LCDR Mark D. Divine
is a Navy SEAL currently serving a one year
recall in support of Operation Noble Eagle
and the War on Terror. Divine was Honor graduate
of SEAL training class 170, and has served
for 14 years with the SEALs - 7 & 1/2 of which
were on active duty at SEAL Team THREE, SEAL
Delivery Vehicle Team ONE and Naval Special
Warfare Group ONE. Most recently he was Executive
Officer at Reserve SEAL Team ONE. After leaving
Active Duty Mark started NavySEALs.com, which
has become a leader on the web for Special
Operations news and intelligence.
You
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March 9, 2004
By Mark Divine
How should Special Operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom be
graded?
What does it mean when we say something is “imperative?” Oxford’s
English Dictionary says it is an adjective that means “of vital importance,”
or a noun that means “an essential or urgent thing.” It is interesting
also to note that the origin of the word imperative is the Latin word
imperatives, which means “specially ordered.”
There are 12 imperatives considered necessary for a Special
Operations mission to succeed. The imperatives apply to the strategic
decision to employ Special Operations Forces for a mission of importance
and were promulgated by SOCOM in the 90’s. The imperatives are not
law, but guidelines to help strategic planners weigh the consequences
of the use of Special Operations forces in a combat role. Let’s take
a look at the first 6 imperatives and see how the use of Special Operations
Forces in Iraq stacks up.
Iraqi
Freedom was primarily a conventional war, but the post-liberation
insurgency led by former Bath Party hold-outs, Fedayeen and Foreign
Fighters (including Al-Queda)
is clearly an unconventional war. Unconventional wars are best fought
by Special Operations Forces. To wit, though we have well over 100,000
conventional troops on the ground in Iraq providing valuable security,
nation building, and counter-insurgency functions, the Special Operations
teams are rounding up the insurgents and taking huge chunks out of
their networks daily. The success is a testament to the training and
proper employment of SOF, the maturing of SOCOM, and the correct application
of the Special Operations Imperatives.
Let’s take a quick look at the imperatives:
*Understand the operational environment.
*Recognize political implications.
*Facilitate interagency activities.
*Engage the threat discriminately.
*Consider long-term effects.
*Ensure legitimacy and credibility of special operations.
*Anticipate and control psychological effects.
*Apply capabilities indirectly.
*Develop multiple options.
*Ensure long-term sustainment.
*Provide sufficient intelligence.
*Balance security and synchronization.
Imperative Number 1: Understand the operational environment.
Situational Awareness. Battlefield Preparation. Eyes on Target. Recon.
Cultural Sensitivity. These are terms that Spec Ops guys grow up with,
and understand implicitly. Studying and understanding the operational
environment is something they do better than anyone else. Their very
lives depend on it. The 5th Special Forces Group has been operating
in the mid-east for many years, and a large percentage of the operators
speak Arabic or Farsi. The SF have a very good understanding of the
operating environment. The SEALs have had a permanent presence in
the Persian Gulf since before the first Gulf War, and sustain their
own unit in the region. Many SEALs have undergone Arabic and Farsi
language training as well, and at least one reserve SEAL was called
to active duty after having lived in the region for several years,
developing relationships and inside knowledge of the culture, economy
and geography. SEALs also clearly understand the operational environment
in the mid-east. The SF and SEAL operators make it their business
to study the operational environment of the region they intend to
work in. Number one gets a check.
Imperative Number 2: Recognize Political Implications. The
Administration has clearly articulated the political implications
of the current insurgency and the effort to thwart it. A cliff-notes
version goes like this: If they succeed, we lose the country and the
opportunity to change history. If they fail, we win the country, and
possibly peace and prosperity in the region (the corollary is that
if they succeed, they can influence the outcome of the U.S. Presidential
elections in November, and an incoming President may not have the
political will to stay the course that Bush has). There is clearly
a well-orchestrated campaign to disrupt the U.S. efforts to rebuild
Iraq, and to cause distrust and infighting between Suuni and Shiite
tribes, and to use the U.S. media to magnify the effect. The more
chaos, the more they will succeed in fomenting discontent with the
American led occupation. The political implications for the use of
SOCOM forces against the Iraqi insurgency are clearly understood,
and the stakes are high. Number two gets a check.
Imperative Number 3: Facilitate interagency activities. Interagency
activity is at an all-time high in Iraq. Suffice it to say that the
term “OGA” shows up in most CONOPS briefs, and there are numerous
alphabet soup agencies working side-by-side the SOF forces to tackle
the insurgents. 'Nuff said - I give number three a check too.
Imperative Number 4: Engage the threat discriminately. Well,
we are not carpet-bombing Baghdad. Nor are the Special Operators indiscriminately
rolling up anyone who looks like a bad guy. There is a very thorough,
intel-driven SOF campaign to identify the perpetrators of actual terrorist
activity, or those planning terrorist activity. This is being done
by the fusion of intelligence into the operational planning picture.
The operators are not waiting for direction from the theater commander
to execute missions, nor are they waiting for an intel product from
the agency. They are acting in real time on intelligence gained on
previous missions throughout the AO. (This is extremely effective
and exactly what the SEALs did in the Mekong Delta during Vietnam
…which led them to be the most highly decorated unit of that war on
a per capita basis). Special Operators accomplish a lot with a little,
and they have no business engaging any threat without very careful
consideration of all contingencies and consequences. Winning the hearts
and minds of the good guys is as important as rolling up the bad guys.
As a result, no one gets apprehended without Positive Identification
that he/she is directly or indirectly supporting the insurgents. Number
four gets a check.
Imperative Number 5: Consider long-term effects. This imperative
is closely aligned with understanding political implications. The
long-term effects of the Iraqi mission are felt at the national strategic
and political level. When we succeed in evolving a free Iraq with
a democratically elected government, we will have achieved a historic
watershed event for the Arab world. The status quo was simple unacceptable
any longer, and failure to build a free Iraq is not an option. The
long-term implications of the use of Special Operations Forces in
Iraq are enormous – both on the region, as well as the Force itself.
Should SOCOM succeed in turning the insurgency back, (and capturing
Bin Laden on the “other front”), they will have validated an experiment,
begun in 1987 with the formation of SOCOM, that many pundits outside
and within the military predicted would fail. Check for number 5.
Imperative Number 6: Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special
Operations. The credibility of the SO force has been greatly enhanced
in recent years by their performance in Operation Enduring Freedom.
Enduring Freedom was an amazing display of the force-multiplier and
lever effect of Special Operations. The war was largely won by the
5th Special Forces Group in Northern Afghanistan
(just a few hundred operators) working with the Northern Alliance
and a SEAL/Marine contingent in the south. Certainly other conventional
forces played a vital role – but a supporting role. My point is that
Enduring Freedom was not conventional. Typically, Special Operations
are conducted on a tactical level to support conventional efforts
– as with Desert
Storm and Iraqi Freedom. But Enduring Freedom was a strategic
unconventional war led by Special Operations. It was outstanding in
its execution and results, subsequently validating the concept of
SOF as a force multiplier and a lever for strategic, campaign-level
operations. This legitimacy and credibility gained will be with SOCOM
until, and unless, they hose it up. Check for imperative number 6
too.
So far it appears that the SOF teams “specially ordered” to hunt down
and capture those who seek US failure in rebuilding Iraq are operating
with the right imperative. Next time we will examine 7-12 and see
if it holds up. Until then – try out your own assessment with the
list above – I will await your results! Hooyah and Semper Gumby.
