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Army
Ranger Pat Tillman died as a hero. No one will dispute that. How
Spc. Pat Tillman died, however, was an outrage. He perished because
of a hasty command decision, poor communication and bravado. Pat
Tillman died by direct friendly fire when, in the fog of war, members
of his platoon misidentified Tillman and an Afghan guide as Taliban
fighters.
Ordinarily, Tillman's death would have barely made the news. But
Pat Tillman was no ordinary soldier. Here's how one recent newspaper
account described him:
"A long-haired, fierce-hitting defensive back with the Arizona Cardinals
of the National Football League, [Tillman] turned away a $3.6 million
contract after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to volunteer for the
war on terrorism, ultimately giving his life in combat in Taliban-infested
southeastern Afghanistan," The Washington Post recalled on Sunday.
"Millions of stunned Americans mourned his death last April 22 and
embraced his sacrifice as a rare example of courage and national
service."
Pat Tillman was a member of 2nd Platoon, "A" Co. of the 2nd Battalion,
75th Ranger Regiment. The Rangers are elite, highly revered members
of the Army whose training is long, hard and extensive. Pat Tillman
was proud to be a Ranger. He and his brother, Kevin, had enlisted
in the Army together and served in Iraq together, fighting alongside
Navy
SEALs and other elite SOF forces. Their unit was subsequently transferred
to Afghanistan
to fight along the Pakistani border, conducting "seek and destroy"
missions. It was on one of these missions that Tillman died last
Apr. 22.
A detailed account of the friendly-fire incident and subsequent
Army "spin" of Tillman's death have emerged in large part due to
a two-part investigation published by The Washington Post on Sunday
and Monday, Dec. 5-6, 2004 (See "In The Kill Zone: The Unnecessary
Death Of Pat Tillman," Dec. 5, and "In The Kill Zone: Managing The
Facts," Dec. 6).
According to the Post account, Tillman's platoon leader, a young,
wet-behind-the-ears West Pointer, was eager to impress his superior
officers, but nevertheless had some common sense. His commanders
were under pressure to get "boots on the ground" before nightfall
in their designated patrol area near Khost, in Afghanistan's Taliban-infested
Paktia province.
Despite the unit's aggressive timetable, the lieutenant reportedly
advised his command that because one of his Humvees had broken down,
he thought he should keep his platoon together and proceed to the
area as a whole, instead of splitting up with one group escorting
the downed vehicle and one group to move ahead. However, higher-ups
ordered the young officer to execute the planned mission over his
objections.
This was a poor decision: The Rangers were going to be moving, divided,
over hostile terrain as night was falling.
Leaders make command decisions. They weigh their options and decide.
After a careful review of the Post investigation, it is clear that
Tillman's platoon leader did not make a correct command decision
challenging the endangering order he had received. He was interested
in returning will all of his assigned vehicles and to complete the
assigned patrol. With hindsight, it is obvious that he should have
left the broken vehicle behind and proceeded with his group intact
to the objective to complete the task.
Moreover, the debate over the mission itself seems to have set the
stage for what happened next: While the lieutenant was arguing this
point with the command, he and his platoon remained in the same
spot for five hours. That was plenty of time for local Taliban insurgents
to gauge their strength and plot an ambush.
The Marine
Corps employs a concept for flank protection called overwatch,
a.k.a. "Guardian Angels". This is a warning system to prevent ambushes
by being vigilant to suspicious activity and terrain features on
all sides of a unit's location and path of advance. Had such a defense
been in place, Pat Tillman would likely alive today.
Tillman's platoon leader guided his platoon through a narrow canyon
approximately 5-10 yards across at its narrowest point. Half of
the group, towing the downed vehicle, had to go around the canyon
while the second "serial" of the platoon proceeded into the canyon.
In the first of several errors, the first group did not radio this
to the platoon leader. Then due to road obstructions, they were
unable to go around and had to drive through the same narrow pass
the first group had earlier maneuvered through successfully.
Immediately as they entered the canyon, they drew fire from unseen
gunmen high up the canyon walls. Rangers interviewed by the Post
recalled that they could not visually identify their attackers and
could only see shapes and muzzle flashes. With their radios not
functioning properly, they were cut off and isolated from the rest
of the platoon.
On hearing the shooting and explosions, the lieutenant ordered his
half of the platoon toward the origination of the firing. They had
no idea where their platoon mates were and their platoon mates didn't
know where the other half were coming from. With the lack of communication,
between the two groups, this proved fatal.
The trapped part of the platoon did their best trying to flee the
kill zone of the ambush but could not with the truck towing the
downed vehicle blocking their way, so, with what firepower they
had, they got into the one working Humvee and punched ahead to engage
the enemy.
Darkness was falling, and with it the fog of war.
The platoon leader's group set in positions in the high canyon wall
and tried to engage their enemy. At this point, all that could be
seen by either group were figures and muzzle flashes. Tillman and
the rest of the group engaged their targets, but because of the
increasing darkness, became the targets - not from the Taliban fighters
- but from their own confused platoon mates.
Because of modern warfare rules of engagements, infantrymen are
taught to fire when fired upon. Rangers are considered the elite
of the group and are held to higher standards. In that canyon in
Paktia province on Apr. 22, the Rangers failed to meet those standards.
Giving in to adrenaline, Tillman's platoon members began engaging
them without fire discipline, shooting indiscriminately against
what one Ranger described as "shapes and muzzle flashes" that they
instinctively - and wrongfully - assumed were the enemy.
Tillman and his comrades did all they could to try to identify themselves
as friendly. they popped smoke grenades, waved hand and arm signals,
shouted, and even shot a warning flare. This was to no avail. They
were continuously fired upon until they no longer called out. The
real enemy was gone long before then.
For many of Tillman's platoon mates, this was their first engagement.
They rushed upon their "kills," only to learn those they killed
were their own men.
What happened next was an Army disgrace. The service awarded Tillman
the Silver Star medal posthumously while spinning the emerging facts
of his death out of all recognition.
Only eight days after his death, the Army issued a statement about
Tillman's heroism, which stated: "He ordered his team to dismount
and then maneuvered the Rangers up a hill near the enemy's location.
As they crested the hill, Tillman directed his team into firing
positions and personally provided suppressive fire …. Tillman's
voice was heard issuing commands to take the fight to the enemy
forces."
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There was nothing in the Army release about Tillman's equally heroic
attempts to call off the friendly fire that was pinning down him
and his mates. The Post reported that at the time of the news release
an investigation had already compiled more than a dozen statements
describing the situation as it had actually occurred.
"Army records show Tillman fought bravely during his final battle,'
the Post continued. "He followed orders, never wavered and at one
stage proposed discarding his heavy body armor, apparently because
he wanted to charge a distant ridge occupied by the enemy, an idea
his immediate superior rejected, witness statements show."
Worse, the Post noted that Tillman's own brother, also a member
of that ill-fated platoon, was never told the truth of what had
happened to Pat Tillman.
The newspaper account indicates that after investigating what happened,
the Army mildly disciplined several members of Tillman's platoon
and four officers in their chain of command. While details have
been withheld because administrative punishment is not releasable,
it seems clear that Tillman's command wanted "boots on the ground"
no matter what the complicating factors.
The Rangers' proud motto from Omaha Beach on D-Day in 1944 is, "Rangers
lead the way!"
In this instance, such false bravado cost an American hero his life.
[Have a comment on this opinion article? Sound
off in the Hot Issues with Defensewatch Forum.]
Contributing Editor Philip A. Quigley Jr. served as an enlisted
Marine combat scout during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and is pursuing
a post-military goal of writing about contemporary defense issues.
He can be reached at HawkmanPQ@aol.com.
Send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
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