- Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(1974)
Bilateral, unratified agreement between the US and USSR prohibiting
underground nuclear weapon tests with yield above 150 kilotons. Compliance
is monitored through the use of national technical means (e.g. seismic
stations outside the testing country). A protocol to the agreement
specified that tests take place strictly defined testing sites and that
upon ratification technical information be exchanged to improve
verification procedures.
Treaty between the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Underground Nuclear Tests
Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974
Ratified December 8, 1990
Entered into force December 11, 1990
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date
the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures
toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of
all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue
negotiations to this end,
Noting that the adoption of measures for the further limitation of
underground nuclear weapon tests would contribute to the achievement of
these objectives and would meet the interests of strengthening peace and
the further relaxation of international tension,
Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives and principles of the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry
out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150
kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, beginning March
31, 1976.
2. Each Party shall limit the number of its underground nuclear
weapon tests to a minimum.
3. The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward
achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground
nuclear weapon tests.
Article II
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means
of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the
generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical
means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of
this Treaty the Parties shall, as necessary, consult with each other,
make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries.
Article III
The provisions of this Treaty do not extend to underground nuclear
explosions carried out by the Parties for peaceful purposes. Underground
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an
agreement which is to be negotiated and concluded by the Parties at the
earliest possible time.
Article IV
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into
force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Article V
1. This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years.
Unless replaced earlier by an agreement in implementation of the
objectives specified in paragraph 3 of Article I of this Treaty, it
shall be extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party
notifies the other of its termination no later than six months prior to
the expiration of the Treaty. Before the expiration of this period the
Parties may, as necessary, hold consultations to consider the situation
relevant to the substance of this Treaty and to introduce possible
amendments to the text of the Treaty.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other
Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English
and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RICHARD NIXON
The President of the United States of America
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Having agreed to limit underground nuclear weapon tests,
Have agreed as follows:
1. For the Purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the
obligations of the Parties under the Treaty by national technical means,
the Parties shall, on the basis of reciprocity, exchange the following
data:
a. The geographic coordinates of the boundaries of each test site and
of the boundaries of the geophysically distinct testing areas therein.
b. Information on the geology of the testing areas of the sites
(the rock characteristics of geological formations and the basic
physical properties of the rock, i.e., density, seismic velocity,
water saturation, porosity and the depth of water table).
c. The geographic coordinates of underground nuclear weapon tests,
after they have been conducted.
d. Yield, date, time, depth and coordinates for two nuclear weapon
tests for calibration purposes from each geophysically distinct
testing area where underground nuclear weapon tests have been and are
to be conducted. In this connection the yield of such explosions for
calibration purposes should be as near as possible to the limit
defined in Article I of the Treaty and not less than one-tenth of that
limit. In the case of testing areas where data are not available on
two tests for calibration purposes, the data pertaining to one such
test shall be exchanged, if available, and the data pertaining to the
second test shall be exchanged as soon as possible after the second
test having a yield in the above-mentioned range. The provisions of
this Protocol shall not require the Parties to conduct tests solely
for calibration purposes.
2. The Parties agree that the exchange of data pursuant to subparagraphs
a, b, and d of paragraph 1 shall be carried out simultaneously with the
exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, as provided in
Article IV of the Treaty, having in mind that the Parties shall, on the
basis of reciprocity, afford each other the opportunity to familiarize
themselves with these data before the exchange of instruments of
ratification.
3. Should a Party specify a new test site or testing area after the
entry into force of the Treaty, the data called for by subparagraphs a
and b of paragraph 1 shall be transmitted to the other Party in advance
of use of that site or area. The data called for by subparagraph d of
paragraph 1 shall also be transmitted in advance of use of that site or
area if they are available; if they are not available, they shall be
transmitted as soon as possible after they have been obtained by the
transmitting Party.
4. The Parties agree that the test sites of each Party shall be
located at places under its jurisdiction or control and that all nuclear
weapon tests shall be conducted solely within the testing areas
specified in accordance with paragraph 1.
5. For the purposes of the Treaty, all underground nuclear explosions
at the specified test sites shall be considered nuclear weapon tests and
shall be subject to all the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear
weapon tests. The provisions of Article III of the Treaty apply to all
underground nuclear explosions conducted outside of the specified test
sites, and only to such explosions.
This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty.
DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RICHARD M. NIXON
The President of the United States of America
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU |
