These
articles and commentaries are provided courtesy
of DefenseWatch, the official magazine
for Soldiers For The Truth (SFTT), a grass-roots
educational organization started by a small
group of concerned veterans and citizens to
inform the public, the Congress, and the media
on the decline in readiness of our armed forces.
Inspired by the outspoken idealism of retired
Colonel
David Hackworth, SFTT aims to give our
service people, veterans, and retirees a clear
voice with the media, Congress, the public
and their services.
In the eight weeks since it was published, I've received a lot of
thought-provoking responses from my article about the new II Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) "get-tough-on-traffic-violators" policy
("Study
Long-Term Impact of New USMC Policies"). Based on the sheer
volume of the e-mails I received, and the strong comments expressed
in most of them, it's clear that the issue of traffic safety and violators
touches a nerve in many service members, especially Marines.
As promised, let me share with you some selected excerpts from those
e-mails and my analysis of what those e-mails told me.
Overall, I would say that the response was pretty much divided between
those in favor of the policy and those opposed to it. Frankly, I was
surprised not to see overwhelming support either way. One trend I
did notice was that certain parts of the policy got much more attention
than others. Those parts also elicited more spirited comments from
many readers.
An Army military policeman sent me a copy of one post commanding general's
2001 policy memorandum on drunk or drugged driving. That memorandum
was very similar in tone to the II MEF policy. One main difference
was that the Army policy also applied to the operation of motorized
watercraft. If the II MEF policy does not include motorized watercraft,
I believe the policy should be modified to include it.
The Army general's reasoning behind his policy is perfectly in sync
with II MEF's concerns: "I wish to deter military personnel from endangering
themselves and others when they exercise the poor judgment to drive
while impaired by intoxicants." What II MEF addresses and the Army
post commander does not in his memo is reckless driving. I believe
it makes sense for the post commander to expand the focus to include
reckless driving.
Many readers commented on officers and staff non-commissioned officers
(SNCOs) being expected to report on- and off-base violations. Some
viewed that mandate as micromanagement and an invasion of privacy.
Some writers said:
"This is another measure of micro-management and in my opinion almost
a double jeopardy situation. Enforcement, Education and Engineering
are the three keys to providing safety on our highways …. Every member
of the service has a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if they
live in the squad bays or barracks .… We all know what goes on for
a lot of folks who are off duty, however, whenever a Marine acts irresponsibly
(DUI, excessive speed, reckless driving, etc.) they should be held
accountable. As far as SNCOs and officers going after people for driving
infractions, well, I think that's going a little too far …. "
Others viewed it as a liberating empowerment or a reinforcement of
the way things should have always been. One writer saw this as an
effort to restore leadership in the chain of command:
"As for the II MEF policy, it is about time that a commander gave
Marines back some of the authority they used to have that enabled
effective troop leading! I would love to see that policy Corps-wide.
'No fear' is what many young Marines feel when approached and corrected
by seniors .… It is our responsibility to help wayward Marines see
their faults and guide them back onto a correct course. Anything less
is dereliction of duty. OOH-RAH for II MEF .… Do you care enough about
your Marines to show them tough love? Talk is cheap, all the way around.
Action is what matters and is louder than words."
Some readers expressed legal concerns about the policy. A few wondered
whether officers and SNCOs assisting civilian law enforcement personnel
by reporting off-base violations was a violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act, which prohibits military personnel from engaging in law enforcement
activities. A couple of readers also viewed restriction of on-base
driving privileges for off-base violations as a "double-jeopardy"
situation. Another reader observed that this policy has the potential
to seriously overload what he already sees as an overly backlogged
and overly bureaucratic base legal system where many cases are dropped
and many other violations often go unpunished.
Not all readers accepted the grouping of reckless and impaired driving
in this policy. One reader in particular differentiated between the
two and expressed a rather hard-line position when it comes to combating
drunk driving:
"Drunk driving, on the other hand, deserves a skewering, as it endangers
life, limbs and property. All violations under the influence of alcohol
should be treated in the same manner as any other drug offense. It
may be legal to drink, but a military member is responsible for [his
or her] own actions 100 percent of the time. Maybe military bases
should stop selling alcohol and shut down the club system."
This policy is now approaching its 100th day anniversary. I believe
in an old military saying that no plan survives intact after first
contact with the enemy. Accordingly, I wonder how well this policy
is holding up after its first contact with traffic violators.
The policy's concepts and intentions sound good and look good on paper.
However, as with all policies, how it is enforced and accepted, and
what the actual results of the policy are relative to what was expected,
will ultimately determine whether this policy succeeds or fails. I
would like to hear from troops, staff NCOs, officers, and members
of the military and civilian police within the II MEF sphere of influence
who have experienced this policy firsthand, or who know of others
who have experienced it firsthand.
These
articles and commentaries are provided courtesy
of DefenseWatch, the official magazine
for Soldiers For The Truth (SFTT), a grass-roots
educational organization started by a small
group of concerned veterans and citizens to
inform the public, the Congress, and the media
on the decline in readiness of our armed forces.
Inspired by the outspoken idealism of retired
