Command Chronology COMBAT OPERATIONS: At 0600 on 24 February, 1991, G-Day, the 2d Marine Division (Rein) attacked and penetrated Iraqi defensive positions between Umm Gudair and Al Manquish oil fields in Kuwait to attack to the north/northwest to destroy Iraqi operational reserves. The 6th Marines created the initial breach and then quickly flowed its maneuver units through the cleared lanes. Upon 6th Marines' reaching the initial Breach Head Lines (BHL), 2d LAI Battalion, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (-), 2d Tank Battalion, the U.S. Army's Tiger Brigade, 10th Marines, and 8th Marines immediately followed 6th Marines to expand the initial BHL, to establish the final BHL, and to conduct a hasty consolidation. The 8th Marines (-) (Rein), of which 3d Battalion, 23d Marines was an integral part, was assigned pre-G-Day and G-Day missions of (1) providing security in the division zone forward of the Saudi defensive berm, which was located on the Saudi-Kuwait border, prior to G-Day; (2) passing through the breach lanes, and: (3) clearing its zone of action to support the attack north. 3d Battalion, 23d Marines (3/23) was initially assigned the pre-G-Day mission of (1) defending in sector, (2) providing security forward of the Saudi berm; and (3) screening to the northeast in order to allow 3d Battalion, 10th Marines (3/10) to establish artillery firing positions forward of the FEBA to provide preparation fires for offensive operations. In order to execute these missions, the battalion's concept of operations was to establish a defense, then to (1) screen forward of the FEBA in order to conduct reconnaissance of routes leading to assigned artillery firing positions to ensure they were clear of enemy activity; (2) guide 3d Bn, 10th Marines survey parties to the firing positions, and (3) provide security forward and to the flanks of the artillery battalion firing positions. The operation would be conducted by a battalion (-) task force in three phases. Phase One was the conduct of the route reconnaissance by four task organized cavalry teams consisting of TOWs, heavy machine guns (HMG), combat engineers, snipers, and artillery reconnaissance assets. Phase Two was the introduction of one motorized infantry company, the battalion command element, and the 81mm mortar platoon in the forward sector. The motorized company would be placed in a blocking position oriented northwest, facing possible Iraqi units being flushed out by 2d LAI Bn screening to the northwest. The cavalry teams were tasked to position themselves between the Iraqi defenses and friendly artillery to screen the Iraqi forward defensive belt, and orient to the northeast. Phase Three would be the movement of the artillery units to their firing positions on 23 February 1991, G-1, under the cover of darkness. On 22 February 1991, G-2, 3/23 commenced combat operations as bulldozers cut three gaps in the Saudi berm to allow 3/23 and 3/10 to execute their missions. The cavalry teams, code named Task Force Alberts, under the command of Captain Lloyd Alberts, entered Kuwait at about 1400 and began conducting the route reconnaissance. Approximately halfway through Phase One, the 8th Marines further tasked 3/23 to provide a Forward Air Controller close to the Iraqi defenses to control an air strike on a pumping station in the Umm Gudair oil field, which had been determined to be a high priority target. This required the 81mm mortar element to move a tube forward of their assigned position in order to range the target for back-up marking capability. When TF Alberts arrived in the vicinity of the Iraqi defenses at the conclusion of Phase One, a number of Iraqi infantry and trucks were observed in and around the Iraqi trench line. In the waning daylight of 22 February 1991, the Iraqis were engaged by the forward 81mm mortar. Simultaneously, the FAC attempted to direct CAS onto the assigned target. However, smoke and haze from the burning oil field obscured the target from the FAC, making laser designation impossible. As darkness descended, Captain Alberts reported sighting Iraqi mechanized elements moving towards his position. TF Alberts was ordered to withdraw to the artillery firing position locations, which were several kilometers from the Iraqi defensive belt. CAS was then requested to destroy the Iraqi unit, and a FAC (A) was required to direct the mission. The DASC required a ground controller due to the proximity of friendly units but request was cancelled. TF Alberts spent the night of 22-23 February 1991 in screen positions 5 to 6 kilometers from the Iraqi defenses. As 0900 on 23 February 1991, G-1, Captain Alberts briefed the Battalion Commander of 3/10 on the results of the route and area reconnaissance. TF Alberts once again pushed out to the Iraqi defenses as escort for artillery reconnaissance elements as well as to commence screening operations. Moving with TF Alberts was Company I, the battalion command element, and the 81mm mortar platoon. Enroute, Company 1 quickly and effectively searched and cleared a large compound located forward of the Iraqi defenses discovering that, although unoccupied, it had been recently used by Iraqi forces as a major supply cache and observation point. The compound was prepared for demolition by attached combat engineers, and subsequently completely destroyed. The battalion force soon encountered similar enemy activity as on the preceding day. Artillery fire was requested on the Iraqi defenses and Battery F, 2/14 responded as well as organic 81mm mortar fire. The direct fire capability of TF Alberts combined with the indirect fire destroyed five BTR-60s, three BDRMS, eight tanks (T-55/T-62) and inflicted approximately 52 Iraqi KIAs. At 1500 on 23 February 1991, elements closest to the Iraqi defenses detected one Iraqi soldier waving a handkerchief and making his way through the enemy minefields. He was eager to surrender and indicated that many more troops in his unit wanted to give up. Shortly thereafter, groups of 10-20 Iraqis emerged from their trenches and made their way through their minefields to members of TF Alberts and the 81mm mortar platoon, 3/23 quickly mobilized enemy prisoners of war (EPW) processing teams which sped the EPWs to the rear. The EPWs were determined to be from the Iraqi 1st Battalion, 83d Brigade, 29th Infantry Division. Ultimately, the battalion captured 238 EPWs, to include an Iraqi Battalion Commander, and sustained no friendly casualties. As darkness descended, 3/10 began moving forward of the Saudi berm to establish firing positions for the H-Hour artillery preparation , protected by the battalion screening force, which remained in its forward positions throughout the night of 23-24 February. In order to pass through the breach lanes as the prelude to the attack into Kuwait, the decision was made to exfiltrate the battalion (-) back through the Saudi berm in order to consolidate the battalion for the move through the breached Iraqi defenses. The battalion task force was ordered to withdraw early on the 24th, and completed its retrograde at 1200 on 24 February. Company I initially remained behind in support of the 3/10 security mission. At 1600 on 24 February 1991, the battalion was ordered to occupy the Green Bravo 5 and Green Bravo 6 assembly areas for movement through the minefield breach. In the early hours of 25 February 1991, G+1, Company I rejoined 3/23 in the breach lane assembly areas upon the displacement of 3/10. At 0615 on 25 February 1991, G+1, 3/23 passed through the breach with 8th Marines, with the bulk of the battalion mounted on M923 5-ton trucks. During the execution of this part of the operation, Company H capture 20 EPWs, sustaining no friendly casualties. Upon emerging from the breach lanes, 3/23 prepared to execute an assigned mission of relieving 3d Battalion, 6th Marines in securing the eastern shoulder of the initial BHL. The battalion command element located 3/6 and conducted liaison to execute the relief. However, 3/23 was soon directed not to relieve 3/6 but to continue the movement to contact north with 8th Marines as the motorized battalion reserve in a regimental "two up and one back" formation. The Regimental Commander's intent was to utilize 3/23 for an envelopment, blocking force, MOUT operations, MSE security, flank screen/security, or EPW security. As the tactical situation developed during the movement to contact on G+1, it became evident that 2d Marine Division was outdistancing 1st Marine Division, scheduled to move north on the right flank of 2d Marine Division. This created a gap between the two divisions. The battalion was assigned the mission of providing flank security for the 2d eastern flank of 2d Marine Division and 1/5 on the western flank of 1st Marine Division. During the execution of this mission, Company H captured three EPWs and destroyed one BMP and one Type 63 APC. Company I suffered the loss of one of its M-105 trailers when it detonated an unexploded MK-72 Rockeye bomblet. As darkness fell, 2d Marine Division reached Phase Line Horse and established the final BHL. Third Battalion, 23d Marines established a defense south of 1/8 oriented to refuse the 2d Marine Division's eastern flank under light conditions which, due to smoke and oil field fires, reduced visibility to absolute zero. On the morning of 26 February 1991, G+2, 2d Marine Division continued its consolidation at PL Horse as the 1st Marine Division attacked north to move abreast of 2d Marine Division. At 1300, 2d Marine Division continued its northern movement, commencing the exploitation phase of offensive operations. The Division's mission was to seize MEF Objective B (Al Jahra), to establish control of lines of communication, and to seize Division Objective 2 (vicinity of QT 5050 and QT 6055). Third Battalion, 23d Marines was tasked to continue providing eastern flank screening and security, following in trace of 1/8. This requirement was particularly vital as elements of 1st Marine Division had veered east to seize Kuwait International Airport, exposing the eastern flank of 2d Marine Division. Immediately prior to commencing the move, Company G sustained 5 WIAs in a non-combat related incident. The battalion continued north in a battalion wedge formation, which had become "SOP" due to its inherent flexibility. Company G was the lead element, with Company H on the right flank, and Company I on the left flank. The point was screened by a task organized force of TOW and HMG (TF Alberts) and the right flank was screened by TF Holmes, which was organized similarly to TF Alberts. The movement north was punctuated twice by NBC alerts. Both required the battalion to assume MOPP-4, and both proved unfounded. As the battalion continued north to re-establish contact with 1/8 after being slowed down by the NBC alerts, the main body of the battalion received fire from a farm complex to its right front. TF Alberts has passed through the final area in trace of 1/8 and, receiving no fire, continued moving north, finally establishing contact with 1/8 south of Al Shadadiyah, Kuwait. Upon receiving incoming small arms rounds, TF Holmes deployed to suppress the sporadic fire, and Company H dispatched one platoon to clear its zone of sniper and harassing fire. The Iraqis broke contact and the battalion prepared to continue its movement north. No friendly casualties were sustained. Darkness had descended by this time and the TF Holmes moved to the north side of the complex, they discovered a large number of parked mechanized vehicles, believe to be BMPs, and apparently abandoned. Upon observing these vehicles through the TOW thermal sights, the thermal signatures of at least nine Iraqis were identified. In accordance with directives to destroy the Iraqi equipment, TF Holmes was cleared to engage and destroy the Iraqi BMPs. An artillery request was denied by 8th Marines since these fires would fall to 1/8's rear; accordingly, organic direct fire weapons were used to destroy a number of enemy vehicles. The exact number of "kills" could not be determined due to the darkness, smoke, and numerous secondary explosions; however, it was readily apparent that these vehicles had been well stocked with munitions. The battalion was tasked with providing overwatch of the complex throughout the night to contain and destroy the balance of the vehicles and personnel should a break out be attempted. At 2330 on 26 February 1991, the battalion received a fragmentary order from 8th Marines to conduct MOUT operations north of Phase Line Bear (a major Kuwaiti highway known as the "6th Ring Motorway") in Al Shadadiyah to clear its assigned zone and block east-west lines of communications. The mission was planned, briefed, and scheduled to be executed at 0600 on 27 February 1991, G+3. However, due to the overall Coalition success in the exploitation phase, advancing Egyptian and Kuwaiti forces would be operating in the intended area of operations. Therefore, 8th Marines was directed to delay operations north PL Bear and continue consolidation in place. Third Battalion, 23d Marines was subsequently directed on G+3 to continue clearing the farm complex from which fire had been received the previous day. The battalion scheme of maneuver was to first broadcast an Arabic psychological operations tape to the remaining Iraqi defenders, hoping to entice them to surrender, and then to reconnoiter the area. Remaining Iraqi vehicles that posed an immediate threat were to be destroyed by direct fire weapons. Company H, with TF Holmes in direct support, would then be used to sweep the compound to clear suspected Iraqi troops. The sweep would be supported by Company I as a reserve, as well as the 81mm mortar platoon. Once clear of any threat, combat engineers would be brought in to destroy any Iraqi equipment remaining in the compound. As TF Holmes and elements of the Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Platoon reconnoitered the area at dawn on 27 February, it immediately became clear that the complex contained a much larger number of vehicles than originally estimated, to include T-62 and T-72 tanks. However, the number of Iraqi troops in the area was still undetermined due to the large number of bunkers and buildings in the complex. At 0900 several visible remaining BMPs were destroyed, and Company H had started its sweep of the compound when 8th Marines halted the operation. The Regimental headquarters dispatched a platoon of M1A1 tanks from Company C, 4th Tank Battalion, and directed that the tanks lead the infantry sweep order to minimize possible friendly casualties. The employment of the tanks was preceded by another reconnaissance of the complex which revealed additional heretofore undiscovered Iraqi vehicles and tanks. At 1400, the tank platoon engaged at lease eight abandoned enemy tanks. The secondary explosion of a BMP at close range caused two friendly casualties to be sustained by the tank platoon; one WIA and one KIA. The operation was ceased and the battalion was again directed to be prepared to execute the MOUT mission in Al Shadadiyah, Kuwait the following day. The total Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) at the farm complex to this point was the destruction of 12 BMPs, 2 BRDMs, 9 T-62 tanks, 2 T-72 tanks, and one ammunition bunker. No Iraqi personnel casualties were assessed. In accordance with 8th Marine direction, 3/23 prepared to move further northeast to an assembly area in preparation for execution of the Al Shadadiyah MOUT operation, to be conducted on G+4. As the main element moved along the northern edge of a farm complex at 1700 on 27 February, the complex was to the battalion's right and a shanty town was to the battalion's left. The battalion was somewhat channelized in this area when the lead element of the main body, Company G, came under sniper and RPG fire. Company G immediately returned fire. At the same time, TF Holmes destroyed an ammunition truck located to the right and rear of the column and assessed 6 Iraqi KIAs. Company H, in the rear of the column, was immediately directed to conduct an infantry sweep of the area from which fire had been received; this was quickly done, with no enemy troops detected. As Company H swept along the column, the battalion remounted its trucks. No friendly casualties were sustained. The battalion continued its movement to the northeast and consolidated south of Al shadadiyah, almost due south of 1/8. At 0800 on 28 February 1991, G+4, offensive hostilities were officially suspended. Third Battalion, 23d Marines were directed by 8th Marines to return to the farm complex with an infantry force, sweep the area, and then move combat engineers in to destroy the balance of remaining enemy equipment. The concept of operations remained the same as G+3 except that two companies would sweep the compound on line. As preparations began to unfold it became clear that two-thirds of the complex that the battalion was clearing was not on friendly maps, therefore causing some degree of confusion with the use of supporting arms. Due to this confusion, the lateness of the hour, and the diminishing visibility due to inclement weather, the operation was postponed to 1 March 1991, G+5. On 1 March 1991, the compound was swept by infantry and no Iraqi personnel were detected.