This
article is provided courtesy of DefenseWatch,
the official magazine for Soldiers For The
Truth (SFTT), a grass-roots educational organization
started by a small group of concerned veterans
and citizens to inform the public, the Congress,
and the media on the decline in readiness
of our armed forces. Inspired by the outspoken
idealism of retired Colonel
David Hackworth, SFTT aims to give our
service people, veterans, and retirees a clear
voice with the media, Congress, the public
and their services.
The U.S. Marine Corps, like every other military service, is facing
a dynamic and uncertain future in today's global environment. Depending
on your personal outlook, you may see a future full of challenges,
or you may see a future of opportunities. Regardless of your perspective,
two critical factors to always keep in mind are the morale and the
retention of the force.
Leaders at all levels usually recognize these two factors and most
leaders include them in their decision-making process. Sometimes,
leaders enact policies that cause many to wonder whether those policies'
effects on morale and retention were given as much attention as they
deserved.
Recently, the Marine Corps announced two new policies that seem to
have the potential to have a tremendous impact on the morale and retention
of all Marines, especially our junior enlisted troops and junior officers.
The senior leadership "party line" for both policies is that they
are positive measures and justified by current situations.
I know Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) is trying to keep track of
the feedback and reactions to these policies. Let me briefly present
these two policies and then solicit your feedback and reactions to
them. I will consolidate what I hear and learn from you and then present
my findings in follow-on articles.
The first policy, announced on Oct. 28, 2003, is to extend the length
of unaccompanied tours to Okinawa and the Japanese mainland from 12
months to 24 months, starting next spring.
According to an article in Marine Corps Times on Nov. 10, Marine Corps
officials said:
"The intent is to increase unit effectiveness by keeping
Marines there longer and reflects a steady improvement in the living
conditions and entertainment options for leathernecks assigned to
the Pacific outposts ..."
The article later went on to quote a statement from Marine Corps Commandant
Gen. Michael W. Hagee:
"The overall quality of life is now relatively comparable
to stateside assignments. The reduced turnover will enhance our
operational readiness and ... war-fighting capability."
Overall, the article tried real hard to present the new policy in
as positive a way as possible. As a career Marine officer, I found
myself thinking that the article was the opening salvo in a public
relations war to try and convince as many Marines as possible that
this policy was good and that it should just be accepted as is.
Here is a quoted sound-bite from a HQMC Public Affairs spokesman:
"We're trying to change the mentality of a tour on
Okinawa as a deployment, vice another duty station .... Okinawa
is just another Marine base. It just happens to be over in Japan
.... If [Marines are] there for two years they start to be good
neighbors ... and they'll be able to understand the culture better
and hopefully that will make us be better guests of the island."
The article's most objective and factual passages gave some official
background to the Japanese overseas assignment policies for all the
services:
"Because life on the island was so austere, in 1987
the Marine Corps was granted an exception from a new Pentagon policy
setting overseas assignments at a minimum of two years .... Therefore,
the Marine Corps assignment policy to Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan,
currently stands apart from the other military services .... The
Air Force sends its troops to Okinawa on 24-month unaccompanied
tours, as does the Navy. Unaccompanied tours to Iwakuni stand at
12 months for airmen, a service spokeswoman said, and the Navy sends
sailors on 12-month unaccompanied tours to a limited number of smaller
Japanese outposts .... Information on the Army's Japan tour lengths
was not available by press time."
On the other side of this issue, the article devoted limited space
to the negative aspects of this policy change:
"But others might greet the news with dismay. Marines with families
may view the choice of uprooting their loved ones for three years
or leaving them stateside for two years as too difficult to accept
.… 'It's harder for single Marines and those whose families are stateside'
" [according to a married lieutenant who just completed a 3-year tour
with his family].
Judging from the informal reactions from enlisted Marines and officers
I have spoken with about this policy, I sense a big disconnect between
what the Marine Corps Times reported and emphasized, and what Marines
are thinking about this policy. I could be wrong, so I would like
to hear from others (Marines and people from other services) who have
specific opinions, perspectives and experiences related to this policy.
Some specific areas I am curious about are the implications for troop
morale and retention, the true readiness enhancement to our Japan-based
forces, and the potential or probable impacts on Marine Corps families.
The second policy came into effect on Nov. 6, 2003: It is the new
II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) crackdown on unsafe driving. This
policy affects Marines, sailors, other service members, and family
members at Camp LeJeune, N.C., Marine Corps Air Stations (MCAS) Cherry
Point and New River, N.C., and MCAS Beaufort, S.C.
According to a Marine Corps Times article on Nov. 24, "It's a radical
policy, one that II MEF officials hope will pay off in the long run.
If it works here, don't be surprised to see it catch on like bulldog
tattoos at Marine Corps bases worldwide."
How radical is this new policy? Well, rather
than give you my opinion on how radical it is, let me give you some
highlights of the policy from the Times article and let you decide
for yourself:
"If you are arrested off base driving while impaired
or intoxicated, you will lose your base driving privileges for 30
days or the length of your civilian suspension, whichever is greater.
Get convicted out in town or refuse to submit to a chemical-analysis
test, and you will lose base driving privileges for at least a year."
"If you get convicted off base for reckless driving, aggressive
driving, or driving in excess of 15 miles per hour over the speed
limit, you will lose base driving privileges for at least 90 days."
"If you are a repeat offender, base traffic court officers have
the authority to revoke driving privileges for a longer period for
on- or off-base infractions, possibly indefinitely."
"Every officer and staff non-commissioned officer (SNCO) in II MEF
is expected to report on- or off-base violations whenever possible
(i.e. writing down license-plate info, vehicle descriptions, driver
descriptions, alleged offenses, and time and location). That info
is to be turned in to the base provost marshal's office for further
action."
"The base provost marshal's office will forward civilian traffic
infractions to commanding officers. Commanders are expected to take
whatever action they feel is appropriate, from doing nothing, deciding
to impose non-judicial punishment and stiff fines, or eventually
leading the offenders to base traffic court."
"Local law enforcement officers have pledged to help support the
new II MEF policy."
This balanced Times article included some comments opposed to the
policy:
"It's bad enough we have other things to worry about
without staff NCOs hounding us out in town. It's just added pressure"
.... "Giving staff NCOs and officers the power to start the ball
rolling on traffic violations opens the door for abuse and problems.
I think that's a little bit much. I think it's just going to cause
a lot of conflicts" ...
Others agree, saying the new plan is founded in solid motives but amounts to intimidation
and infringement on personal rights.
And some comments in favor of or justifying the policy:
"A large number of these deaths [20 II MEF deaths
from off-duty vehicle accidents out of 53 total Marine Corps off
duty vehicle deaths in fiscal year 2003] are directly attributed
to people failing to do the right things. The largest group affected
is our Marines and sailors between the ages of 19 and 21 .... I'm
looking for everyone to hold themselves and their fellow Marines
and sailors accountable for their actions [Camp LeJeune's Commanding
General, BGen. Robert Dickerson] ... 'All that anyone expects is
you to do the right thing. Part of doing the right thing is accepting
responsibility. If you follow the rules and adhere to the law and
drive sensibly, none of this is going to impact you.' "
Personally, I understand the concerns of those opposed to the policy,
but I strongly agree with the logic and motives behind the comments
of those in favor of the policy. However, since I am not stationed
within the II MEF sphere of influence, I will reserve my judgment
about whether this policy is good or bad until I hear from those personnel
directly affected by this policy.
I would like to hear from troops, staff NCOs, officers, and the military
and civilian police who all have a role in this new policy. I would
also like to hear from personnel from other bases and stations, and
from other services, who have had similar thoughts, problems, or policies.
When new policies are released, the perceptions and realities of those
policies need to be factored in to the morale and retention of the
forces for which those policies are written. I trust that my readers
will help define the perceptions and realities of these two radical
policies and help predict the impacts to the morale and retention
of the forces involved.
This
article is provided courtesy of DefenseWatch,
the official magazine for Soldiers For The
Truth (SFTT), a grass-roots educational organization
started by a small group of concerned veterans
and citizens to inform the public, the Congress,
and the media on the decline in readiness
of our armed forces. Inspired by the outspoken
idealism of retired 
