threat to the United States. Newbold’s analysis was that Saddam was no threat to the region. He was totally bottled up, his army had decayed to the point of ineffectiveness, and Coalition aircraft ranged far and wide all over Iraq. Newbold also said that it was also widely known then (and subsequently proved by post-war analysis) that Saddam had maintained no real connection to terrorists for at least five years. Terrorism should have been the number one issue for the security of the United States, but Iraq wouldn’t have made the "top eight" list of countries who were supporting it.
As for WMD, Newbold’s view is that the issue was not whether Iraq had WMD, but rather, were they likely to use it on other countries or provide it to terrorists who might? The truth, according to Newbold, is that there were several other countries, or groups within countries, more likely to provide WMD to terrorists, and Iraq was not likely to either provide it, use it internally (again), or against neighbors because they were watched so closely, and the punishment for use would be so swift and sure. Saddam let the world believe he had WMDs for the prestige and the world attention he received. The Americans made him bigger than life and, in the eyes of the Arab and Muslim world, only Saddam Hussein stood up to the Americans and the UN.
It is known today that while Iraq appears not to have possessed large stores of WMD, Saddam did maintain the capability to produce it; his scientists did bury some small amounts of chemical and/or bio weapons, and some conceivably may have been moved to other countries.
I then asked the general about the planning that led up the invasion of Iraq from a perspective of his position as the J-3 Operations Officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
How many troops were in the original military campaign plan? He replied 500,000 total in the region. This was based on the former Regional Commander-in-Chief’s (General Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret)) estimate, to successfully complete an invasion and the secure the country until a new form of government could take control of security and a stable government.
The Department of Defense leadership rejected the original plan and said to plan for no more than 125,000 maximum. It took many weeks of debate and strong military leadership to get the number to 220,000 total in region for the invasion.
I offered to LtGen Newbold that, in my opinion, the problems we have today stem from four failures:
The failure to keep a major portion of the Iraqi army intact
The failure to keep employed the massive Iraqi government bureaucracy that existed before the invasion
The failure to work with the established Muslim and other religious leaders that were in place
The failure to adequately plan for an “end game” after the war was over
He agreed, but added that now we are faced with the following circumstances in Iraq today: "The single most important reason for the opposition to the Coalition forces today is the image of the US occupation. When US and Coalition forces defeated Saddam’s army, we created a vacuum and we permitted chaos to go unabated because we did not have a post-Iraqi defeat plan. We were first viewed as liberators, but now we have been seen as a conquering power for too long. Our forces are intended to provide stability (which they do magnificently in large portions of the country), but they also are a rallying point for violent opposition."
I asked LtGen Newbold what do we have to now.
He stated that the most important thing we must do is to leave Iraq with the image of an American victory - it cannot be seen as a Mogadishu-like withdrawal. We have to establish a legitimate Iraqi government, we have to convince/compel the Iraqis that it is up to them to defend their new won freedoms, and we have to plan a deliberate and sequential return of American forces to our home bases. To the eyes of the world and the U.S. public, we must show that we are retrograding on our terms, and therefore it would probably be smart to announce our schedule publicly. LtGen Newbold added that the Iraqis must understand that they will succeed or fail based on how much attention they give to their new political, economic, military and social institutions. It is up to them to stand up for a new Iraq, or watch their country fractured.
We both agreed that it was critical for the long-range future of the United States, as a participant in global affairs, that the US is seen as bringing the Iraqi enterprise to a successful conclusion.
