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Peter Brookes writes
a weekly column on foreign policy and defense
for the New York Post and is penning
a book on national security affairs for McGraw
Hill due out early next fall. He appears regularly
on national TV and radio.
Prior to joining the Heritage
Foundation, Brookes served in the Bush
administration as the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (DASD) for Asian and Pacific Affairs
in the Office of Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, where he was responsible for the
development, planning, guidance and oversight
of U .S. security and defense policy for 38
countries and 5 bilateral defense alliances
in the Asia-Pacific region.
Brookes has a distinguished military background,
including active duty in support of military
operations in Iraq/Kuwait (Desert Storm);
Haiti (Restore Democracy); and Bosnia (Joint
Endeavor). He flew reconnaissance missions
in East Asia and the Persian Gulf while stationed
in Japan covering military matters related
to the Soviet Union, North Korea, China, Vietnam,
Iran and Iraq. His personal awards and decorations
include: the Joint Service Commendation Medal;
the Navy Commendation Medal (3 awards); the
Navy Achievement Medal; several naval and
joint unit awards; the Defense Language Institute’s
Kellogg Award; the Joint Chiefs of Staff service
badge; and Naval Aviation Observer (NAO) wings.
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February 9, 2004
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PAKISTAN has become the world's nuclear Wal-Mart. The father of
the Pakistani bomb, jetsetter scientist A.Q. Khan, turns out to be the
godfather of global nuclear proliferation. Perhaps more than any one person,
Khan is responsible for the most egregious string of nuclear-proliferation
transactions in recent history - perhaps ever.
Khan's televised mea culpa on sharing nuclear technology with Iran,
North Korea, and Libya is little consolation. Certainly it's not enough to
warrant the pardon given by Pakistani President Musharraf. Even more
disappointing is Pakistan's refusal to allow an independent probe of Khan's
proliferation activity - or that of others in Pakistan's scientific,
intelligence or military circles.
You can bet that Khan isn't the only one complicit in this fiasco.
U.N. nuclear watchdog Mohammed ElBaradei (Hans Blix's old sidekick) has said
that Khan is just the "tip of the iceberg." ElBaradei's investigators are
pursuing leads in at least five countries, including Japan, Malaysia,
Germany and a couple of other yet-unidentified European nations.
But what does all this mean? That the world's most destructive
weapons have been placed in the hands of the world's most despicable
regimes. Iran has extensive ties with terrorism, including considerable
outright sponsorship of it. North Korea has amply demonstrated its
willingness to sell ballistic missiles to the highest bidder.
So the burning question is "secondary proliferation": What might
Iran and North Korea do with their newfound capabilities and knowledge,
besides go nuclear themselves? Will an Iranian A.Q. Khan share nuclear
technology with Syria? Will North Korea give atomic tips to Burma's junta,
which already plans to build a nuclear research reactor?
Why did Khan do it? For self-aggrandizement, and to line his pockets
with the coins of despots. And to get North Korean ballistic-missile
technology that would let Islamabad level the strategic playing field with
nuclear India. (The Pakistani "Ghauri" ballistic missile is a
nuclear-capable knock-off of Pyongyang's "No-Dong" missile.) Some suggest he
even did it out of anti-Americanism, supplying America's sworn enemies with
nuclear weapons.
Perhaps the most important question is: What to do now that the
nuclear horse has left the barn? Here are some suggestions:
Debrief Khan's nuclear clan: Find out exactly what was shared with
North Korea and Iran, the status of their nuclear programs, the locations of
their covert research and production facilities, and who else may have had
access to Pakistani nuclear technology or materials.
For instance, has there been Pakistani contact with the Saudis or
the Syrians, both believed to have nuclear aspirations? Did Pakistani
scientists or intelligence personnel have dealings with the Taliban and al
Qaeda on nuclear matters, as has been rumored? Is all Pakistani fissile
material - such as might be used in a "dirty bomb" - accounted for?
Break up the world's nuclear networks: Using the information gleaned
from Khan's debriefing (as well as Libyan info), U.S. and international
partners must act swiftly to dismantle the clandestine global-proliferation
grid, keeping nukes from spreading beyond Iran and North Korea. Middlemen
and front companies must be exposed and closed down as soon as possible.
Strengthen international nonproliferation pacts: The U.N.'s Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and the voluntary, 38-country Nuclear Supplier Group
export-control agreement are proving anemic in fighting nuclear
proliferation. Real penalties and vigorous enforcement, such as those
contained in the Bush administration's Proliferation Security Initiative,
are in order.
Improve proliferation intelligence: In his Georgetown University
address last week, CIA Director George Tenet identified some intelligence
victories on nonproliferation, such as Libya. That's great. But these
triumphs didn't prevent the Pakistani nuke blueprints from getting to Tehran
and Pyongyang. The independent intelligence assessment called for by the
White House must go beyond Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to improving
all intelligence, but especially WMD and terrorism.
Pakistan is a troubling strategic partner, especially in light of
Khan's (forced) revelations. But Islamabad remains critical in fighting
terrorism and proliferation.
The Pakistani nuclear genie is out of the bottle, but with
Pakistan's (belated) help, we still have a chance of keeping the North
Korean and Iranian bottles corked.
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[Have an opinion on this article? Sound
off here.]
© 2004 Peter Brookes. Mr. Brookes is
a Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation
in Washington, DC. This column originally appeared in the New
York Post. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's
and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.
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